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Abstract 
This thesis offers a theory of sustainable accountability informed by Vedic 
philosophy. Although Vedic philosophy is often described as the philosophy of 
ancient India, this thesis will explain how relative factors, such as time and place, 
do not exclude one from experiencing the taste of what is described as the 
ripened fruit of the tree that is the Vedic literatures. The implications the Vedas 
have for sustainability stem mainly from their alternative notions of the self and 
its needs. The Vedas hold that upon a correct evaluation of the needs of the self, 
an individual will be completely satisfied and will therefore not desire to live and 
consume in a way that is destructive to their surrounding environment and its 
inhabitants. Within the Vedic paradigm there are two main divisions of thought – 
the dualist and non-dualist schools of philosophy. Because they differ in their 
conceptions of the self, these schools differ markedly in their notions of 
accountability, welfare and theories of sustainability and social change. Within 
the social accounting literature, a non-dualist theory of sustainable accountability 
has been given by Saravanamuthu (2006), but a dualist opinion has not yet been 
presented. This thesis seeks to introduce dualist Vedic philosophy and its theory 
of sustainability, and describe how a system of accountability could be 
constructed upon such a philosophy. In the past, academic scholarship has 
frowned upon sacred forms of knowledge such as the Vedas, and has considered 
their claims to be unverifiable. Therefore this thesis also asserts, using arguments 
from the critical realist ontology, that sacred forms of knowledge such as the 
Vedas should be admissible in academic circles. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The term accountability, as described by Roberts and Scapens (1985), refers in 
its broadest sense to the giving and demanding of reasons for conduct. 
Accounting systems, they explain, are instead the rules and resources that are 
drawn upon in the practical application of accountability. Velayutham and Perera 
(1996), in turn, have observed that the specifics of a system of accountability will 
depend upon a society’s metaphysical conception of the self. They state:  
 
“… accounting is a socio-technical activity in which peoples’ values and 
patterns of thinking play an important part… differences [between Western and 
Eastern theories of management and accountability] are related to different 
metaphysical notions of the self and freedom, which provide the basis for the 
development of cultural values in a particular society, such as those identified by 
Hofstede (1980), and are central to the understanding of the nature and purpose 
of organisations and the role of accounting in society” (Velayutham and Perera, 
1996, p. 66). 
 
In rendering accounts, then, presupposed notions of the self determine whom one 
is accountable to, what one is accountable for, and what particulars are regarded 
as relevant to decision-making. Shearer (2002), for instance, explains that 
neoclassical economics regards individuals as self-interested. Because self-
interested behaviour is generally considered by neoclassical economics as 
welfare maximising behaviour (Gray, 2006), Shearer claims that mainstream 
accounting places no requirement on the corporate entity to recognise any 
reporting obligation other than the pursuance of its own interests. Thus, because 
of a particular conception of the self embedded in the neoclassical paradigm 
(self-interested), the accounting framework is configured a certain way 
(accountability only for self-interested behaviour). It follows, then, that in order 
to change the configurations of whom one should be accountable to, and what 
one should be accountable for, due consideration needs to be given to the 
underlying notions of the self in mainstream accountability.  
This thesis gives a theory of sustainable accountability informed by a 
Vedic conception of the self. Not very well known, and not very well understood 
in Western scholarship, Vedic philosophy has its roots in India, and is the largest 
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mass of philosophical knowledge descending from the ancient world (Rosen, 
2006). The Vedas give an extraordinarily detailed description of the self and its 
needs that has profound implications for disciplines such as accounting and 
economics. As Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2007) state, for instance, 
traditional Hinduism encouraged economic practices for the purposes of 
nourishing the body and the mind, as well as the soul. Other proponents of Vedic 
economics have also said that the Vedas advocate the pursuit of wealth in an 
ethical manner (Kanagasabapathi, 2007; Sharma and Talwar, 2004, 2005, 2007; 
Sihag, 2007), so as to satisfy material needs but not unlimited material wants 
(Biswas, 1998). Therefore, in light of calls for more ethical and ecological 
systems of accounting, a theory of accountability based upon the Vedic 
conception of the self has much to contribute, as Chakraborty and Chakraborty 
have implied: 
 
“The comprehensive approach of the ancient Hindu mind in identifying such an 
ensemble of economic functions is noteworthy. They wisely realised that the 
generation of wealth without proper allocation would only mean lopsided 
economic growth without social harmony. Hence, care was taken to channelize 
wealth for organic development of the society” (2007, p. 716).  
 
To date, few scholars have recognised the potential of the Vedic paradigm to 
inform social and ecological economics and accounting and Vedic philosophy 
remains relatively unknown to influential commentators, or, where it has been 
acknowledged, it is not yet taken seriously. Yet, as the above authors have 
implied, the Vedas give unique and practical insights to many significant issues 
such as sustainability, social welfare, responsibility for the other, social change, 
ethics and the interdependence of humans and the ecosystem. Therefore there is a 
gap in the literature that expands across many different subjects where the Vedas 
can provide valuable comment. As implied by Velayutham and Perera (1996), 
alternative forms of accountability begin with alternative conceptions of the self. 
Hence this thesis contributes to the sustainability literature by offering a theory 
of accountability based upon the Vedic conception of the self. 
Within the Vedic paradigm there are, broadly speaking, two divisions of 
thought – the dualist, or dvaitic schools of thought; and the non-dualist or 
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advaitic schools (Saravanamuthu, 2006, 2007). The differences arise from 
different interpretations of the Vedic literatures. Differences in thought also exist 
in other religious codes – to consider Islamic banking practices, for instance, 
different interpretations of the Quran play a significant role in how Islamic 
banking is conducted (Nathan and Ribiere, 2007). As a very brief summary, the 
non-dualist Vedic schools of thought assume no distinction between the self and 
the remainder of the universe, and thus they hold that everything is 
interconnected, or everything is one. According to non-dualist philosophy, the 
perception that one’s self is different from the universe is regarded as maya, or 
illusion. The dualist schools of philosophy, on the other hand, assert that there is 
a significant difference between the self and matter, and, in addition, there is also 
a distinction made between the self and the Supreme Person, in that both 
eternally maintain their own individual and personal existences. As will be seen, 
to refer to God as the Supreme Person is a more accurate rendering of the Vedic 
conception of God. In the Vedic literatures God is described as personal, and is 
called by many different names, with His principle name being Krishna. 
According to the dualist philosophy, then, maya – illusion – is to consider the 
self to be material in origin, and to be the Supreme Person. 
A non-dualist theory of accountability has been given by Saravanamuthu 
(2006, 2007) based upon the theorisations of Mohandas Gandhi, which are 
themselves located in non-dualist Vedic philosophy (Ghosh, 2007). However, 
given the differences between dualism and non-dualism, the non-dualist theory 
of accountability offered by Saravanamuthu is not representative of all Vedic 
philosophy. Because of their differences in conceptions of the self, the dualist 
and non-dualist schools differ markedly in their notions of accountability, 
welfare, and theories of sustainability and social change. Therefore this paper 
presents a theorisation of sustainable accountability from a dualist school of 
Vedic philosophy called Gaudīya-Vaisnavism. Although this philosophy has 
more in common with dualist philosophy than the non-dualist, it agrees with 
certain non-dualist claims as well. A more thorough description of the 
similarities and differences between dualism and non-dualism, and their 
implications for a Vedic theory of accountability is presented in Chapter Two. A 
comparison between the Vaisnava and non-dualist theorisations of 
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accountability, as described by Saravanamuthu (2006, 2007) is given in the 
eighth chapter. 
As this thesis explains a dualist conception of Vedic accountability, it 
must also describe the dualist opinion of the sacred secular divide that has 
received much attention in the accounting and religion literature. Several 
commentators have stated that accounting represents a profane activity at odds 
with religious values, and is therefore only externally used in religious 
organisations (Booth, 1993; Laughlin, 1988, 1990; Lightbody, 2000). Further 
studies, however, have revealed that accounting has often been used to support 
religious goals and practices, which suggests that for some religious institutions 
no division between the sacred and the secular exists (Irvine, 2005; Jacobs, 2005; 
Jacobs and Walker, 2004). These different positions will be located within a 
Vedic understanding of the sacred secular divide, alongside the Gaudīya-
Vaisnava perspective.  
 
Research Questions 
Saravanamuthu (2006, 2007) formulates a theory of accountability upon 
Gandhi’s theorisations for socio-political change, which are themselves located 
in the advaitic paradigm. Saravanamuthu’s developments of Gandhi’s paradigm 
are therefore taken as an embodiment of advaitic accountability, and thus they 
represent the necessary benchmark to compare the two accountings. As 
explained, because the dvaitic and advaitic schools differ in their conceptions of 
the self, their respective notions of welfare, ethics, and sustainability also differ. 
This thesis seeks to compare and evaluate the ability of each to provide a 
sustainable form of accounting. The first research question therefore becomes: 
 
1. What would be the significant features of a theory of accountability 
informed by dualist Vedic philosophy, as represented by Gaudīya-
Vaisnavism? 
 
A second research question then becomes: 
 
2. How does a dualist theory of accountability, represented by the 
Gaudīya-Vaisnava school of Vedic philosophy, differ to the non-
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dualist theory of the Ghandi-Vedic paradigm, as presented by 
Saravanamuthu (2006)? 
  
Outside of religion and philosophy departments, Vedic philosophy is exceedingly 
rare in Western scholarship. Indeed, secular orthodox and heterodox economics 
journals rarely publish papers exploring the relevance of religious scriptures, and 
there are few books explaining such issues (Beed and Beed, 2004). In the social 
accounting literature, McKernan and Kosmala (2007) comment that despite a 
recent expansion of interdisciplinary research, relatively few scholars have 
attempted to connect accounting and religion. The reason, claimed by McPhail, 
Gorringe and Grey (2004, 2005), is that religious or sacred forms of knowledge 
have, in the past, been frowned upon by academic scholarship as a legitimate 
form of knowledge because they lack any apparent falsifiability. McPhail et al. 
(2004) nonetheless claim that there is a growing awareness that modern and post-
modern critiques of theology, when applied reflexively back on themselves, 
show the claims of science and post-modernism to be no less spurious or 
arbitrary than those of religious belief systems. Oslington (2000) also shows that 
several well-respected philosophical positions have come to similar conclusions. 
This paper, in describing non-dualist Vedic philosophy and its theory of 
accountability, draws upon the latest spiritual developments of Roy Bhaskar 
(2000) in his philosophy of critical realism.  Elsewhere, authors have used 
critical realism to defend religious knowledge as academically acceptable and to 
cast doubt on positions sceptical of religious knowledge (Archer, Collier and 
Porpora, 2004).  Since this thesis will draw on Bhaskar’s spiritual developments 
of critical realism to defend the academic credibility of sacred forms of 
knowledge, particularly the Vedic teachings, the third research question 
becomes: 
 
3. What arguments can be presented from a critical realist position that 
will establish the academic credibility of sacred forms of knowledge, 
in particular Vedic philosophy? 
 
Using the arguments put forward by Archer et al. (2004), this thesis contributes 
to work begun by Oslington (2000) to establish sacred forms of knowledge as 
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academically acceptable. The arguments this thesis will add, however, are 
derived from critical realist ontology, and thus they strengthen the position that 
sacred forms of knowledge are admissible in rational debate. 
 
Methodology 
As mentioned above, within the dualist and non-dualist Vedic schools of thought 
there are further subdivisions. The dualist school adopted here is that of 
Gaudīya-Vaisnavism.2 It is selected because this school, or sampradāya, 
emphasises the necessity of adopting the specific mood required to understand 
Vedic teachings. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, the text that contains the essence of 
Vedic philosophy, Krishna explained to Arjuna the reasons why he should fight 
in the Battle of Kuruksetra. In the final verses, when Krishna asks Arjuna if he 
has understood all of His instructions, Arjuna replies that he has, and that he was 
prepared to fight (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 18.72-73). Therefore, in 
order to understand the Vedic texts and injunctions, one has to adopt the same 
mood that Arjuna had in the Bhagavad-Gītā. As Bhaktivedanta Svami states, this 
applies to any material situation: 
 
“If we want to take a particular medicine, then we have to follow the directions 
on the label. We cannot take the medicine according to our whim or the 
direction of a friend. It must be taken according to the directions written on the 
label or the directions given by a physician. Similarly, the Bhagavad-Gītā 
should be taken or accepted as it is directed by the speaker Himself. The speaker 
of the Bhagavad-Gītā is Lord Śrī Krsna” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, p. 3).3 
 
This mood is described by Krishna in the Gītā at the beginning of the fourth 
chapter, where Krishna tells Arjuna that he will understand the Vedas because he 
is bhakto ‘si me sakhā – Krishna’s friend and devotee. The exact verse reads: 
 
                                                 
2
 As explained in the second chapter, the Gaudīya-Vaisnava school accepts some tenets of both 
dualist and non-dualist Vedic philosophy. It is, however, more closely associated with dualist 
Vedic lines of thought, and therefore in this thesis it is also described as one of the dualist 
schools. 
 
3
 Due to there being different sized publications of the Bhagavad-Gītā As It Is, by A. C. 
Bhaktivedanta Svami, the page numbers to quotations may not always match up between copies.  
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sa evāyam mayā te ‘dya 
yogah proktah purātanah 
bhakto ‘si me sakhā ceti 
rahasyam hy etad uttamam 
 
“That very ancient science of the relationship with the Supreme is today told by 
Me to you because you are My devotee as well as My friend and therefore you 
can understand the transcendental mystery of this science” (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1989, verse 4.3). This qualification for understanding the Vedas is not 
limited to the Bhagavad-Gītā, but is inherent throughout all Vedic literatures. 
The last verse of the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad, for example, implies the same 
requirement: 
 
yasya deve parā bhaktir 
yathā deve tathā gurau 
tasyaite kathitā arthāh 
prakāśante mahātmanah 
 
“Only unto those great souls who have implicit faith in both the Lord and the 
spiritual master are all the imports of Vedic knowledge automatically revealed” 
(Śvetāśvatara Upanisad, verse 6.38, quoted in Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, p. 
361). Bhaktivedanta Svami therefore writes that one who is trying to understand 
the Bhagavad-Gītā should at least theoretically accept Śrī Krishna as the 
Supreme Person, and with that submissive spirit they can understand the 
Bhagavad-Gītā. As he states: 
 
“Bhagavad-Gītā should be taken up in a spirit of devotion. One should not think 
that he is equal to Krsna, nor should he think that Krsna is an ordinary 
personality or even a very great personality. Lord Śrī Krsna is the Supreme 
Personality of Godhead. So according to the statements of the Bhagavad-Gītā or 
the statements of Arjuna, the person who is trying to understand the Bhagavad-
Gītā, we should at least theoretically accept Śrī Krsna as the Supreme 
Personality of Godhead, and with that submissive spirit we can understand the 
Bhagavad-Gītā” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, p. 6).  
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Essentially, then, in order to understand the Vedas, a submissive attitude is 
required, but this does not imply that one should follow the Vedic injunctions 
blindly or without scrutiny. Indeed, up to that point in the Gītā, Arjuna had asked 
many questions of Krishna.  
In the social accounting literature, the notion that one must adopt the 
correct mood to understand the Vedas is absent, and non-dualist schools even 
suggest the contrary:  
 
“The [Bhagavad] Gita…the deeper you dive into it, the richer the meaning you 
get…With every age the import the words will carry new and deeper 
meanings…the seeker is at liberty to extract…any meaning he likes so as to 
enable him to enforce in his life the central teaching [of embracing 
responsibility for the other]” (Gandhi, 1961, p. 456 quoted in Saravanamuthu, 
2007, p. 38). 
 
Gandhi’s approach to the Bhagavad-Gītā illustrates a non-submissive attitude to 
understanding the Vedas. Rather than trying to understand the purpose for which 
the Bhagavad-Gītā was spoken, Gandhi attempts to use the philosophy of the 
Gītā to justify his motive of freeing India from British rule. Gandhi was heavily 
influenced by ideas of non-violent resistance put forward by the Russian novelist 
Tolstoy, who himself was a pacifist (Hellmon, 1994). Later, Gandhi employed 
similar notions of satyagraha and ahimsa in his political activism to free India 
from the British (Saravanamuthu, 2006). In the Bhagavad-Gītā, however, 
Krishna urges Arjuna to fight a fratricidal war, which was contradictory to 
Gandhi’s inclinations towards non-violent resistance. Therefore Gandhi was 
forced to claim that the Bhagavad-Gītā is simply an allegory that illustrates the 
inner war between good and evil that takes place in all humans. Thus, where the 
Bhagavad-Gītā reads dharma-ksetre kuru-ksetre (the place of pilgrimage at 
Kuruksetra) in the first verse (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 1.1), Gandhi 
interprets kuru-ksetre to mean this body, even though Kuruksetra is an actual 
place of pilgrimage in India that many thousands of people visit every year. As 
he states: 
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“Everything related to every hero in the Ramayana or Mahabharata I do not take 
literally… Nor do I regard Rama and Krishna as portrayed in the two poems as 
infallible beings. They reflect the thoughts and aspirations of their ages. Only an 
infallible person can do justice to the lives of infallible beings. One can, 
therefore, only take the spirit of these works for guidance only, the letter will 
smother one and stop all growth” (Gandhi, 2001, p. 47).  
 
Because Gandhi did not approach the Gītā with the same submissive spirit that 
Arjuna had, he could not understand its teachings. For instance, according to the 
Gītā, the title mahātma – which was conferred upon Gandhi – refers to one who 
is fully engaged in the service of God – not to one who strives for political 
independence (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 9.13). This thesis claims that 
the Gaudīya-Vaisnava school of philosophy adopts the correct method of 
understanding Vedic teachings as it most authentically represents the Vedas, and 
more faithfully uses them as a source than non-dualist works. As the only Vedic 
work on social accounting is in the non-dualist tradition it is important to 
establish a dualist Vedic approach.  
To compare both forms of Vedic accountability, this thesis must first 
describe Saravanamuthu’s (2006) developments of Gandhi’s advaitic paradigm, 
which acts as a benchmark for the comparison. Prior to this, however, it is 
necessary to give an introduction to Vedic philosophy itself, as some readers may 
not be well acquainted with the Vedas, or may harbour false conceptions of what 
is contained in them. Bhaskar’s spiritual developments of critical realism are 
used to describe non-dualist Vedic philosophy, as he explains and justifies 
advaitic Vedic thought in a way comparable with Western philosophy. It is 
therefore necessary to also describe the fundamental tenets of critical realism. 
Then Saravanamuthu’s non-dualist accountability is described and subsequently 
a dualist position and the comparison of the two accountings are given.  
Altogether this thesis has ten chapters. This first has been introductory – 
it has outlined the need for a dualist opinion of accountability and described the 
methodology underpinning this thesis. The second chapter briefly introduces 
Vedic philosophy and reviews the accountability literature relevant to a Vedic 
approach. Chapter Three describes the critical realist arguments for accepting the 
Vedas in rational discourse. The fourth chapter explains non-dualist 
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accountability drawing upon Saravanamuthu’s (2006) and Bhaskar’s (2000) 
explanations of advaitic Vedic philosophy. The fifth chapter describes dualist 
philosophy and the sixth and seventh describe a theory of accountability 
informed by such philosophy. This leaves the comparison for the eighth chapter, 
and the ninth examines the operational feasibility of dualist Vedic accountability. 
Finally, some concluding comments are made in Chapter Ten.  
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Chapter Two: Accountability and Vedic Philosophy 
Translated into English, the Sanskrit word Veda means knowledge. The term 
Vedic, then, refers to the literature and teachings of the Vedas. In contemporary 
social economics, the Vedas have been described as the ancient philosophy of 
India, and they are often referred to as the scriptures that provide the basis for the 
various branches of Hinduism (Biswas, 1998; Chakraborty and Chakraborty, 
2007). The Vedas, however, do not limit their applicability only to those born in 
a certain geographical location, or only to those who ascribe to the Hindu faith. 
The words Hindu and Hinduism are not found in any of the Vedic scriptures, and 
nor are such terms included in the Sanskrit language. The word Hindu is a 
descendent of the Indo-Iranian word sindhu, which, when translated into English, 
means river. The word sindhu was used to refer especially to the Indus River and 
the culture along its expansive valley. When Persian travellers returned to their 
homeland, having explored the Indian subcontinent, and subsequently mentioned 
the Sindhu River, the phonetic peculiarities of their native language changed the 
word Sindhu into Hindu. Due to this, the people of the Indus Valley became 
known as Hindus, which was slang for the people who live by the Sindhu River 
(Rosen, 2006). The word India also has its origins in the same river. Upon 
crossing the Sindhu River when invading the subcontinent in 325 BCE, 
Alexander the Great renamed the Sindhu Indus because it was easier for the 
Greek army to pronounce (Tigunait, 1983). The term later grew to refer to the 
entire subcontinent. Therefore both the terms Hindu and India have no 
connection with the intended scope of Vedas.  
Instead of limiting their applicability to the residence of a particular time 
or place, the Vedas see the entire human race as their intended audience (Druhl, 
Langstaff and Monson, 2001; Sharma and Talwar, 2007).4 Various theological 
commentators have presented views on economics and accounting from different 
religions on the strength that their respective faiths are exceptionally widespread. 
Liyanarachchi (2007), for instance, states that an estimated 360 million of the 
world’s population are Buddhist, and Beed and Beed (2004) cite that a third of 
                                                 
4
 One of the fundamental tenets of dualist Vedic philosophy is that the self, or the living entity, is 
not their material body. Gender is dependent only on the type of body the living entity inhabits, 
but the living entity itself is gender-neutral. Throughout the Bhagavad-Gītā, though, 
Bhaktivedanta Svami refers to the living entity as a ‘he’, and the same terminology is adopted in 
this thesis. 
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the world’s population claim Judeo-Christian allegiance. The dualist side of 
Vedic philosophy, however, does not make the same appeal to popularity as a 
justification for its significance to accounting – although it is possible to do so, as 
more than 600 million people in India alone identify themselves as Vaisnavas of 
some kind (Rosen, 2006). To justify its applicability to economics and 
accounting, dualism instead refers to the Vedic concept of sanātana-dharma, 
which translates into English to mean the eternal function of the living entity. The 
English word religion is slightly different from the Vedic concept of sanātana-
dharma. The word religion conveys the idea of faith, and faith may change. One 
can have faith in a particular doctrine, and he may change his faith and adopt 
another, but sanātana-dharma refers to that activity which is eternal, and cannot 
be changed. Dualist Vedic philosophy asserts that the sanātana-dharma, the 
eternal occupation of the living entity, is to render service: 
 
“… one friend serves another friend, the mother serves the son, the wife serves 
the husband, and the husband serves the wife and so on. … The politician 
presents his manifesto to the public to convince them of his capacity for service. 
The voters therefore give the politician their valuable votes, thinking that he will 
render valuable service to society. The shopkeeper serves the customer, and the 
artisan serves the capitalist. The capitalist serves the family, and the family 
serves the state in terms of the eternal capacity of the eternal living being” 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, p. 19). 
 
Finally, the living entity simply renders service to the desires of his own mind 
and senses, and thus there is no exception to this rendering of service. To render 
service, then, is the sanātana-dharma of the living entity. One may profess to 
belong to a certain faith with reference to a particular time and circumstance and 
thus claim to be a Hindu, a Muslim, a Christian, a Buddhist or an adherent of 
some other sect. A Hindu may change his faith to become a Muslim or a 
Christian, yet in all circumstances such change does not affect his eternal 
occupation of rendering service.  
Dualist Vedic philosophy, then, justifies the presentation of its theory of 
accountability as an opinion concerned with sanātana-dharma. As explained 
later, dualism asserts that if the living entity renders service to the Supreme 
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Person Whom he is a part of, then he will be most satisfied. Because all living 
entities render service regardless of their particular faith, dualist Vedic 
philosophy is non-sectarian, and thus dualist accountability can be applied across 
any peoples, regardless of their circumstantial designations. While some 
religious commentators appeal for a particular type of accountability for those 
who adhere to that particular faith (Lewis, 2001), dualist Vedic accountability is 
intended for the welfare of all. 
 
The Vedas 
If this thesis is to give a theory of accountability informed by dualist Vedic 
philosophy, then it is important to define which Vedic texts are being considered. 
This thesis makes allusion to the four original Vedic texts, the Rig-veda, Yajur-
veda, Sama-veda and Atharva-veda, and also includes reference to the Puranas 
and Itihasas. The Puranas and Itihasas are Vedic commentaries on historical 
events and are termed by the Chandogya Upanisad as “the Fifth Veda” 
(Chandogya Upanisad, 7.1.4, quoted in Devamrita Svami, 2002, p. 37). Their 
authority is affirmed with specific citations from the four Vedas and the 
Upanisads.5  
This thesis will refer especially to the Bhagavad-Gītā because it contains 
the essence of all Vedic knowledge (Rosen, 2006), and the Bhāgavata Purāna, 
“the most popular of the Puranas” (Mahadevan, 1954), also known as the 
Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam. The Bhagavad-Gītā is a philosophical discourse that took 
place immediately before the Battle of Kuruksetra, fifty centuries ago, in which 
the sons of the King Dhrtarāstra opposed their cousins, the Pāndava brothers. A 
leader of the Pandavas, Arjuna, upon feeling compassion for his countrymen and 
kinsmen whom he would soon have to fight, decided that it would be better to 
                                                 
5
 The Atharva-veda, for example, states:  
 
“The Rig, Sama, Yajur and Atharva-vedas manifested from the Supreme Lord along with the 
Puranas” (Atharva-veda, 11.7.24, quoted in Devamrita Svami, 2002, p. 37). 
 
The Brihad-aranyaka Upanisad (2.4.10) also makes a similar statement: 
 
“Just as a fire kindeled with wet fuel sends out clouds of smoke, so the Supreme God has breathed 
out the Rig-veda, the Yajur-veda, Sama-veda, Atharva-veda, Itihasa, Puranas, science of 
knowledge, mystic Upansads, succinct verses, codes elaborations and commentaries. He, indeed, 
breaths all these out” (Brihad-aranyaka Upanisad, 2.4.10, quoted in Devamrita Svami, 2002, p. 
37). 
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leave the field before the battle commenced. Arjuna, however, takes guidance 
from his charioteer, Whom the Gītā states is none other than bhagavān – the 
Supreme Person Himself. Their conversation forms the Bhagavad-Gītā, which, 
in English, means Song of God. As a chapter of the Mahābhārata, which is one 
of the Itihasas, the Gītā is a part of the Fifth Veda.  
Krishna-Dvaipāyana Vyāsa first put the Bhāgavata Purāna, or the 
Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, into writing approximately five thousand years ago, and it 
is therefore the natural commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra. Vedānta-sūtra, in 
English, means the conclusion of all Vedic knowledge and the Śrīmad-
Bhāgavatam is the natural commentary on this because Vyāsa also compiled the 
Vedānta-sūtra. Thus the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam is authoritative because it is the 
natural commentary on the conclusion of all the Vedas.6 Structured like a novel, 
the Bhāgavatam tells of the world’s history and gives accounts of the 
extraordinary activities of ancient Vedic kings and sages to illustrate Vedic codes 
of ethical and moral standards. This thesis will occasionally cite passages from 
the Bhāgavatam to illustrate principles relevant to a dualist Vedic theory of 
accountability. 
According to the Vedas, their origins extremely ancient. Chakraborty and 
Chakraborty (2007), for example, state that the Rig-Veda was recorded at least 
3000 BCE, making it the oldest sacred text in the world, and Saravanamuthu 
(2006) holds that the Vedas have been traced back to at least 5000 BCE. 
Generally in modern academia, however, it is considered that the beginnings of 
Vedic culture were sometime during 1,500 to 1,200 BCE, when Indo-Aryan 
tribes supposedly either invaded or migrated into the Indian subcontinent. It is 
commonly thought that the Vedas were written sometime after that. Sihag 
(2007), for instance, states that both Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra and the Mahābhārata 
were written during the second century BCE, and therefore he states that this 
period may be described as India’s Renaissance.  
Recent satellite evidence, however, has enabled the more recent dates 
ascribed to Vedas antiquity to be ruled out. The Vedic texts frequently mention 
an abnormally wide river named the Sarasvatī that flowed from the Himalayan 
                                                 
6
 Some non-dualist scholars argue that Vyāsa did not compile the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, but that it 
is a modern creation written by someone named Vopadeva. However there is reference to the 
Bhāgavatam in the oldest of the Purānas, and therefore the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam cannot be a 
modern creation (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, 1988). 
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Mountains to the sea. The Sarasvatī is the principle river mentioned in the Rig-
veda, which contains fifty references in forty-six hymns to her. The Sarasvatī 
also received extensive mention throughout many Vedic texts such as the 
Mahābhārata, the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam and the Padma Purāna. However, 
despite its frequent mention, the Sarasvatī is apparently no longer in existence. 
Recent satellite technology, though, has revealed the dried riverbed of the 
Sarasvati extending from the present Ghaggar River and flowing four miles wide 
in the region of India west of Delhi. Satellite and field study has determined that 
parts of the river began to dry up as early as 3000 BCE, and dates put its 
complete disappearance anywhere from 2500 to 1700 BCE (Devamrita Svami, 
2002). Furthermore, archaeologists have carbon-dated dwellings constructed on 
the dry riverbed itself and found they are carbon-14 dated at 3000 BCE 
(Francfort, 1992). Thus the Vedas, which refer extensively to the Sarasvati River, 
must have been written before it began to dry up, and therefore the dates 
suggested by Sihag (2007) that the Mahābhārata was written during the second 
century BCE cannot be accepted.  
The small amount of literature applying Vedic philosophy to accounting 
and economics illustrates how Vedic principles are still relevant today, and can 
provide a basis for establishing ethical principles. Biswas (1998), for instance, 
describes that the Vedas do permit economic development and wealth 
accumulation, though not as ends in themselves but as means to a higher end. 
Sharma and Talwar (2005) relate the Vedic emphasis on charity and sacrifice for 
others to corporate social responsibility, and they show how these Vedic 
premises would serve both the long-term interests of the wider community and 
the organisation itself. And Saravanamuthu (2006), whose work this thesis later 
examines in greater detail, describes how externalities may be incorporated into a 
more holistic form of sustainable accounting through the interconnectedness of 
the entire ecosystem, which is a non-dualist Vedic premise. The Arthaśāstra, 
written by Chanakya Pandit around 300 BCE, describes a Vedic social structure 
and its systems of economics and accounting. Several accounting historians have 
commented on the advanced ethical qualities of Chanakya’s system of 
accountability, and have drawn comparisons to their modern day equivalents 
(Matessich, 1998; Sihag, 2004, 2005). Thus, although it is thousands of years old 
and has generally not been significant in Western scholarship, commentators 
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have nonetheless asserted that Vedic philosophy has an important contribution to 
make in the social and environmental literature in accounting and economics.  
 
Accountability in Religious Organisations  
Several issues are raised by a dualist Vedic theory of accountability that other 
commentators have addressed, and thus a brief review of the accountability 
literature is given here. This review is concerned with specifying a model of 
accountability against which dualist and non-dualist theories may be evaluated in 
later chapters. The matter of the sacred secular divide is then addressed in the 
subsequent section.  
As mentioned in Chapter One, Roberts and Scapens defined 
accountability as the “giving and demanding of reasons for conduct” (1985, p. 
447).7 Investigating the differences between Eastern and Western theories of 
management and accountability, Velayutham and Perera (1996) found that the 
specific conduct to be accounted for will depend upon a society’s metaphysical 
conception of the self. As Roberts (1991) and others (Hines, 1988, 1989; Shearer, 
2002) have described, though, the act of being held to account also constructs 
and sharpens one’s sense of self and one’s actions. Hines (1988), for instance, 
explains that by selecting and reflecting only the materialist aspects of society, 
mainstream accounting effectively confines social consciousness to the 
materialist universe. Roberts similarly observes that “different forms of 
accountability produce very different senses of our self and our relation to 
others” (1991, p. 385). He suggests two forms of accountability that give 
different senses of the self that are relevant to this thesis: hierarchical and 
socialising.  
Roberts describes hierarchical forms of accountability, drawing on 
Foucault’s (1979) conception of disciplinary power, as those that give an 
individualising sense of self. Through institutionalised and invisible channels of 
disciplinary power, they create in those held accountable a mental absorption 
with the self and with how one is seen. Roberts (1991) suggests that alongside 
the individualism that hierarchical accountability produces, other possible 
                                                 
7
 Others have given similar definitions, such as Arrington and Francis (1993), who observe that 
accountability constitutes the economic subject as answerable – obligated to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of their actions to a community of others through the activity of giving accounts. 
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experiences of accountability are alive and flourishing that can produce a more 
rationally grounded consensus. These socialising forms of accountability also 
aim at confirming the self, but at the same time they openly acknowledge the 
interdependence of the self and the other. Socialising forms of accountability, 
Roberts (1991) claims, are characterised by a relative absence of asymmetries of 
power and are most effectively conducted in a face-to-face negotiation of 
significant organisational events. In contrast to hierarchical forms, socialising 
forms give rise to the unguarded flow of talk that draws one into a deeper and 
richer form of mutual engagement and reciprocal recognition. The result is a 
humanised experience of work where there is mutual understanding, consensus 
and acknowledgement of other.  
Laughlin (1996) elaborates on Roberts’ descriptions of hierarchical and 
socialising accountability by suggesting that an organisation’s style of 
accountability will depend upon the contextual relationship between the 
principals and agents of that organisation. Laughlin has similar terms for 
Robert’s forms of accountability –hierarchical accountability he calls contractual 
accountability, and socialising forms are termed communal accountability. 
Communal accountability occurs only in less formal relationships, where 
expectations over conduct and information demand and supply are less structured 
and defined. Contractual forms, on the other hand, exist in more formal 
relationships where expectations of action and information demand and supply 
are tightly defined and clearly specified. Laughlin’s explanation elaborates on 
specific contextual situations and attributes their differences to the potential for 
trust and value conflict between principals and agents. Where there is a high 
level of trust between parties the agent will fulfil the expectations of the 
principal, sophisticated and formal controls are not seen as so necessary. Where 
there is a low level of trust, the principal will take greater pains to exert control 
over the behaviour of the agent – which may lead to the use of more formal and 
contractual mechanisms for control by the principal. A similar scenario unfolds 
with reference to the potential for value conflict – where there is little potential, 
accountability is likely to be more communal, and where there is high potential, 
the principal is likely to employ more contractual forms of accountability.  
Such models illustrate the conventional notions of accountability 
dominant in economic theory and in law. Laughlin (1996) states that in both of 
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these disciplines it is considered unproblematic for the principal to make certain 
demands over the conduct of the agent because the principal has transferred the 
ownership of certain resources to that agent. Thus it may be said that in the 
conventional framework of accountability, if the use of resources is transferred to 
the agent, then the agent should meet the expectations of the principal, and the 
principal has the right to demand from them the reasons for actions taken. 
Implicit to this conventional notion of principal-agent accountability is the 
presumption of neoclassical economics that the collective societal good is best 
achieved by the pursuit of individual interests. Benston (1992), for example, who 
adopts this outlook, implies that only to the extent that incomplete ownership 
rights and market imperfections exist, will shareholder interests not serve the 
greater good. Thus the conventional view holds that in an ideal market situation, 
there are no supra-contractual obligations to be recognised on that part of the 
agents. 
 Laughlin (1996), however, questions this seemingly natural and 
fundamental right for principals to expect compliance from the agents. He 
describes specific circumstances where the rights and interests of economic 
principles should be overridden by the expectations and requirements of what he 
refers to as higher principals. In certain “caring professions”, Laughlin explains, 
there are higher principals who have hierarchical authority over the typical 
principal-agent relationship (1996, p. 233). Laughlin states that this is 
characteristic of religious organisations, where the relationship that the agent has 
with the divine higher principal is typecast as sacred and the relationship with 
the mundane principal is classified as secular or profane. He states: 
 
“… it is assumed that certain individuals (for our purposes the ‘agent’) have a 
clear view about what is important and central in the way of values and 
activities (which can by typecast as ‘sacred’) as well as what is treated as 
unimportant and peripheral (the ‘secular’ or the ‘profane’). Where what is 
deemed as ‘secular’ attempts to infiltrate, colonize or control the ‘sacred’, then 
this ‘secularization process’ must be resisted to prevent the sacred being 
compromised and perhaps obliterated” (1996, p. 232).  
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Laughlin asserts that it is not only in religious organisations where the 
hierarchical authority of higher principals can be applied, for in other caring 
professions, such as education, healthcare and other social services, there is the 
same underlying logic that the expectations of the resource-supplying principals 
will clash with the requirements and values of the agents. While such 
accountability may be relevant to other institutions of the caring professions, 
Laughlin (1996) gives an empirical analysis of the Church of England in order to 
demonstrate this. He identifies three different levels of principal-agent 
relationships where resources are provided for use (the parish levels, diocesan 
levels and the central levels). One finding that emerged was that all of the 
expectations attached to the transfer of resources to the agents were very ill-
defined by the principals. Accountability in the Church, Laughlin states, was 
communal, and reporting was ex-post and was directed only to issues concerning 
probity and legality. In all cases, agents were left to define their activities without 
explicit direction from the principals. In higher levels of the principal-agent 
relationship, principals were seen to provide administrative machinery for the 
unconditional provision of an adequate resource base for the work of the agents. 
Furthermore, Laughlin observed that there were intermediaries who would act as 
buffers between principals and agents, so as to prevent the former from affecting 
the latter’s conduct. While principals might have exerted some short-term 
pressures on agents regarding the use of resources, Laughlin states that in the 
final analysis they were seen to share the philosophy that agents should be 
protected from too much intrusion through making them more accountable: 
 
“… money passes between these bodes in the Church of England with little in 
the way of formal controls or expectations. It is an organisation where ‘high 
trust’ dominates and, despite much current murmuring coming from 
questionable financial investments by the Church Commissioners, is unlikely to 
change in the foreseeable future” (1996, p. 235). 
 
Agents in the Church of England could be entrusted with resources with few 
constraints over their actions because the entire organisation is familiar with the 
underlying philosophy that the agents need the “space and time” to discover the 
“will of God” (Laughlin, 1996, p. 236). As Laughlin describes: 
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“The absence of formal controls is made possible by all participants in the 
Church of England being aware of the underlying values which guide its 
working. The Church of England is founded on ‘sacred and secular’ principals. 
It has a clear hierarchical view about what is important and central and what is 
more secondary. It is the foundational example of Eliade’s model of sacristy. 
God is the ‘principal’, to those who adhere to this value system, before whom all 
participants must look for guidance and direction. Institutionally this includes 
setting aside certain individuals (primarily the clergy) to be the mediators for 
understanding the wishes of God. They need to be free – ‘autonomous’ using 
professional jargon – to perform the function in the way that they deem 
appropriate” (1996, p. 235). 
 
Under more contractual forms of accountability, the agents within the Church of 
England would have been hampered in their work because the principals did not 
possess the knowledge required to discover the will of God, or they might have 
held conflicting interests – thus accountability in the Church was communal. 
Outside of the Church’s example, though, there are situations where agents 
within organisations are held accountable to a higher principal through the use of 
accountability that is more contractual in nature. Islamic accountability, 
described in greater detail in later chapters, is one instance of this. Here it will 
suffice to say that such accountability is often contractual in nature, for in Islam, 
it is not simply religious organisations and caring professions that are held 
accountable to higher principals, but all organisations. Many Islamic 
commentators confirm this: 
 
“Accountability to God and the notion of people having an account book with 
God are central tenets and presumptions of Islam … Several commentators 
indeed stress that there is a strong emphasis on accountability in Islam (Omar 
Naseef, 1998; Lewis, 2001; Maali et al., 2003)” (Kamla, Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2006, p. 257). 
 
It was seen from Laughlin’s (1996) empirical analysis of the Church of England 
that within caring professions, agents have a special interest and specific 
knowledge of how to satisfy the higher principal; and thus they are given more 
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freedom in the use of resources. Islamic accountability, however, is not limited 
solely to the caring professions, but is applicable to all Muslims and is used to 
ensure that Islamic injunctions are complied with by commercial organisations. It 
is not assumed that all agents of the private sector are endowed with the specific 
knowledge of how to satisfy God, the higher principal, and nor is it assumed that 
they will all act simply with that intent. As Kamla et al. state: 
 
“In point of principle, it would be reasonable to suggest at least that to the extent 
Islam comes to terms with capitalism it places little or no emphasis on the 
maximisation of profit (or shareholder wealth) – and specifically sees greed or 
tamma as a negative value to be avoided, while moderation (iqtisad) is seen as a 
positive value (Lewis, 2001, p. 108; see Rahman, 1994) – and substantive 
emphasis on the need to satisfy constraints reflective of Islamic principles in the 
context of any profit orientation” (2006, p. 253).  
 
The specifics of such contractual accountability are not delineated in the same 
fashion, though, as in the conventional accountability relationship that exists 
solely between the principal and the agent. As Lewis (2001) describes, specific 
boards well versed in the injunctions of the Quran and the Sharia decide the 
requirements of Islamic banking and accountability. This contractual feature of 
accountability is to ensure compliance with Islamic injunctions by agents who 
are not proficient in such matters. 
Islamic accountability advocates that agents outside of religious 
organisations should have obligations extending beyond those to the immediate 
resource-supplying principal, and this has also been suggested in the 
accountability literature for non-religious business organisations. Shearer (2002), 
for example, states that to achieve an ethically adequate accountability of 
economic entities, systems of account must be more responsive to the other.8 
Shearer describes that when economic entities render accounts of themselves in 
economic terms, the obligations of the entity with respect to the broader 
community depend upon the specific conceptions of subjectivity and 
                                                 
8
 Other authors have also suggested, in various ways, that economic entities have a supra-
contractual obligation to some community of others. See, for example, Cooper (1992), Gray 
(1992), Henderson (1991), Gallhofer and Haslam (1996, 1997), Lehman (1995, 1999), Lovell 
(1995), Schweiker (1993) and Tinker, Lehman and Neimark (1991). 
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intersubjectivity instantiated by economic discourse of neoclassical economics 
and its theory of individual choice. Therein it is held that the value of an object 
does not reside in the good itself, but rather in that good’s relationship to the 
satisfaction of human desire. Thus, in neoclassical economics, the value of an 
object is determined by the desire of the economic subject. At this point, Shearer 
(2002) claims that to desire the other for the fulfillment of what is lacking in 
one’s own subjectivity is to turn the other to one’s own purposes – essentially 
making the other an object of satisfaction in relation to the desiring self. Hence 
neoclassical economics holds that all value, even the value of supposedly selfless 
behavior, is governed by self-interest. This, Shearer states, restricts how 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity are experienced and, thus, also restricts the 
scope of the economic entity’s responsibility. 
Furthermore, within neoclassical economics it is held that self-interested 
behaviour, owing to the theory of the invisible hand, produces the greatest 
common good. Within economic discourse, then, ‘ethical’ behavior is simply that 
which, while it benefits others, ultimately yields a net long-term benefit to the 
individual engaged in the behavior. Consequently, within economic discourse, 
each individual is properly held accountable only for the pursuit of his own 
private good (Shearer, 2002). Following Schweiker (1993), Shearer states that to 
hold economic actors accountable in exclusively self-interested terms contradicts 
the moral identity enacted in the practice of giving an account. The latter will 
ideally render the agent accountable to some moral community whose values and 
beliefs will serve to judge his intentions, actions and outcomes. On these 
grounds, and the basis of globally increasing social and environmental 
degradation, Shearer advocates that systems of accountability not limited to those 
in the caring professions must be made more responsive to the other. 
Thus it has been seen that, for several reasons, agents have obligations to 
those other than the resource-providing principal. In the Church of England, 
Laughlin (1996) showed that accountability to higher principals overrode 
obligations to the mundane principal but, due to the specific knowledge of the 
agents, accountability was structured as communal. Islamic accountability 
demonstrated how the principal-agent accountability could be contractual, even 
when obligations to a higher principal were recognised, and Shearer (2002) has 
argued that to fulfill the moral identity enacted in the practice of giving an 
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account, economic entities must be made accountable to a wider community of 
others than is currently possible under the neoclassical economic model, where 
one is held accountable only for self-interested behavior. These models will be 
used in later chapters to evaluate the dualist and non-dualist theories of 
sustainable accountability.  
 
Vedic Philosophy and the Sacred Secular Divide 
As explained in the first chapter, Vedic philosophy can be divided into two 
factions – the dualists and the non-dualists. The Vedic school used to represent 
dualist philosophy in this thesis is the Gaudīya-Vaisnava school, though this does 
not represent a pure dualist opinion. A pure non-dualist opinion is one of 
monism, where God, living entities and matter are all regarded as one, and any 
apparent difference or individuality is held to be a product of avidya, ignorance, 
or maya, illusion (Bhaskar, 2000). A pure dualist opinion, on the other hand, is 
where God, living entities and matter are regarded as completely separate from 
one another. Pure dualism is found in strands of Christian philosophy, where man 
is sometimes regarded as being unable to know God while in material existence. 
As McKernan and Kosmala, writing from the Christian perspective, state: 
 
“We accept that religious belief is generally not open to conformation or 
refutation through empirical evidence, the kind of evidence that can command 
intersubjective agreement in science, and we celebrate its withdrawal from what 
Rorty (2005, p. 36) calls the “epistemic arena”” (2007, p. 729). 
 
A particular religion’s classification as dualist or non-dualist will determine its 
position on what is known in accounting and religious circles as the sacred 
secular divide. Within the literature on accounting and religion, there has been 
considerable discussion of the supposedly secular practice of accounting in the 
sacred mission of churches and religious institutions. Commentators have termed 
this debate the sacred secular divide. It has been seen that different religions offer 
a range of opinions on whether accounting is a secular practice or not. Some 
consider that when it is engaged for a spiritual purpose, the activity of accounting 
itself becomes sacred. Occasionally, even within the same religion, there are 
contradicting perspectives. Amongst Christian commentators, for instance, the 
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sacred secular divide has been seen as an absolute standard governing all 
religious organisations (Laughlin, 1988); as non-existent (Irvine, 2005); and 
continuum rather than a set of absolute and opposing poles (Jacobs, 2005). 
Islamic opinions are less divided, with virtually all commentators claiming that 
Islamic injunctions govern both the sacred and secular aspects of life, and 
therefore they hold no barrier to accounting executing a sacred purpose (Kamla 
et al., 2006; Lewis, 2001; Pomeranz, 1997). The Vedas offer a unique 
understanding and contribution because they hold that how a religious 
philosophy sees the secular in relation to the divine will depend upon its location 
on the dualist and non-dualist spectrum. This section will thus consider the 
divide in the light of Vedic philosophy and describe the Gaudīya-Vaisnava 
position with respect to accounting and other secular activities.  
The notion of a division between the sacred and secular activities of a 
religious organisation was introduced into the accounting literature through 
Laughlin’s (1988) seminal study of the Church of England, where he suggested 
that accounting embodies a secular aspect contrary to the sacred values and 
orientation of religious organisations. Laughlin has maintained this suggestion in 
further studies (Laughlin, 1990), and other commentators have adopted this line 
of thought (Booth, 1993; Lightbody, 2000). The contrary has been proposed as 
well, though, with Kreander, McPhail and Molyneaux (2004), for instance, 
suggesting that because accounting cannot but be saturated with moral values 
(Arrington and Francis, 1993), it may be infused with theological values too. 
Others have made similar assertions (Faircloth, 1988; Irvine, 2005; Jacobs and 
Walker, 2004; Swanson and Gardner, 1986). While these opinions of the sacred 
secular divide represent polar opposites, Jacobs (2005) has suggested that the 
sacred and profane are better understood as two extreme points along a spectrum 
of possible experience rather than as binary conditions. 
As explained, non-dualist philosophy claims that everything is one, and 
thus there is no difference between God and living entities. The perception of any 
such difference, Bhaskar (2000) states, is the product of maya, illusion, and 
avidya, ignorance. The pure dualist position, on the other hand, holds that God, 
the living entities and matter are fundamentally different. The sacred secular 
divide, then, is a product of thinking aligned with pure dualist thought – that the 
sacred and the secular are fundamentally different and the secular cannot be 
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dovetailed in the service of the divine. This is evident in Laughlin’s (1988) 
references to Durkheim (1976) when claiming that accounting used in the 
Church of England to evaluate and determine behaviour was seen as “an 
unhealthy intrusion” (1988, p. 23). When Church commissioners did use 
accounting information, it was used more for accountability than decision-
making. Laughlin thus concludes that accounting systems could be legitimate 
aids for resourcing activities of the Church but otherwise could not be a part of 
the Church’s sacred agenda, “and should not interfere with the more important 
spiritual endeavours of the Church of England” (Laughlin, 1988, p. 38). Drawing 
on Durkheim (1976), Laughlin presented this sacred secular divide as universal 
to all religions: 
 
“All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common 
characteristic: they presume a classification of all the things, real or ideal, of 
which men think, into two distinct terms which are translated well enough by 
the words profane and sacred… This division of the world into two domains, 
one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive 
trait of all religious thought” (Durkheim, 1976, p. 37, quoted in Laughlin, 1988, 
p. 24).  
 
From Laughlin’s analysis (1988), then, it is evident that notions of the sacred 
secular divide spring from a close alignment with pure dualist thought, where 
there is a clear distinction between God, living entities and matter. In more pure 
forms of dualism, secular activities such as accounting are generally not regarded 
as compatible with the sacred, as Jacobs explains:  
 
“This sacred-secular dualism, the case that the secular is secondary, while the 
sacred is dominant and the perception that accounting will necessarily form part 
of the secular, underlie Booth’s (1993) research framework. While Booth (1993, 
p. 58) acknowledged that the “sacred cannot be completely separated from the 
secular” and that the “... role of religious beliefs within the framework… is not 
proposed as a simple deterministic casual factor”, this is in-effect what has 
happened. While the possibility of the alternative is present in both Laughlin 
(1988, 1990) and Booth (1993) it is too easy to read an a priori structuralist 
dualism. The world is divided into two parts, the sacred and the secular. We 
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know that accounting is part of the secular and the “legitimate” part of the 
Church is part of the sacred. Therefore, the research agenda is to work out how 
this sacred-secular divide operates in Churches and religious organisations” 
(2005, p. 191). 
 
While recognising the contributions of Laughlin and Booth, Jacobs (2005) 
showed in his investigations of the Church of Scotland that not all Christianity is 
representative of pure dualism. Jacobs refers to the writings of John Wesley, who 
encouraged Christians to develop personal accountability to gain all they could, 
save all they could, and give all they could to God – effectively using personal 
accountability for a sacred purpose (Wesley, 1956). Other Christian 
commentators have also documented the use of accounting for sacred purposes – 
Irvine (2005) studied how a local church adopted accounting to further the 
church’s sacred mission, and Jacobs and Walker (2004) found that Iona 
(Christian) community ministers used accounting systems to monitor and 
evaluate the use of their time and to encourage the spiritual practices of 
congregation members.  
Jacobs (2005), then, rather than presenting the sacred secular divide as 
two absolute and opposite poles, drew on Studstill (2000) who saw the sacred 
and the secular as two extreme points along a spectrum. At the non-dualist end of 
this spectrum, Saravanamuthu (2006) has presented an advaitic conception of 
sustainable accountability based on the oneness of the entire ecosystem, which, 
she states, is more conducive to achieving sustainable outcomes than Judeo-
Christian models because it does not dichotomise humans from nature, unlike 
Christian models that divide the sacred and the profane. Evidently, this is the 
monist perspective of non-dualist thought. Within the current accounting and 
religion literature, then, it is possible to observe both the pure dualist and monist 
philosophies and their views of incorporating secular practices like accounting.  
The Gaudīya-Vaisnava position on the sacred secular divide is similar to 
that presented by Jacobs (2005) and Studstill (2000), because it incorporates both 
dualist and non-dualist tenets. This is possible because Gaudīya-Vaisnavism 
advances the philosophy of acintya-bhedābheda-tattva: the assertion that 
everything is simultaneously one with and different from everything else. An 
ordinary, mundane perception finds it acintya – impossible to conceive how 
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everything, including God, can be simultaneously one and different. Acintya-
bhedābheda-tattva, however, can be explained thus. The Vedas assert that God is 
janmādy asya yato, the source of all creation, maintenance and destruction 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, verse 1.1.1). As the source of creation, all verities 
of energy are non-different from God. A simple example is that golden 
ornaments of different shapes and sizes remain non-different from the stock of 
gold they originated from. Similarly, the manifested universe remains non-
different to God because He is the source of its creation. It is on this assertion 
that non-dualist philosophers conclude that everything is one, and that man is 
therefore God, which is the essential thesis of Bhaskar (2000) in From East to 
West. Gaudīya-Vaisnavism, however, states that although everything is non-
different from God, one should not therefore conclude that the Supreme has lost 
His individual and personal existence. Krishna refutes this impersonalism in the 
Bhagavad-Gītā, stating: 
 
mayā tatam idam sarvam 
jagad avyakta-mūrtinā 
mat-sthāni sarva-bhūtāni 
na cāham tesv avasthitah 
 
na ca mat-stāni bhūtāni 
paśya me yogam aiśvaram 
bhūta-bhrn na ca bhūta-stho 
mamātma bhūta-bhāvanah 
 
“By Me, in My unmanifested form, this entire universe is pervaded. All beings 
are in Me, but I am not in them. And yet everything that is created does not rest 
in Me. Behold My mystic opulence! Although I am the very maintainer of all 
living entities and although I am everywhere, I am not part of this cosmic 
manifestation, for My Self is the very source of creation.” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 
1989, verse 9.4-5). These verses explain that by expanding His various energies, 
Krishna is not depleted, and thus He states that although He is present 
everywhere in His unmanifested form, He still remains aloof. This is 
simultaneous oneness and non-difference that is acintya – inconceivable to 
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ordinary sense perception. A simple example is that a successful chief executive 
may direct many departments of a business enterprise, and thus all departments 
rest on his order. If someone says that the entire business rests on such a person, 
it does not mean that the person is maintaining all the factories and offices on his 
head. Nor does one expect to find the chief executive personally present in each 
department. Rather, it is understood that by his actions or his energetic 
expansion, the entire business runs without interruption. Similarly, although 
Krishna’s energies comprise and maintain the entire universe, Krishna does not 
lose His individuality or personality. Bhaktivedanta Svami explains this point 
further: 
 
“The Lord says that everything is resting on Him. … This should not be 
misunderstood. The Lord is not directly concerned with the maintenance and 
sustenance of this material manifestation. Sometimes we see a picture of Atlas 
holding the globe on his shoulders; he seems to be very tired, holding this great 
earthly planet. Such an image should not be entertained in connection with 
Krishna’s upholding this created universe. He says that although everything is 
resting on Him, He is aloof. The planetary systems are floating in space, and this 
space is the energy of the Supreme Lord. But He is different from space. He is 
differently situated. Therefore the Lord says, “Although they are situated on My 
inconceivable energy, as the Supreme Personality of Godhead I am aloof from 
them.” This is the inconceivable opulence of the Lord” (1989, pp. 459-460). 
 
Thus the philosophy of acintya-bhedābheda-tattva holds that God can be 
simultaneously one with and different from all His various energies. This 
philosophy has profound implications for a Vedic theory of accountability for if 
everything is the energy of God, then everything can be used in His service, 
accounting included. It also carries implications for the nature of the self, as 
different from matter and as a part of God, which will be described in later 
chapters. Thus far, though, it can be stated that by incorporating tenets of both 
dualism and non-dualism, Gaudīya-Vaisnavism advocates the use of the secular 
to serve the Supreme, just as when an iron rod is placed in a fire it will become 
heated and will take on the properties of fire.  
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Chapter Three: The Vedas and Western Scholarship 
More than a decade ago, a dialogue between accounting and the sacred would 
have been impossible in academia due to the over-bearing deference given to 
secular materialism (McPhail et al. 2004, Oslington, 2000). Therefore, the 
handful of papers that adopt a Vedic lens have only barely established the Vedic 
paradigm as a genuine body of knowledge. Saravanamuthu (2006), for instance, 
relates one reviewer’s response to her work, in which the Gandhi-Vedic 
paradigm she adopts was described as “noble”, but doubtful as to whether it 
could meet current problems of “feeding 6 billion people, providing jobs and 
economic development, which often brings mankind into conflict with nature” 
(anonymous reviewer, quoted in Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 292). Devamrita 
Svami makes a similar observation: 
 
“The Western world has known about the revolutionary contents of the Vedas 
for almost two centuries, but rare is the Western Indology expert who considers 
the texts a reasonable documentation of human civilisation. Even Indian 
scholars have been trained to feel apologetic or disdainful about what has come 
to be viewed as the Vedas’ gross exaggerations and fantasies concerning the 
ancients. A. L. Basham, who wrote the popular classic The Wonder that Was 
India [1954], is one of many” (2002, p. 155). 
 
Thus Vedic philosophy still does not receive the same consideration given to 
secular forms of knowledge, or even that given to other sacred forms. As 
described by Nathan and Ribiere (2007), Islamic banks, which derive their 
injunctions from Islamic scriptures, now operate in almost seventy-five 
countries, and the industry has a market estimated at US$250-300 billion. As the 
ninth chapter will describe, much work remains to establish the Vedas as a 
genuine discipline of knowledge. 
McPhail et al. (2004) point out that when modern and post-modern 
critiques of theology are applied reflexively back on themselves, the claims of 
science and post-modernism are shown to be no less spurious or arbitrary than 
those made by the world’s different religions. Millbank (1990), for instance, 
claims that modern and post-modern critiques have often tried to undercut claims 
made by religions by emphasising their historical and linguistic nature. He states: 
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“Theology has rightly become aware of the (absolute) degree to which it is a 
contingent historical construct emerging from, and reacting back upon, 
particular social practices conjoined with particular semiotic and figural 
codings” (Millbank, 1990, p. 2, quoted in Oslington, 2000, p. 34).  
 
Millbank (1990), however, also points out that modern and post-modern social 
sciences are subject to the same historical and linguistic criticisms that they pitch 
at theology. Millbank, though, does not attempt to restore any pre-modern 
Christian position and he completely accepts descriptions of theology as merely 
historical and linguistic. This thesis, however, endeavours to establish from a 
critical realist position that sacred forms of knowledge should be recognised for 
the religious experiences that they can generate in practitioners. Recently 
theologians have employed critical realism to transcend the post-modern 
impasse. This thesis employs the critical realist philosophy of Archer et al. 
(2004) to establish parity between sacred and secular forms of knowledge and 
challenge tendencies for atheism not having to present its credentials in 
academia, whereas sacred forms of knowledge must. These arguments originate 
from Bhaskar’s spiritual developments of the philosophy of critical realism, the 
basic tenets of which are outlined below.  
 
Critical Realism  
The term critical realism is associated with the earlier work of Roy Bhaskar. In 
his first book, A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar (1975) defended a position 
he called transcendental realism, which referred to the ontology derived from his 
analysis of scientific practices. Bhaskar explained that for science to be possible, 
the world must exist in a certain way, and, given how scientific training and 
experimentation take place, an ontological reality independent of human 
knowledge constructions is necessary. In 1979, Bhaskar argued for an extension 
of transcendental realism to the social sciences in The Possibility of Naturalism, 
calling its stance critical naturalism. Since then, readers have combined the two 
terms to produce the name critical realism. In a later publication, Dialectic: The 
Pulse of Freedom, Bhaskar (1993) changed the terminology to transcendental 
dialectical critical realism. In his latest publication, From East to West: The 
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Odyssey of a Soul, Bhaskar (2000) developed his dialectic critical realism into a 
philosophy of universal self-realisation, claiming that it does not involve any 
rejection of existing critical realist positions.  
Archer et als’ (2004) arguments for including debates on God’s existence 
in academic scholarship are based on Bhaskar’s (1975) transcendental realism 
and, to a lesser extent, his latest, more spiritual developments. This section, then, 
concentrates on describing Bhaskar’s transcendental realism. The philosophy of 
critical realism, however, is a “broad church” – there are many differences in 
thought that are disputed amongst intellectuals who might be labelled as critical 
realists (Potter and Lopez, 2001, p. 15). This thesis does not consider all 
variations of the philosophy, but seeks only to explain its fundamentals in order 
to underpin subsequent arguments that the Vedic teachings are a legitimate form 
of knowledge. The critical realist paradigm does possess some core propositions 
(Potter and Lopez, 2001), which this thesis describes. 
In A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar (1975) locates transcendental 
realism within a general history of the Western philosophy of science. Bhaskar 
identifies the classical empiricist position presented by Hume as the first 
philosophical reference point to compare transcendental realism with. The 
essential characteristic of empiricism that Bhaskar identifies is that Hume 
considered the ultimate objects of knowledge to be atomistic events. The second 
broad philosophical position Bhaskar identifies is Kant’s transcendental idealism. 
Here objects of knowledge are artificial constructs of the mind and are therefore 
not independent of men or human activity. According to transcendental idealism, 
then, the natural world is a construction of the human mind or, in some modern 
versions, of the scientific community.  
In contrast, transcendental realism regards objects of knowledge as 
“structures and mechanisms that generate phenomena” (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 19) – 
objects of knowledge are neither the phenomena nor the events that they are for 
empiricism; nor are they human constructs imposed upon phenomena, as 
suggested by idealism. Instead, they are held to be structures and causal laws that 
endure and operate independently of human knowledge, human experience and 
the conditions that allow observers access to them. In contrast to empiricism, 
objects of knowledge are structures, not events; in contrast to idealism, they are 
intransitive – independent of human activity. This explicates Bhaskar’s 
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transcendental as opposed to empirical realism. The entities that the 
transcendental realist is concerned with are the objects of scientific discovery and 
investigation, such as causal laws, and not the events produced by experiments 
(Bhaskar, 1975). For the transcendental realist, then, science is not an 
epiphenomenon of nature as it is with empiricism, and nor is it a product of man 
as according to idealism. As Philip summarises: 
 
“The basic framework which transcendental realism sets out to establish begins 
by arguing that the real is, the real world exists independently of our experience; 
our knowledge of the world is thus provided by means of experience; while for 
empiricists, experience contains all there is to reality – experience constitutes 
what is. Transcendental realism argues that experience is merely the appearance 
of independently existing objects – perceived objects without knowing what in 
fact they are. Knowledge constitutes accounts of things, structures, mechanisms 
etc., rendering knowledge of objects to the category of conjecture or hypothesis, 
that is, our knowledge of the world is rendered fallible” (1995, p. 28). 
 
Bhaskar reaches this transcendental realist position by posing the question: what 
must reality be like for science to be possible? He states that it is not necessary 
that science occurs, but, given that it does, it is necessary that the world is a 
certain way (Bhaskar, 1975). Hence the transcendental realist asserts that the 
structured nature of the world can be established by philosophical argument: 
 
“For it is not the fact that science occurs that gives the world a structure such 
that it can be known by men. Rather, it is the fact that the world has such a 
structure that makes science, whether or not it actually occurs, possible. That is 
to say, it is not the character of science that imposes a determinate pattern or 
order on the world; but the order of the world that, under certain conditions, 
makes possible the cluster of activities that we call ‘science’” (Bhaskar, 1975, p. 
23).  
 
To establish this, Bhaskar (1975) argues that the intelligibility of perception and 
experimental activity in science both presuppose the intransitive and structured 
character of objects of knowledge. Bhaskar points out that the epistemic 
significance and very meaning of perception implies the independent existence 
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of objects of knowledge. The possibility of scientific change and criticism, as 
well as the necessity for scientific training, takes for granted the intransitivity of 
real objects. As Bhaskar states, if the changing experience of objects is to be 
possible, then it follows that objects must have a distinct being in time and space 
from the experiences of which they are objects:  
 
“For Kepler to see the rim of the earth drop away, while Tacho Brahe watches 
the sun rise, we must suppose that there is something that they both see (in 
different ways). Similarly when modern sailors refer to what ancient mariners 
called a sea-serpent as a school of porpoises, we must suppose that there is 
something which they are describing in different ways” (1975, p. 24). 
 
If objects of knowledge are distinct from experiences of them as objects, then it 
can be claimed that events and momentary states do not exhaust the objects of 
perception, and that events are categorically independent of experiences. As 
Bhaskar describes, then, there could be a world of events without experiences. 
Given the possibility of a world without perceptions, there is no reason why there 
should not be events in a world containing beings capable of perception that 
otherwise go unperceived, and, given current human capacities and 
qualifications, are unperceivable. Even a superficial review of the history of 
science will show events never imagined, of which theoretical, and sometimes 
empirical, knowledge is eventually achieved (Bhaskar, 1975). These 
transcendental arguments form the basis for Bhaskar’s (2000) more recent claims 
for the existence and perception of God. 
Bhaskar supports his arguments for transcendental realism with an 
analysis of experimental activity. In empiricist ontology, a causal law is regarded 
as a constant conjunction of perceived events. An experiment that artificially 
constructs a controlled environment is necessary for such a conjunction of 
events, for the events would not be forthcoming without it. The theory 
underlying such experimentation is that by bringing about a particular 
conjunction of events in an artificial environment, one will find out what the 
world is like outside of such an environment. This belief, however, presupposes 
that scientists actively induce regularities, not that they produce the causes of 
such regularities. If experimenters were thought to produce not just regular 
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conjunctions but also the laws governing these, then such laws could not be 
expected to hold outside of the experimental settings (Groff, 2004). Thus, as 
Bhaskar (1975) states, the transcendental realist holds that causal laws, instead of 
being the constant conjunction of events produced via experimentation, are 
categorically independent of that sequence of events. The scientist conducting 
the experiment is the causal agent of the sequence of events but not the agent of 
the causal law identified from the sequence of events due to the controlled 
conditions of the experiment. As Bhaskar describes: 
 
“It lies within the power of every reasonably intelligent schoolboy or moderately 
clumsy research worker to upset the results of even the best-designed 
experiment, but we do not thereby suppose they have the power to overturn the 
laws of nature. I can quite easily affect any sequence of events designed to test 
say Coulomb’s or Guy-Lussac’s law; but I have no more power over the 
relationships the laws describe than the men who discovered them had. In short, 
laws cannot be the regularities that constitute their empirical grounds” (1975, 
pp. 25-26).  
 
Given this categorical independence of causal laws, it is possible to hold that 
laws continue to operate in open systems, where no constant conjunction of 
events prevails. This categorical independence of causal laws forms another 
premise upon which Bhaskar (2000) argues for the existence of God.  
 The intelligibility of sensory perception and experimental activity, then, 
both presuppose the intransitive nature of the objects of scientific knowledge, at 
least as causal laws. Bhaskar (1975) declares that any adequate philosophy of 
science must show how science is a transitive, socially generated process, and 
take into account intransitive objects of knowledge that do not depend upon 
human activity, such as the specific gravity of mercury, the process of 
electrolysis and the mechanism of light propagation. As described above, 
Bhaskar makes this proclamation in light of his analysis of experimental activity, 
for based on this it is possible to argue that in a world without humans to observe 
the intransitive, reality would presumably continue to act and interact: 
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“If men ceased to exist sound would continue to travel and heavy bodies fall to 
the earth in exactly the same way, though ex hypothesi there would be no one to 
know it … The tides would still turn and metals conduct electricity in the way 
that they do without a Newton or a Drude to produce our knowledge of them… 
Two atoms of hydrogen would continue to combine with one atom of oxygen 
and in favourable circumstances osmosis would continue to occur” (Bhaskar, 
1975, pp. 21-2). 
 
Thus the transcendental realist asserts the existence of an ontological reality 
independent of human intervention. Transcendental realism, however, does allow 
for the influence of social and historical conditioning in science, which Bhaskar 
(1975) terms epistemic relativity. Thus, although holding to a realist ontology, 
critical realism allows for a subjective, transitive interpretation of the intransitive 
objects of knowledge that Bhaskar asserts via his analysis of experimentation. To 
suppose, however, that because there is no epistemologically objective view of 
the world, there is also no objective world ontologically, is to commit what 
transcendental realism terms the epistemic fallacy. This is committed when 
statements about intransitive objects of knowledge are regarded as equivalent to 
statements about the transitive, which leads to the relativist claim that to the 
extent that there are different worldviews, the holders of these worldviews 
inhabit ontologically different worlds (Groff, 2004). Potter and Lopez explain 
that critical realism instead exhibits epistemological caution regarding scientific 
knowledge, thus allowing room for subjective interpretation whilst not 
conflicting with realist ontology: 
 
“Critical realism accepts most (if not all) the significant differences between the 
respective subject matters of social and natural science. It understands as 
essentially correct all the peculiarly human features of the objects of social 
scientific knowledge which, according to the hermeneutic tradition, renders it 
not susceptible to scientific explanation. It accepts that human society is much 
more like a language than a mechanical machine. It accepts the full significance 
of the manner in which theorising is socially located. It accepts the significance 
of the ‘language-borne’ nature of theory. It accepts the socially constructed 
nature of knowledge” (2001, p. 9). 
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By acknowledging the relative nature of transitive knowledge, the goal of 
transcendental or critical realism becomes what is termed alethic truth. 
Epistemologically, all such judgements remain provisional, yet a point is reached 
where science will consider the case virtually settled: 
 
“Although we remain open to new arguments should they appear, we do not 
expect any to turn up. Among the alethic truths that most people hold today are 
the roundness of the earth, the law of gravity, and the existence of microbes. It is 
not that absolutely everyone accepts these putative truths, but that among those 
who do the remaining arguments of the dissenters fail even to be intellectually 
challenging. Further, intellectually challenging arguments to the contrary do not 
even appear on the horizon. On matters such as these, those familiar with the 
arguments are fairly sure that they have got reality right” (Archer et al. 2004, pp. 
2-3). 
 
Because transitive accounts of reality are different accounts of one underlying 
reality, Bhaskar asserts that it is possible to reach alethic truths through 
judgmental rationality. As Potter and Lopez state, “we can (and do!) judge 
between competing theories on the basis of their intrinsic merits as explanations 
of reality. We do so both scientifically and in everyday life. If we could not we 
would not be very frequently successful in even our most mundane activities” 
(2001, p. 9). Bhaskar also states: 
 
“If the relation between theories is one of conflict rather than merely difference 
[as is the case with the suggestions of Kuhn and Feyerabend that no meaning 
may be shared in common between a theory and its successor], this presumes 
that there are alternative accounts of the same world, and if one theory can 
explain more significant phenomena in terms of its descriptions than the other 
can in terms of its, then there is a rational criterion for theory choice, and a 
fortiori a positive sense to the idea of scientific development over time. In this 
sort of way critical realism claims to be able to combine and reconcile 
ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgemental rationality” 
(1998, pp. x-xi). 
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These three tenets – ontological realism, epistemological relativism and 
judgemental rationality – form the basis of the critical realist philosophy. The 
next section describes how Archer et al. (2004) utilise these to argue that 
spiritual topics can be the subject of judgemental rationality.  
Before moving on, though, it is of interest to briefly consider critical 
realism in the light of dualist Vedic philosophy. Dualism also holds to a realist 
ontology and, like critical realism, it claims that one’s perception of reality is 
obscured due to conditioning. The Vedas recognise four main defects in the 
conditioned living entity’s ability to perceive ontological reality: firstly, time and 
space constraints and social conditioning limit his sensory perception. Secondly, 
he is subject to making mistakes – although he may hold all the relevant data, he 
may simply read it incorrectly. Thirdly, the conditioned living entity is subject to 
illusion – the acceptance of one thing for something it is not. Finally, the Vedas 
describe the cheating propensity – although the subject has limited senses, makes 
mistakes and can be bewildered by illusion, the living entity may still put himself 
forward as a learned philosopher or a leader in society. As Devamrita Svami 
states: 
 
“We should bear in mind that naïve realism has no value in the Vedic texts. 
Only a fool is said to believe the world exists directly as his senses perceive it. 
Because human vision feels so simple, we have the tendency to think that the 
image we see is directly the world “outside ourselves.” … The Vedas assume 
that we understand that the world as we perceive it – or think about it – depends 
on our states of consciousness, our levels of awareness. The texts point out that 
we are only dealing with appearances – the effects of something upon our 
consciousness. That something is – in of itself – unknown to us, because of the 
filtration done by our senses, combined with the meditation done by our states 
of consciousness” (2002, pp. 101-102). 
 
Thus dualism, in this respect, holds to the same principle as critical realism – 
through conventional methods, knowledge is epistemically relative. However the 
goal of dualism is not the alethic truth that it is for Bhaskar. Rather, the Gaudīya-
Vaisnava philosophy holds a similar tenet as the non-dualists – God is the 
fundamental constituent of reality. Employing the philosophy of acintya-
 42 
bhedābheda-tattva, though, Gaudīya-Vaisnavism also holds that God is 
simultaneously a person, just as a government, for example, has a personal and 
an impersonal aspect. Being a person, God can reveal Himself at His own 
discretion. As Krishna describes in the Bhagavad-Gītā, He is inclined to reveal 
himself to someone who has His interests at heart, and is therefore always 
prepared to serve Him. The same principle exists in a material context – one is 
more inclined to reveal personal aspects of himself to someone who is always 
concerned with his welfare. In Sanskrit, this service to God is called bhakti-yoga, 
which translates into English as the yoga of devotion. Concerning the 
epistemology of the Vedas, the Vedic scholar Rūpa Gosvāmī states: 
 
atah śri-krisna-nāmādi 
na bhaved grāhyam indriyaih 
sevonmukhe hi jihvādau 
svayam eva sphuraty adah 
 
“No one can understand Krishna as He is by the blunt material senses. But He 
reveals Himself to the devotees, being pleased with them for their transcendental 
loving service to Him” (Bhakti-rasamrta-sindhu, 1.2.234, quoted in 
Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, pp. 368-369). The Sanskrit term yoga describes a 
union (Wilson, 1997), just as religio – the Latin root of the English word religion 
– means to bind. Some commentators suggest that the import of the word 
religion is that religion is the binding agent intended to keep members of a 
society functioning together harmoniously by the endorsement of slogans such as 
loving thy neighbour. When understood in light of the Vedic meaning of yoga, 
religion and religious practice are seen as intending to bind one in relationship 
with God through spiritual experience – the Supreme revealing Himself to the 
rigid practitioner. As McPhail et al. (2004) state, though, such statements have 
generally not been recognised in mainstream academia as credible scholarship, 
and therefore it is necessary to argue why the Vedas are a legitimate tradition of 
knowledge. This is done with reference to the critical realist arguments of Archer 
et al. (2004). 
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Critical Realism and Sacred Forms of Knowledge 
As explained, critical realism asserts that for activities called science to be 
possible, an underlying, ontological reality is necessary. From the vantage point 
of critical realism, Archer et al. (2004) argue that there must be an ontological 
answer to the question of God’s existence. Just as Bhaskar’s analysis of 
experimentation demonstrated the necessity of an underlying ontological reality, 
Archer et al. similarly assert that documented cases of spiritual experience give 
evidence for an underlying spiritual reality. They state: 
 
“So many [religious experiences] from so many different cultures all 
independently report some experience of transcendental reality. Is there not 
some reality behind it all? Can all be similarly mistaken about the category of 
the transcendent and are all just mistaking group consciousness for divine? 
There are no simple answers, but this observation, too, carries its own power” 
(Archer et al., 2004, p. 12). 
 
Appealing to the experience of a transcendental reality, the “faith in the 
possibility of the impossible,” that McKernan and Kosmala (2007, p. 742) 
espouse is not adopted by Archer et al. to justify the inclusion of sacred 
knowledge in academia. Nor do the Vedas appeal to such notions. Instead the 
transcendental experience generated by the practice of Vedic philosophy is put 
forward as evidence that it should be seriously considered in academic 
scholarship. Since differing experiences are an entry point to rational debate, 
Archer et al. hold that the question of God’s existence is amenable to 
judgemental rationality, and thus better or worse arguments for God’s 
ontological reality can (and should, they state) be proposed and evaluated within 
academia.  
The Vedic literatures describe a process by which one can obtain 
spiritual, or transcendental experience and, if one’s determination is firmly fixed, 
how one can become eligible for God-realisation. This is confirmed by Krishna 
in the Bhagavad-Gītā: 
 
vita-rāga-bhaya-krodhā 
man-mayā mām upāśritāh 
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bahavo jñāna-tapasā 
pūtā mad-bhāvam āgatāh 
 
“Being freed from attachment, fear and anger, being fully absorbed in Me and 
taking refuge in Me, many, many persons in the past become purified by 
knowledge of Me – and thus they all attained transcendental love for Me” 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 4.10). Here, Krishna states that in the past 
many people, equipped with the necessary qualifications, have become God 
realised and have thus attained transcendental experience of the Supreme. The 
non-dualist schools of thought have also asserted that the Vedas give a process 
for attaining transcendental experience: 
 
“The practical value of the Vedic Science is that it includes techniques for 
experiencing and thereby developing the full range of consciousness in the 
individual. The key element here is the experience of the simplest, most settled 
state of human awareness, termed “transcendental consciousness”” (Druhl, et 
al., 2001, p. 392). 
 
Similarly, Inayatullah (2005) refers to the documented psychological benefits of 
meditation and has suggested that such measures can serve as a basis for 
spirituality to become a fourth bottom-line in annual reports, as its benefits can 
now be empirically verified. Elsewhere, certain Vedic meditative practices are 
being promoted as a managerial tool to improve employee effectiveness (Heaton 
and Harung, 1999), and consciousness is being suggested as a common ground 
for theories of organisational change (Druhl et al., 2001). Thus the Vedic 
paradigm is not a discipline of faith but is one of experience. As Wilson states, 
writing from the Vedic worldview, “Spiritual development can take place with or 
without adherence to specific religious beliefs” (1997, p. 520). Because Archer et 
al.’s (2004) arguments hinge upon transcendental experience, they apply 
especially to the Vedic tradition.  
The previous section described how, in critical realism, individual 
experiences would be varied, or epistemically relative, due to the socially 
conditioned nature of transitive knowledge. As Bhaskar (1975) observed, though, 
differing accounts of experience must be alternative accounts of the same 
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ontological reality, otherwise science itself would not be possible. Potter and 
Lopez (2001) therefore state that post-modern philosophies that ascribe to 
relativism cannot adequately explain why science continues to produce useful 
knowledge. As the previous section explained, differing accounts of the same 
reality may be evaluated through judgemental rationality. Thus, according to 
Archer et al. (2004), the variegated accounts of spiritual experience provide an 
entry point to rational debate, for all such debates are initiated by differing 
standpoints of experience. They state: 
 
“Our theories differ, in part, because our experiences differ. Our different 
experiences, however, are not the end of the story. They do not remain 
impervious to adjudication and correction. Instead we come together in 
conversation to reason about them” (Archer et al., 2004, p. 5). 
 
Thus Archer et al. argue that debates about the existence of God should be 
accepted in academia on the basis of religious experience. This thesis adds to this 
by asserting that sacred forms of knowledge such as the Vedas – because they 
describe methods capable of producing transcendental experience – should be 
accepted in academic debate, and be considered as informing bodies of 
knowledge in disciplines like economics and accounting.  
While Archer et al. (2004) suggested that widespread transcendental 
experience is evidence of an underlying spiritual reality, other commentators 
point out that such variegated experiences may instead indicate the absence of 
any such reality, because no one religion’s explanation of God and reality can 
account for all such experiences (Collier, 2004). Archer et al. admit to this as 
well: 
 
“There is the feeling of creature consciousness identified by Friedrich 
Schleiermacher; the experience of the numinous or holy as identified by Rudolf 
Otto; the sense of the transcendent as expressed by Martin Buber; and the 
experience of self-engulfment and cosmic union described by the Western 
mystical tradition but particularly associated with the Eastern religions” (2004, 
p. 12). 
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Thus, while they hold that purported spiritual experiences are the sign of an 
underlying transcendental reality, Archer et al. nonetheless admit that their verity 
represents a potential hurdle for all religions – each of which proposes to explain 
God’s existence. Variegated transcendental experience, however, does not 
interfere with the Vedic description of the Supreme, which encompasses 
different experiences based on one’s dedication and practice of God-realisation. 
To this end the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam explains:  
 
vadanti tat tattva-vidas 
tattvam yaj jñānam advayam 
brahmeti paramātmeti 
bhagavān iti śabdyate 
 
“Learned transcendentalists who know the Absolute Truth call this non-dual 
substance Brahman, Paramatma or Bhagavan” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, 
verse 1.2.11). Hence the Vedas hold that although different realisations of God 
are possible, such as personal or impersonal, the transcendentalist with full 
realisation knows there is no qualitative difference between them.9 Furthermore, 
in the Bhagavad-Gītā, Krishna states, ye yathā mām prapadyante tāms tathaiva 
bhajāmy aham: “As all surrender unto Me, I reward them accordingly” 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 4.11). Thus the Vedic literatures allow for 
different realisations of the same God depending on one’s desire and practice. 
Therefore different experiences of the same transcendental reality are not an 
impediment to accepting the Vedas in rational debate. 
However, even prior to considering differing experiences of 
transcendence, it is possible to question such experiences altogether, alleging that 
critical realism holds them to be epistemically relative, and therefore products of 
social conditioning. An advocate of this theory might assert that because 
someone has been socially conditioned to believe in God, they will imagine for 
                                                 
9
 Bhaktivedanta Svami explains the purport to this verse, stating, “The same substance is realised 
as impersonal Brahman by the students of the Upanisads, as localised Paramatma by the yogis, 
and as Bhagavan [the Personality of Godhead] by the devotees… Less intelligent students of 
either of the above schools sometimes argue in favour of their own respective realisation, but 
those who are perfect seers of the Absolute Truth know well that the above three features of the 
one Absolute Truth are different perspective views seen from different angles of vision” 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, First canto, pp. 103-104). 
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themselves the experience of transcendence. However, as is explained below, 
critical realism does not attribute all factors that influence a person’s beliefs 
exclusively to social conditioning. Room is also allowed for the experience of 
reality. Furthermore, epistemic relativism is not limited just to religious 
experience but extends also to the experiences of atheists and agnostics. Their 
absence of religious experience is itself a kind of experience, also subject to 
prevailing norms, circumstances and conceptual schemes, and factors of personal 
biography such as resistances, prejudices and preferences. Archer et al. therefore 
state that the purported experience of the absence of transcendence “is no less 
corrigible than the experience of presence” (2004, p. 4). Porpora elaborates on 
this: 
 
“Religious nonbelief stands in as much need of explanation as religious belief. It 
is only a lingering bias of the Enlightenment that makes the intellectual baseline 
and belief, alone, something to be explained. Treating belief and nonbelief 
symmetrically, the distinguishing generative mechanism is religious experience. 
… Thus, although atheists and agnostics may think that they, at least, are 
examining the objective evidence dispassionately, they tend to forget that what 
they are also entering into evidence is their own absence of religious 
experience” (2000, p. 14).  
 
Thus the critical realist position holds that there is an ontological answer to the 
question of God’s existence, but given that experiences are subject to 
interpretation affected by historical and social conditioning, experiences of that 
reality will vary. Atheistic beliefs are not exempt from social conditioning, and 
therefore it cannot be held that religious belief is something to be explained and 
atheism is not. Because of the claim to transcendental experience Archer et al. 
(2004) hold that the question of God’s existence is permissible in judgemental 
rationality. The same applies to sacred forms of knowledge – it cannot be held 
that they are unacceptable in rational debate when they can produce 
transcendental experience that may be the subject of judgemental rationality. 
Although transcendental experiences are a widely acclaimed 
phenomenon, the social sciences have nonetheless privileged atheism and 
presented it as an epistemologically neutral position, instead of what Archer et al. 
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(2004) describe as – a commitment to a belief in the absence of religious 
phenomena. Beed and Beed (2004), for instance, state that most economists and 
social scientists avoid presenting religious beliefs in their professional work, one 
reason being that they believe that they are following a science from which 
metaphysical presuppositions and values should be banished. To account for this, 
Archer (2004) explains that since the Enlightenment, the social sciences have 
adopted certain models of man that systematically preclude the human subject 
from having transcendental relations, and thus they have attributed religious faith 
and belief exclusively to social causes. She argues that such models are defective 
for both the social sciences and disciplines of faith because they assume that all 
of man’s relationships with reality are socially derived. The critical realist model 
that she suggests, though, does allow for an ontological reality determining an 
individual’s nature and beliefs, and thus it does not rule out in advance the 
possibility of authentic human relations with the divine (Archer, 2004). 
Since the Enlightenment, Archer et al. (2004) explain, two models of the 
human being have dominated social theorising: the instrumentally rational Homo 
Economicus of positivist thought, whom Archer refers to as Modernity’s Man; 
and the product of social constructionism – Homo Sociologicus – who Archer 
denotes as Society’s Being. The former stresses human self-sufficiency, whilst 
the latter emphasises social dependency. To examine the personal qualities of 
Modernity’s Man first, one may observe that, in essence, he is simply an 
instrumentally rational and calculating seeker of preference satisfaction. Theories 
of markets and collective choice in neoclassical economics and the political 
domains where Homo Economicus was born take individual preferences as 
given. As Hahn and Hollis (1979) explain, neo-classical economics is 
characterised by an overriding concern with the individual, conceived in isolation 
from the social, political and economic institutions in which he exists. Weale also 
explains, “no attention is paid to the source of these preferences, or to the extent 
to which they may be modified in the light of reflection and argument” (1992, p. 
63). Free from any embedding in historical circumstances, then, Homo 
Economicus is a model that strips the human being down to one remaining 
property – the capacity to maximise his preferences through means-ends 
relationships to optimise his utility. Natural, social and transcendental 
relationships are not even partially constitutive of the beliefs he holds, and 
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although man works on the world, the world does not work on him – except by 
attaching risks and costs to the accomplishment of his pre-formed designs. As 
Daniels states: 
 
“Convinced of the objectivity and value-free stance of their discipline, 
economists adopted secular, rational economic man as the archetypical 
behavioural model of economic decision-making. Individual welfare was 
considered simply as a positive function of consumption derived from 
accumulation of material wealth. There was minimal recognition of the dynamic 
nature and importance of the underlying beliefs and values which may structure 
or at least heavily influence human behaviour” (1998, p. 968). 
 
Therefore Homo Economicus is closed against any experience of reality that 
could make him fundamentally different from what he already is, and thus the 
modern self has been ontologically purged of transcendence (Archer, 2004). As 
Philip describes:  
 
“To reduce the understanding of human action to the terms of purely physical 
laws is to ignore those very distinguishing features of humans – speech, reason 
and spirituality” (1995, p. 22). 
 
While Modernism’s self has been immunised against all outside influence, social 
constructionism takes the other extreme and presents all human properties – 
beyond biological constitutions – as the gift of society, beliefs included. Social 
constructionism therefore precludes the role that religious experience plays in 
determining beliefs by assuming that man is nothing beyond what society has 
made him through his participation in society’s conversation. Weale explains: 
 
“Homo sociologicus lives according to rules, roles and relations. As Homo 
sociologicus grows up, he must undergo rites of passage in relations from 
boyhood to manhood, having been socialised into the appropriate norms of 
behaviour. At work he will need to adjust to the division of labour, and when he 
falls ill he does not simply suffer physical malfunction but adopts the sick role. 
Politically he adopts the attitudes appropriate to someone with his education, 
occupation, social status and place of abode” (1992, p. 63). 
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The same is so for Homo Sociologicus when it comes to his choice of faith. 
According to post-modern thought, his religious belief is nothing more than a 
product of social conditioning and evidence of transcendental experience is not 
recognised as the experience of reality (Archer, 2004). This is evident in 
McKernan and Kosmala (2007), who, adopting the constructionist position, state 
that the disciplines of religion and accounting now operate in environments that 
are effectively post-modern: 
 
“We are inclined to see science, religion, and for that matter accounting as 
language games, each in their own way grounded in faith, each having reasons 
for the claims they make, and each having lost any meta-narrative grounding, or 
legitimation, it might have once had” (2007, p. 731). 
 
A partiality can also be observed, for many founding fathers of the social 
sciences – Durkheim, Freud, Marx, Nietzsche and Weber, who Collier refers to 
as the “Masters of Suspicion” (2004, p. 82) – all give debunking explanations of 
the prevalence of religion. Marx famously referred to religion as the opium of the 
people, and Weber declared himself religiously unmusical. Their critiques, 
however, are debunking in the sense that religions console people and play on 
their unhappy lot by the power of wishful thinking, but they are not explanatory 
critiques that show a religion’s truth claims are false. At most they show that 
religious belief is produced by an oppressive social structure (Collier, 2004).  
Collier points out that all the Masters of Suspicion; Marx, Freud and 
Nietzsche, are materialists, and therefore, “more or less take it for granted that 
religion is false, the only question being why a false belief became so 
widespread” (2004, p. 83). He adds that none of them consider that secularism 
could be subjected to a similar critique, and they all assume that secular 
knowledge is obvious, and confer upon themselves the authority to place the 
onus on religion to prove its contentions. The secularist claims that one needs 
reasons for believing in something but not reasons for not believing something. 
However, the secularist has not the non-belief of religious phenomena but a 
belief in their absence, and, as Collier states, one needs grounds for these beliefs 
as much as for religious beliefs. Secularism or materialism, then, is not a neutral 
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position, and the idea that religion is an extra belief beyond ordinary beliefs is 
not a neutral standpoint but a partisan, secularist one.  
Because of the dominance of these two models of man in the social 
sciences, transcendental experience has been excluded from the analysis of what 
determines religious belief and faith in sacred forms of knowledge. The 
consequence is that sacred forms of knowledge are regarded as lacking in 
falsifiability. This is the objection that Oslington (2000) claims many economists 
have to Christian theology. McKernan and Kosmala (2007), for instance, who 
write from the post-modern standpoint, state that they do not regard religious 
belief as being open to empirical verification. Lack of falsifiability, or 
reconciliation to blind belief, is also a concern of Saravanamuthu (2006). She 
cites Swami Vivekananda, a famous non-dualist philosopher, who argued that 
religious forms of knowledge should be subjected to the same methods of 
investigation as scientific and secular forms of knowledge (Saravanamuthu, 
2006). Vedic philosophy, however, asserts that God’s existence, and therefore 
the authenticity of the Vedas is falsifiable – by following a particular process of 
engaging the mind, body and words, one may obtain transcendental experience. 
In the Bhagavad-Gītā, Krishna uses two Sanskrit words to describe categories of 
knowledge: jñāna and vijñāna. Jñāna refers to the theoretical understanding of 
the knowledge in the Vedas, and vijñāna means the experiential realisation of 
that knowledge. As Stein (2002, p. 51) writes concerning the Vedic 
epistemology, “We see that one does not merely know the truth; one realises it or 
has a direct and immediate experience of it.” Other commentators as well have 
attested to the falsifiability of the Vedic teachings:  
 
“We have argued above that a complete approach to organisational change and 
development must include a scientific account of and approach to the subjective 
aspect of the organisation, represented by its individual members. By scientific 
we mean, in particular: systematic, rational and subject to empirical test. … To 
this end, we will now consider a worldview which sees the subjective aspect of 
reality as most basic, and yet contains approaches for individuals and 
organisational development which can be empirically tested, and thus 
objectively verified. This view is expressed in the ancient Vedic tradition of 
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knowledge, which has been residing in India since time immemorial” (Druhl et 
al., 2001, p. 390). 
 
This is also the assertion of Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gītā where He explains to 
Arjuna that through the practice of bhakti-yoga, one will be able to see Him, just 
as He was standing before Arjuna at Kuruksetra: 
 
bhaktyā tv ananyayā śakya 
aham evam-vidho ‘rjuna 
jñātum drastum ca tattvena 
pravestum ca parantapa 
 
“My dear Arjuna, only by undivided devotional service [bhakti-yoga] can I be 
understood as I am, standing before you, and can thus be seen directly. Only in 
this way can you enter into the mysteries on My understanding” (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1989, verse 11.54). Thus when Swami Vivekananda asserts that religious 
knowledge should be subjected to the same methods of investigation as in the 
sciences, dualist Vedic philosophy does not protest this. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, 
Krishna never tells Arjuna simply to believe in Him, rather He advises Arjuna to 
adopt the path of bhakti-yoga. 
For bhakti-yoga to be regarded as falsifiable, though, academia must first 
allow for the influence of transcendental experience upon the individual. Archer 
(2004) shows that religious beliefs are often deemed to be false because the 
experiences upon which they are based are automatically discounted. Such 
experiences are, however, specifically what the critical realist model of man 
allows for. From the realist point of view, the central deficiency of Homo 
Economicus and Homo Sociologicus is their basic denial that the nature of reality 
makes any difference to the beliefs that people hold (Archer, 2004). In both 
versions what is lost is the direct experience of reality. Instead two versions of 
the epistemic fallacy, whereby reality is a consequence of modernity’s 
instrumental rationality or society’s discourse, are substituted for what the world 
really is. As previously explained, the epistemic fallacy is committed when the 
inference is made that because there is no epistemologically objective view of the 
world, there is also no objective world ontologically. This leads to the relativist 
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claim that to the extent that there are different worldviews, holders of these 
worldviews inhabit ontologically different worlds: 
 
“It implies that when people discovered that the earth revolves around the sun 
and changed their opinions accordingly, then the objective world they inhabited 
actually changed. Before, say, Galileo, the sun revolved around the earth and 
then suddenly did not. For better or worse, critical realists believe that the world 
cannot be altered just by altering our beliefs about it” (Archer et al., 2004, p. 2). 
 
Although realists concede that all experiences are fallible, critical realism cannot 
accept any foreclosure that prematurely restricts that which can be experienced, 
and hence influences what people become (Archer, 2004). Nor can it accept 
religious belief simply on the grounds of blind faith either, as this does not meet 
the criterion of judgemental rationality: 
 
“To make faith into blind faith, as some religious people do, is not intellectually 
acceptable. It is not intellectually appropriate to privilege any belief – not even a 
religious belief – in such a way that it becomes immune to judgemental 
rationality. If we feel to privilege our own pet beliefs in this way, why should 
not racists so privilege their racism? If, as religious believers, we are still to 
remain a part of the community of rational dialogue, all our beliefs, including 
our religious beliefs, must be equally placed upon the table” (Archer et al., 
2004, p. 16). 
 
Realism, then, allows for the possibility of unmediated human experiences that 
are not necessarily reducible to self-referentiality, as in Modernity’s Man, or to 
social constructions, as in Society’s Being: 
 
“Realism opens up a space, which, of course, was never really closed, in which 
whatever properties and powers pertain to reality can have an unmediated 
influence upon us, through our experiences of them, which need not be 
articulated. Primitive man experienced gravity as he fell down inclines and 
failed to jump over large obstacles, under whatever descriptions, if any, he knew 
these limitations. Although it is inappropriate to speak of God ‘belonging’ 
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anywhere, in a purely conceptual sense he ‘pertains’ to this space, as do other 
unobservables such as scientific entities, like gravity” (Archer, 2004, p. 68). 
 
As Stein (2002) argues, no-one will doubt the reality of a newborn child’s 
experience when cradled in its mother’s arms, even though it lacks all language 
and cognitive abilities. If, therefore, by following a prescribed method, one can 
obtain sensory verification of the Supreme, that experience should not 
necessarily be reduced to a product of social and historical conditioning but 
should be recognised in rational debate. Throughout history there have been 
many claims to religious experience, but, due to the dominating conceptions of 
the self, academia has regarded these as a product of social construction or 
simply as irrelevant. When allowed to present evidence of transcendental 
experience though, sacred forms of knowledge like the Vedas are admissible in 
rational debate.  
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Chapter Four: Non-Dualist Vedic Accountability 
As described, non-dualist Vedic philosophy holds that the fundamental 
constitution of reality is an all-pervading, undifferentiated spiritual energy of 
oneness. As Saravanamuthu describes:  
 
“There are two schools in the Vedic tradition: Advaitism and Dvaitism [Non-
dualism and Dualism]. The former is grounded in the concept of ‘oneness’ or 
the union of the subject and object (or the spiritual oneness of all beings: Dalton, 
1993), whereas Dvaitism is premised on a dualist interpretation” (2006, p. 296). 
 
The Vedas call this non-dual substance brahman, and non-dualist philosophers 
hold it to be the primary ingredient of reality. They often refer to brahman, for 
lack of a better English word, as God. For example, when defining her use of the 
term God, Saravanamuthu cites the famous non-dualist philosopher Svami 
Vivekananda, who defined the Supreme as, “the sum total of intelligence 
manifested in the universe,” whereby, “all the forms of cosmic energy, such as 
matter, thought, force, intelligence, and so forth, are simply the manifestation of 
that cosmic intelligence” (Svami Vivekananda, Lecture on ‘Jnana-Yoga. The 
cosmos: The macrocosm.’ Delivered in New York on 19 January 1896, quoted in 
Rolland, 1988, p. 262, again quoted in Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 311). Based on 
this, Bhaskar (2000) – like many others – holds that man himself is God.  
Saravanamuthu (2006, 2007) presents a theory of sustainable 
accountability informed by this advaitic philosophy. Because it is based on the 
notion that all forms of life are interconnected, such accountability radically 
expands the scope of a corporate entity’s reporting obligations. This chapter 
examines Saravanamuthu’s non-dualist theory of accountability so it can be 
compared with a dualist one later. Firstly, though, Bhaskar’s (2000) description 
of the self in non-dualist Vedic philosophy is used to illustrate the non-dualist 
position.  
 
The Self in Non-Dualist Vedic Philosophy 
Taking the primary ingredient of reality to be the impersonal sum of all energies, 
Bhaskar asserts that man is God – though man does not realise this because of 
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layers of avidya (ignorance) and maya (illusion) that cloud reality and make 
features like individuality and personality appear factual: 
 
“The essential thesis of this book is that man is essentially God (and therefore 
also essentially one, but also essentially unique); and that, as such, he is 
essentially free and already enlightened, a freedom and enlightenment which is 
overlain by extraneous, heteronomous determinations which both (a) occlude 
and (b) qualify this essential fact” (2000, p. ix). 
 
Similarly, Gupta praises Svami Vivekananda for propagating the same notion: 
“Vivekananda emphasized the great Vedantic realization of “I am Brahman” or 
“I am God” as the highest truth for all people” (2007, p. 643). The dualist 
philosopher will not deny that everything has its source in brahman, but will 
disagree that brahman is the fundamental source of existence. In the Bhagavad-
Gītā, Krishna states, brahmano hi pratisthāham: “I am the basis of the 
impersonal brahman” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 14.27). Krishna is 
therefore known as Parabrahman – the Supreme Brahman (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1989, verse 10.12). To be true to the Vedas, then, the dualist philosopher 
recognises the ultimate ontological reality to be personal rather than impersonal. 
As there is personality in manifestations of the source, it follows that the source 
must be personal. Personality cannot come from an impersonal object, just as a 
drop of salty water cannot come from a freshwater lake. A person, however, can 
display both personality and be impersonal. The dualist will therefore attribute 
the ultimate source with an individual personality. 
Unconscious to this, Bhaskar claims that man, upon forgetting his 
Godlike nature and acting on the premise that he is different from the rest of the 
universe, creates further contradictions and forms of conceptual alienation. 
Bhaskar refers to this forgetfulness as self-alienation:  
 
“This chain of avidya secrets a veil or veils, which together form an interlocking 
web or meshwork of illusions. This (irrealist) web (or ensemble) holds 
contemporary thought in thrall, generating aporiai, contradictions, lacunae, 
conflicts, splits, anomalies, crises and many other modes of oppositionality 
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within it… This real alienation (and conceptual alienation to which it gives rise) 
is in turn ultimately explained in terms of self-alienation” (2000, pp. 5-6). 
 
Bhaskar states that the attempt to eliminate suffering without first attending to its 
causes is myopic, and thus he holds that self-alienation may only be remedied 
through the reinstatement of the true nature of the self as one with the rest of the 
cosmos: 
 
“The resolution of the problem of agency is grounded in a radically transformed 
conception of the self, of being and identities. What I do depends upon my 
dharma, i.e. my intrinsic nature. This will be spontaneously right action. The 
question of agency therefore depends on resolution of the question of the self” 
(Bhaskar, 2000, p. 66). 
 
Gandhi-Vedic Accountability 
Saravanamuthu (2006), in formulating a non-dualist theory of Vedic 
accountability, gives a similar account of reality as Bhaskar. She constructs her 
theory on the foundation of Gandhian economics, which itself is secured in the 
bedrock of advaitic Vedic philosophy. She states:  
 
“[Advaitic Vedic philosophy]… is constructed on the presumption that all forms 
of life have been projected from a mass of energy” (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 
299). 
 
Because the entire ecosystem emanates from one source and is thus 
interconnected, non-dualism holds that by harming another, one is causing harm 
to one’s own self (which is non-different to the other). Gandhian economics, 
then, and any theory of accountability formulated upon it, proceeds on the karmic 
premise that every action generates knock-on consequences, “because elements 
of the whole are interconnected to each other” (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 297). It 
is this advaitic premise of spiritual interconnectedness that Saravanamuthu 
harnesses as a mount for a theory of sustainable accountability: 
 
“… one’s responsibility for the other (or spiritual interconnectedness) minimises 
the likelihood of circular dialectics of social contradictions: it reduces the 
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chances that hazardous norms of risk society may be perpetuated” (2006, p. 
306). 
 
The goal of extended responsibility in Gandhi-Vedic accountability is ahimsic 
(non-violent) outcomes, or outcomes that are harmonious with the 
interconnectedness of the entire ecosystem. In order for systems of accountability 
to produce such outcomes, Saravanamuthu (2006) employs Gandhi’s concept of 
satyagraha (non-violent resistance). This works for ahimsic outcomes, she 
explains, by employing moral and political means to engage interested parties in 
a reasoned dialogue. Through these means, satyagraha seeks to empower a 
weaker party by refusing their consent to the hegemony of exploitation whilst 
discursively engaging with those in positions of power (Saravanamuthu, 2006; 
Ghosh, 2007). Saravanamuthu states that, in the case of animal welfare, 
satyagrahic responsibility “argues for the rights for all creatures (from the 
multitudes of insects that keep the ecosystem ticking over to the animals reared 
for human consumption) that should be respected in animal husbandry practices” 
(2006, p. 312). Thus, as this example illustrates, new ahimsic outcomes are 
reached by considering the entire ecosystem to be interconnected. 
Gandhian economics holds that an individual becomes trapped in a 
treadmill of alienation and exploitation by consenting to social norms emanating 
from the logic of control, or as Saravanamuthu explains, individuals create a “rod 
for their own back” (2006, p. 304). The Australian Government’s proposal to 
compress and store Greenhouse gasses underground instead of reducing reliance 
on fossil fuels is one example of such logic, as these “band-aid fixes” to 
degradation do not eliminate the underlying causes of unsustainable practices 
(Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 305). Such temporary solutions, she states, result in 
fresh contradictions that simply replace the previous set. Gandhi’s advaitic Vedic 
paradigm is designed to prevent such unsustainable practices by encouraging a 
“reflexive” rather than a “fear” response:  
 
“An individual who faces a new set of circumstances (such as temporary socio-
environmental degradation) may respond either reflexively, or out of fear. A 
reflexive response occurs when a person copes with an unfamiliar challenge by 
modifying her/his mental schema to create a ‘what is’ reality. It is accompanied 
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by a conscious decision to modify one’s behaviour, expectations and values. 
Therefore reflective behaviour is the ability to cope with changing 
circumstances. A fear response avoids the challenges that accompany change by 
resorting to the comfort of familia ‘what was’ realities. It effectively shuts out 
and perpetuates the logic of exploitation. Behaviour that is dominated by ‘what 
was’ perceptions will continue to fragment time and space dimensions of the 
whole by privileging private interests over the whole” (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 
306). 
  
Thus Saravanamuthu explains that ‘what is’ realities, produced via reflexive 
responses, create ahimsic outcomes, based on the concept of the self being 
interconnected with the entire ecosystem. The satyagrahic method of 
accountability produces a reflexive response by, “escalating the tension between 
opposing parties (through political and moral means) until the point where a 
common interest between the parties becomes so obvious that they engage in a 
dialogue to resolve the conflict” (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 308). Its goal in 
accounting is to engage parties in a discourse that minimises the fragmentation of 
time and space and thus makes individuals more conscious of their actions. 
Conventional accounting thought, Saravanamuthu (2007) explains, prioritises the 
pursuit of profit above social and environmental concerns, and is therefore based 
on the shortest temporary cycle. Hence a profit orientation fragments the 
environment’s longer time dimension. Similarly, mainstream accounting is 
concerned with legal space as opposed to environmental concern that requires, 
according to Saravanamuthu (2007), an awareness of interconnected spaces or 
the interconnected ecology that advaitic Vedic philosophy describes. Through 
engagement in a discourse that minimises time and space fragmentations, 
tensions between conflicting perspectives will escalate until common ground is 
reached – a resolution achieved between the two parties that is in both of their 
interests (Saravanamuthu, 2006, 2007). Saravanamuthu asserts that decisions 
based upon such a framework of accountability will bring outcomes more 
consistent with a non-dualist conception of self, and this will manifest more 
sustainable behaviours in society. 
To incorporate Gandhi’s satyagrahic method of escalating tensions 
between opposing parties, Saravanamuthu (2006) proposes three general tools for 
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accounting systems: customised accountability, the minimised dichotomisation 
between means and ends, and increased reflexivity. Customised accountability is 
an instrument that Saravanamuthu (2006) derives from the Gandhian requirement 
for political and economic independence. She states that, “information used to 
provide accounts to the other should be tailored to local circumstances: it follows 
on from the fact that the Gandhian-Vedic outcomes are context related” 
(Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 316). For non-dualist accountability, then, customised 
accountability is part of the reform agenda that facilitates a reflexive rather than a 
fear response, as it will enrich perceptions of “what is” realities instead of taking 
shelter in the “what was” hegemonic rhetoric that emerges from a “one size fits 
all” governance framework (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 317). Dichotomisation of 
means and ends, Saravanamuthu explains, puts greater emphasis on the means 
used to ascertain the end – instead of relying on the outcome, especially endless 
economic growth, to justify the means (2006, p. 318). Finally, she states that 
increased reflexivity embraces greater responsibility to the other based on the 
advaitic premise of spiritual interconnectedness: “a person is more likely to 
respond reflexively to ‘what is’ challenges of risk society when the person is able 
to associate her/his reality with the needs of the other” (2006, p. 318). 
In relation to Laughlin’s (1996) model of accountability, it can be seen 
that the Gandhi-Vedic model is not concerned with accounting to a higher 
principal. Instead, an effort is made to achieve a consensus, or a common interest 
between parties that is more conscious of their interconnected nature. This 
absence of accountability to a higher principal stems from the advaitic Vedic 
concept that God is impersonal, and man is the highest principal. Gandhi-Vedic 
accountability, though, does hold some similarities to Robert’s socialising forms 
of accountability. As Roberts states, socialising forms of accountability work for 
the acknowledgement of others, and to articulate differences through talk. 
“Rarely perhaps”, he explains, “does such talk explicitly aim at achieving 
consensus, but undoubtedly it is the basis of mutual understanding, and 
consensus, albeit fluid and transitory, may be its unintended consequence” 
(Roberts, 1991, p. 362). It was seen that the satyagrahic method of accountability 
would be tailored to local circumstances and be designed to produce reflexive 
responses by “escalating the tension between opposing parties (through political 
and moral means) until the point where a common interest between the parties 
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becomes so obvious that they engage in a dialogue to resolve the conflict” 
(Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 308). Similarly, in Saravanamuthu’s (2007) case study 
of the Riverlands citrus industry, the horticulturalists attempted to initiate a 
rational discourse between producers, consumers and regulators to highlight the 
common interests of environmentally sustainable action. Thus satyagrahic 
accountability has similar objectives as Roberts’ socialising forms.  
It cannot be said, however, that Gandhi-Vedic accountability possesses 
all the features of Laughlin’s (1996) communal accountability, such as high trust, 
low potential for conflicting interests and ex-post reporting. Rather, satyagrahic 
accountability has more contractual features – such as radar plotting and the 
minimised dichotomisation between means and ends – in order to highlight the 
common interests of sustainable action. Therefore, instead of subduing 
conflicting interests with individualising forms of accountability, Gandhi-Vedic 
accountability uses explicit reporting requirements to tease out common interests, 
and to reach a consensus. Therefore satyagrahic and socialising forms of 
accountability have a similar destination, but different paths are taken to reach 
that conclusion. Rather than being left to their own devices, under Gandhi-Vedic 
accountability agents would be required to fulfil additional reporting obligations 
so that ahimsic outcomes might be achieved. In this way, satyagrahic 
accountability can be compared with Shearer’s (2002) appeal for a greater 
accountability to the other: it was seen that under the neoclassical doctrine, the 
individual was motivated by self-interested action, and was thus only held 
accountable for such. In contrast to the neoclassical model, an advaitic theory of 
accountability assumes that all forms of life are interconnected. 
Interconnectedness becomes a defining characteristic of Gandhi-Vedic 
accountability that Saravanamuthu refers to as increased reflexivity, which is 
specifically aimed at broadening the scope of accountability to the other: 
 
“… one’s responsibility to the other (or spiritual interconnectedness) minimises 
the likelihood of circular dialectics of social contradictions … it reduces the 
chances that Beck’s (1993) hazardous norms of risk society may be perpetuated. 
… Spiritual development involves curtailing the human ego by detaching 
private interests from one’s thoughts and actions. Therefore, Gandhi’s ideas of 
non-violence, satyagraha and swaraj are directed at sacrificing the self, or ego 
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… because it minimises inner conflicts (or personal contradictions)” 
(Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 306).  
 
Thus the Gandhi-Vedic theory of sustainability functions by making one aware 
of what Saravanamuthu calls “what is” realities (2006, p. 306), through various 
contractual accounting devices. This has some semblance to Shearer’s 
accountability for the other, and it has similar ends as Roberts’ socialising forms 
of accountability, but does not recognise an obligation to any divine higher 
principal.  
 
The Riverlands Citrus Industry’s Satyagrahic Journey 
Saravanamuthu (2007) applies the tools for satyagrahic accountability to the case 
study of a networked community in South Australia. By relating her findings and 
suggestions from the case study of a segment of the citrus industry in the 
Riverlands region, which faced sustainability issues, it is possible to observe an 
example of non-dualist Vedic accountability. The citrus horticulturalists had 
realised that their practices were not sustainable in the long term, as their 
dependence on irrigation had upset the ecological balance in the Riverland’s arid 
environment. Saravanamuthu (2007) reports that, unsatisfied and disempowered 
by the ends based feedback associated with conventional management practices, 
the blockies had begun to search for more sustainable horticultural techniques.10  
In 2003, a group of blockies incorporated themselves as the Movement 
for Environmentally Sustainable Horticulture (MESH), and initiated what 
Saravanamuthu (2007) likens to Gandhi’s satyagrahic journey, whereby the 
satyagrahic method of accountability produces reflexive responses through 
increased transparency. Saravanamuthu (2007) describes how MESH secured 
reflexive responses by implementing systems of accountability that would 
eventually establish a farm-to-market network for its produce, along with a 
database containing operational data for all its participating blockies that would 
be duly audited to ensure customers that its members were adhering to its ethos. 
It was MESH’s aspiration that customers would be able to perceive the citrus 
farm’s output as products rather than commodities, as each product has a story 
                                                 
10
 Saravanamuthu (2007) uses the South Australian term ‘blockies’ because, she explains, each 
horticulturalist cultivates, on average, a 30-hectare block of land. 
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behind it – specifically of how the Riverlands community endeavoured to grow 
its produce in a sustainable fashion.  
Amongst the accountability techniques developed by MESH to achieve 
this communicative action was a manual of best practices (MESH, 2003) that 
identified priority areas and measurements aimed at achieving higher levels of 
sustainability. As Saravanamuthu describes, MESH’s endeavour for sustainable 
horticulture began by scrutinising the most fundamental assumptions: 
 
“…a lot of people have no idea of exactly what a healthy tree looks 
like…people think that something that is nice bright black green is healthy, but 
it is not. The greener it is, the more vulnerable it is…because it indicates…a 
high level of nitrogen, and maybe phosphate as well…If you look under a 
microscope…if it has too much nitrogen… you will have gaps between the cell 
walls, the cell walls will be weak and sap-sucking insects like your thrips…will 
attack that plant because it is very easy to get in and…have a drink” (O (i) 
blockie, quoted in Saravanamuthu, 2007, p. 26). 
 
This manual of best practices moved the blockies from generic horticultural 
categories to more sustainable management techniques – each MESH blockie 
would measure the impact of his horticultural methods on the surrounds, and any 
method that inflicted less destruction would be included in a pool of more 
sustainable practices. Thus Saravanamuthu (2007) describes how MESH 
blockies built up a collection of increasingly sustainable horticultural techniques 
into an emergent vocabulary of horticultural cultivation that would draw the best 
practices from the existing methods and advances in agricultural science. Their 
reform agenda would then be subjected to review with a range of auditing 
processes, from self-audits to peer-reviewed third party audits. As 
Saravanamuthu (2007) describes, these steps are part of a larger vision of 
constructing a networked community containing everyone from producers to 
final consumers. Such a connection has some resemblance to Gandhi’s 
satyagrahic action intended to generate reflexive responses: 
 
“MESH’s communicative action is similar to Gandhi’s satyagraha because it 
increases the likelihood of rational discourse between producers-customers-
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regulators by using marketing and informational strategies to cast politico-
economic influences to highlight their common interests (following Pareka, 
1991). The term “rational” refers to reasoned dialogue in the context of 
uncertainty and ambiguity about the totality of Gaiaic interconnections.11 The 
common interests in the Riverland emanate from the tight inter-connection 
between the health of the catchment and industry community” (Saravanamuthu, 
2007, p. 24). 
 
The MESH manual of best practice, however, did not altogether meet 
Saravanamuthu’s qualifications of satyagrahic accountability and therefore her 
subsequent research was directed at supplementing implementations made by the 
Riverlands community to provide holistic feedback that might tailor accounts to 
generate more reflective responses. To this end, she recommended radar plots as 
a vehicle of sustainability accountability: 
 
“The radar plot is a diagrammatic representation of the satyagrahic ethos 
because its equal representation of conflicting-and-complementary feedback 
increases tension between stakeholders through dialogue, which in turn makes 
the common interest binding stakeholders all the more apparent” 
(Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 331). 
 
Radar plots can be a tool for satyagrahic accountability, Saravanamuthu (2006) 
explains, because their representation of performance minimises the 
fragmentation of time and space. Essentially they locate performance within the 
broader context of risks and dangers, and thus they translate, very concisely, a 
verity of measurements on a graduated scale of high to low risk impact. 
Saravanamuthu claims that, in her case study of the Riverlands citrus industry, 
radar plots would grant equal representation to known horticultural consequences 
whilst highlighting their relative risk: 
 
“Viewed in its entirety, the spokes of the radar plot represents the multi-faceted 
impact of human activities on land, water, atmosphere and bio-diversity. Each of 
                                                 
11
 Saravanamuthu uses Lovelock’s (1995) Gaia theory to aid in explaining her notion of 
sustainability: “Gaia, an ancient Greek divinity on Earth, refers to the highly coupled connection 
between the Earth’s creatures and its atmospheric, terra firma and hydrologic elements that 
regulate and sustain life” (2007, pp. 3-4).  
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the radar plot’s spokes represents a different measure of performance, which has 
been subjectively standardised on a graduated scale of risk. Risk assessments are 
juxtaposed against each other to provide comparative yet holistic representations 
of risk-danger. The tighter the area (from the origin) between the spokes, the 
less the degree of risk posed by the horticultural practices to the health of the 
catchment” (2007, p. 28). 
 
Through such accountability methods, Saravanamuthu (2007) proposes that 
outcomes more aligned with the advaitic premise of interconnectedness would be 
achieved. Radar plotting, along with the other accountability techniques 
mentioned, would increase the likelihood of reflexive responses made upon 
“what-is” realities. Through such accountability methods, she states, members of 
networked communities can access, question and contest taken-for-granted 
assumptions, and thereby scrutinise conditions to reach a common interest 
between contracting parties.  
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Chapter Five: Dualist Vedic Philosophy 
The non-dualist theory of sustainable accountability presented by Saravanamuthu 
(2006, 2007) is based upon the advaitic conception of reality that everything is 
one. With the entire ecosystem being interconnected, to harm one part of the 
whole is to harm oneself. As Saravanamuthu explains, based on this conception 
of reality, advaitic accountability is designed to generate reflexive decisions 
which lead to ahimsic outcomes. Bhaskar (2000), also coming from the advaitic 
paradigm, similarly explains that contemporary societal ills may be cured by 
correcting the ontological error that one’s self is a separate entity from the rest of 
the cosmos. What Saravanamuthu and Bhaskar describe, then, is a theory of 
sustainability (or sustainable accountability) based on the non-dualist conception 
of the self.  
Dualist Vedic philosophy readily acknowledges that such accountability 
would create more sustainable outcomes than current systems that fragment time 
and space. With its foundations in neoclassical economic theory, the notion of 
the self in mainstream accounting is what Weale (1992) terms Homo 
Economicus. As a species, Homo Economicus is prone to self-interested utility 
maximising behaviour, and thus mainstream accounting recognises no obligation 
for an economic entity to account for anything but the pursuance of what 
neoclassical economics determines is its own interest – the maximisation of 
shareholder wealth (Shearer, 2002). In stark contrast, Saravanamuthu’s advaitic 
accountability advocates a broader scope of analysis that includes, for instance, 
animal welfare (Saravanamuthu, 2006).  
Whilst acknowledging the superiority of non-dualist accountability over 
the conventional, dualist Vedic philosophy asserts that higher levels of 
sustainability and societal wellbeing are attainable by aligning systems of 
accountability with a dualist conception of the self. Gaudīya-Vaisnavism does 
not consider the self to be material, as pure dualists or materialists might. Nor 
does it conclude that the self has no personal identity because it is one with the 
rest of the ecosystem, as the monist philosophy does. Instead, Vaisnavism 
recognises the self as different from the material body and a part of the Supreme. 
When his needs in relation to the Supreme are met, one is no longer impelled by 
the dictates of the material body and mind. Hence a dualist theory of 
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accountability encourages a sustainable pattern of desires and consumption. 
Under non-dualist accountability, however, one’s needs in relation to the 
Supreme go unfulfilled, because neither the self nor God are recognised as 
individuals or as personal in nature. Dualism offers a more sustainable form of 
accountability because if the needs of the self are met one has no desire to 
engage in unsustainable patterns of consumption, and because of a higher level 
of satisfaction one willingly changes his values, desires and behaviours. Under 
the non-dualist theory of accountability that Saravanamuthu (2006) has 
described, behaviours and values are influenced when satyagrahic discourse is 
employed but no higher form of satisfaction than sensory pleasure is provided 
for, unlike a Vaisnava theory of accountability. This chapter prepares the way for 
a description of the dualist theory of accountability by describing its underlying 
philosophy and its conception of the self.  
 
Dualist Vedic Philosophy 
As explained in the second chapter, the Vedic text Bhagavad-Gītā summarises 
the essential principles of Vedic philosophy. The dualist conception of the self is 
explained in several chapters of the Gītā, but since this thesis also refers to non-
dualist Vedic philosophy, it is helpful to begin a description of dualism with the 
Gītā’s seventh chapter. This explanation will make it possible to locate 
materialist, non-dualist and dualist forms of accountability within the theoretical 
framework presented by Krishna. At the beginning of the seventh chapter, 
Krishna declares to Arjuna that He will summarise everything in the universe, 
both material and spiritual. His words read: 
 
jñanam te ‘ham sa-vijñānam 
idam vaksyāmy aśesatah 
yaj jñātvā neha bhūyo ‘nyaj 
jñātavyam avaśisyate 
 
“I shall now declare unto you in full this knowledge, both phenomenal and 
numinous. This being known, nothing further shall remain for you to know” 
(Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 7.2). While this may seem an immense task 
to accomplish in one conversation, Krishna nonetheless completes it in the next 
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few verses. His framework describes everything as either His superior or His 
inferior energy. Krishna begins by listing His inferior energies: 
 
bhūmir āpo ‘nalo vāyuh 
kham mano buddir eva caī 
ahankāra itīyam me 
bhinnā prakrtir astadhā 
 
“Earth, water, fire, air, ether, mind, intelligence and false ego – all together these 
eight constitute My separated material energies” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, 
verse 7.4). Other Vaisnava commentators have translated earth, water, fire, air 
and ether as solid, liquid, and gaseous matters, radiant energy and empty space – 
in other words, Krishna is listing His energies in the descending order of their 
perceptibility.  
From the Vedic perspective, reductionist material science is concerned 
mainly with the first five categories of inferior energy that Krishna described, 
namely solid liquid and gaseous matters, radiant energy and empty space. 
Psychologists and philosophers also address mental activities. Hines, for 
instance, suggests that accounting should include the emotional values of the 
“Universal Feminine,” such as “the prioritising of feelings; the reality and value 
of the non-marketable and non-material” (1992, p. 314). Finally, non-dualist 
Vedic philosophy is concerned with all eight of these energies and nothing more, 
their source being the impersonal brahman. These substances are described by 
Krishna as inferior energies because, by themselves, they lack the presence of 
consciousness. In the next verse Krishna explains that it is His superior energy, 
the living entities, that exhibit the consciousness that causes the material energy 
to function: 
 
apareyam itas tv anyām 
prakrtim viddhi me parām 
jiva-bhūtām mahā-bāho 
yayedam dhāryate jagat 
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“Besides these, O mighty armed Arjuna, there is another, superior energy of 
Mine, which comprises the living entities who are exploiting the resources of this 
material, inferior nature” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 7.5). While the 
Bhagavad-Gītā admits that the living entities cannot be directly perceived, it also 
asserts that their presence can be known by certain symptoms, just as the 
movement of clouds and dust indicate the wind’s currents. Elsewhere in the Gītā, 
Krishna denotes consciousness as the symptom that indicates the presence of the 
living entity: 
 
yathā prakāśayaty ekah 
krtsnam lokam imam ravih 
ksetram ksetrī tathā krtsnam 
prakāśayati bhārata 
 
“O son of Bharata [Arjuna], as the sun alone illuminates all this universe, so does 
the living entity, one within the body, illuminate the entire body by 
consciousness” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 13.34). Sometimes the sun is 
not directly seen because the sky is filled with clouds, yet because of the light of 
the sun, one is convinced that the sun exists. Similarly, in the above verse, 
Krishna asserts that consciousness is the symptom that indicates the presence of 
the living entity, even if he may not be directly perceived. Furthermore, Krishna 
explains here that consciousness is not a product of chemical combinations, as 
material science asserts. After death, when the body no longer exhibits any 
consciousness, the same chemicals are present in the body as during life, yet 
consciousness is absent, and cannot be revived. Therefore dualist Vedic 
philosophy holds that consciousness is not a product of combinations of matter 
but is a symptom that indicates the presence of the living entity.12 
According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, conventional forms of accountability 
limit their concern to the eight inferior energies that Krishna listed which lack 
consciousness. Considering Smark’s (2006) contention that accounting does not 
factor the indirect costs of schizophrenia, and Saravanamuthu’s (2006) 
                                                 
12
 Many further issues arise from this assertion, and it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
consider them all. Interested readers, however, may refer to Cremo (2003) for a comprehensive 
description of the Vedic explanation of consciousness.  
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arguments that it excludes large portions of the ecosystem by labelling them as 
externalities, it may be argued that mainstream accounting does not even cater 
for inferior energies very well. Academics therefore advocate more social and 
environmental forms of accountability by campaigning for the improved 
accounting of these eight energies, such as the above example from Hines 
(1992), who suggested accounting should extend its concern to the functions of 
the mind. According to the Bhagavad-Gītā, though, none of these forms of 
accounting consider the needs of the conscious self, who is different from the 
material energy. Without considering the needs of the conscious self, any theory 
of sustainable accountability will inevitably be limited in its effectiveness. This is 
evident in Druhl et al. (2001) who, also writing from the Vedic paradigm, 
identify the consciousness of an organisation’s individual members as a unifying 
basis for organisational management and change. The two conventional 
approaches to organisational change, “planned change” and the “learning 
organisation”, often meet with limited success, and Druhl et al. attribute this to 
each approach addressing only a partial aspect of the organisation and failing to 
identify a common area of organisational life, from which all aspects of the 
organisation can be understood and managed. In their analysis they identify the 
elusive conscious self – the target of Vedic inquiries: 
 
“What is missing in the classical and quantum paradigms so far is a systematic, 
scientific approach to this subjective element as a potentially unifying basis for 
managing the whole range of diverse aspects of the organization. … A complete 
understanding of the organization and a correspondingly successful strategy of 
change will emerge only when this missing element is included. In the area of 
quantum physics we have identified the subjective element to be the observer. In 
the area of organizations and social relations we now locate the subjective 
element in the individual member of the organization. By the individual member 
here we are referring not to the individual’s position or role, which are structural 
aspects, nor to his or her social interactions, which are behavioral aspects. 
Rather, we are referring to the individual’s inner nature, his awareness or 
consciousness, the inner wakefulness which perceives, the subjective screen on 
which position, role and interaction are seen and from which they are organized” 
(Druhl et al., 2001, pp. 389-390). 
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The Self in Dualist Vedic Philosophy 
Dualist Vedic philosophy establishes a difference between matter and the 
conscious living entity, or a difference between the material body and the 
conscious self. This is illustrated by Krishna at the beginning of the Bhagavad-
Gītā, where He states: 
 
dehino ‘smin yatā dehe 
kaumāram yauvanam jarā 
tathā dehāntara-prāptir 
dhīras tatra na muhyati 
 
“As the soul continues to pass, in this body, from boyhood to youth to old age, 
the soul similarly passes into another body at death. A sober person is not 
bewildered by such a change” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 2.13). 
Linyanarachchi (2007), in describing a Buddhist theory of accountability, 
advances the concept of samsāra – the continuous repetition of birth and death. 
The notion of repeated lives is present in the Vedas as well, but in the verse 
above Krishna explains that the self inhabits different material bodies, not just in 
different lives, but also within one lifetime. Contemporary medical science 
accepts that the chemicals that comprise the material body change over a period 
of approximately seven years, as new cells are created and the old are discarded. 
If all chemicals of the human body are constantly being replaced, then it follows 
that the body is a different set of chemicals in youth than in childhood. Again, in 
old age, the body is comprised of an entirely different set of chemicals due to cell 
replacement. Thus the living entity not only changes bodies at death but also 
throughout his current life. The consciousness of the living entity, however, does 
not change or die, nor does one’s identity change with the change of the chemical 
composition of the body. Instead the living entity retains the same consciousness 
throughout their entire lifetime, and thus the self cannot be the material body. 
With the identity of the self different from the material body, dualist 
Vedic philosophy asserts that one cannot find satisfaction through indulgence of 
the body’s senses. One’s identity is different from the vehicle they drive, and 
thus they do not consume the fuel of the vehicle for their own enjoyment – to do 
so would only cause frustration. Similarly, the Vedas explain that one has a 
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separate identity from the material body, and therefore to try and attain 
satisfaction solely through the senses of the body will result only in frustration. 
Nonetheless, the Vedas support the careful maintenance of the body – although 
one has a separate identity from their vehicle, this does not impel them to destroy 
it. Instead a vehicle is carefully maintained so it can achieve certain ends. 
Similarly, the Vedas encourage the maintenance of the body so it can be used for 
spiritual rather than material ends. In this regard, the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam states: 
 
kāmasya nendriya-prītir 
lābho jīveta yāvatā 
jīvasya tattva-jijñāsā 
nārtho yaś ceha karmabhih 
 
“Life’s desires should never be directed towards sense gratification. One should 
desire only a healthy life, or self-preservation, since a human being is meant for 
inquiry about the Absolute Truth. Nothing else should be the goal of one’s 
works” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, verse 1.2.10). The dualist consideration is 
that material objects like the body can be utilised for spiritual purposes, just as an 
iron rod, when heated in fire, takes on the properties of fire. Biswas (1998) 
therefore explains that the Vedas permit economic development and wealth 
accumulation, not as ends in themselves, but as means to a higher end. 
Chakraborty and Chakraborty (2007) also claim that the Vedas view the desire 
for a decent material life not as a hurdle but as an enabling factor for fulfilling 
the supra-material aspirations of life.  
As Velayutham and Perera (1996) stated, different theories of 
accountability become manifest from different metaphysical notions of the self, 
and therefore a dualist conception of the self as different from the material body 
has profound implications for theories of sustainable accountability. It is not 
sufficient, however, simply to know that the self is not the material body. To 
formulate a theory of accountability, positive information of the real identity of 
the self and its needs is also required – as Devamrita Svami states, “we cannot 
account for the cosmos without accounting for the accountant” (2002, p. 100). 
Rather than being one with God, as non-dualists assert, the Bhagavad-Gītā holds 
that the self is eternally a part of the Supreme: 
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mamaivamśo jiva-loke 
jīva-bhūtah sanātanah 
manah-sasthānīndriyāni 
prakrti-sthāni karsati 
 
“The living entities in this world are My eternal fragmental parts. Due to 
conditioned life they are struggling very hard with the six senses, which include 
the mind” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 15.7).13 Psychologists assert that, 
in general, humans seek pleasure and try to repel distress (Layard, 2005). The 
reason, according to the Vedas, is that all living entities are parts of Krishna, 
Who is also pleasure-seeking in nature. As a drop of seawater has the same salty 
characteristics as the ocean, so does the living entity have the propensity to seek 
pleasure, for this propensity is inherent in God. Because humans, and all other 
forms of life for that matter, share the same pleasure-seeking tendency, it 
demonstrates that they are all parts of a Complete Whole that is pleasure seeking 
in nature. 
When under the impression that he is the material body, the living entity 
seeks satisfaction through matter by gratifying the senses of the body. As the 
above verse of the Gītā demonstrates, the Vedas include the mind as a sense 
organ, and the functions of the mind are described as thinking, feeling and 
willing – therefore the Vedic definition of materialism is inclusive of subtle 
forms of enjoyment as well as more gross forms. The Vedas explain, however, 
that actual satisfaction may only be attained by satisfying God, as the living 
entities are His parts. This follows from the Vedic definition of God as 
bhoktāram yajña-tapasām – the ultimate beneficiary of all sacrifices and 
austerities, or the Supreme Enjoyer (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 5.29). An 
example is that part of a machine co-operates with the whole of the machine, and 
a part of the body co-operates with the rest of the body. The different parts of the 
                                                 
13
 Saravanamuthu raises the question, “Why did God need to create anything if he is complete 
and perfect?” (2006, p. 312). This question may be answered with Krishna’s statement, “The 
living entities in this world are My eternal fragmental parts” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 
15.7). Although all the living entities themselves have individual personality, they are, 
nonetheless, fragmental parts of God. Therefore, in answer to Saravanamuthu’s question, the 
Vedic conception of God includes all living entities as well, and therefore God has not created 
anything outside of Himself, rather He is still complete and perfect.  
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body, the hands, legs, eyes and so on, are not actually the enjoyers. The digestive 
system is the enjoyer because only it has the ability to assimilate the energy of 
the food. If different parts of the body are to be kept healthy, all respective parts 
of the body must feed the digestive system and thus be nourished. The different 
bodily parts cannot obtain nourishment without satisfying the digestive system, 
and similarly, as parts of Krishna, living entities must satisfy Him in order to feel 
fully satisfied. As Bhaktivedanta Svami states: 
 
“A person should act in such a way that the Lord is satisfied by the activity; it is 
not that he himself is to be satisfied. Of course, when the Lord is satisfied, the 
devotee automatically becomes satisfied. This is the secret of the process of 
bhakti-yoga” (1987, Fourth Canto, p. 514). 
 
This service to God is also the Vedic conception of love, as one cannot claim to 
love God without rendering Him service. In describing love of God, McKernan 
and Kosmala (2007) incorporate Derrida’s conceptions of “the possibility of the 
impossible” (Derrida, 1993, p. 43, quoted in McKernan and Kosmala, 2007, p. 
733). They state that love of God is, “passion for the impossible,” and, “a going 
out to the other without demanding that the other compromise its alterity: it is a 
giving of oneself as a gift without calculating the return” (McKernan and 
Kosmala, 2007, p. 734). The Vedic conception of love, however, is more 
straightforward: one cannot claim to love their husband or wife and yet, 
simultaneously, be negligent of the desires of their partner. Therefore to love 
God also means to serve God. 
A dualist theory of accountability, then, recognises these two central 
points concerning the self: firstly, the living entity is not the material body, and 
sensory pleasures, by themselves, will not satisfy him; secondly, the living entity 
is a part of God and thus his satisfaction depends upon the satisfaction of the 
Supreme. Therefore dualist accountability simultaneously performs two 
functions: the first recognises the difference between body and self by not 
attributing value to unnecessary sensory engagements, and the second ascribes 
value and recognition to activities that bring pleasure to the Supreme. Herein lies 
one essential difference between dualist and non-dualist systems of 
accountability. In order to stimulate the reflexive responses that generate ahimsic 
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outcomes, Saravanamuthu (2006) claimed that advaitic accountability would 
utilise Gandhi’s satyagrahic methods of reducing the fragmentation of time and 
space, thereby making people more conscious of their actions. Decisions would 
thus be made on information that treated the ecosystem as an interconnected 
whole – in this way more externalities would be internalised, and a sustainable 
form of accounting would ensue. Whereas non-dualist accountability depends 
upon Gandhi’s satyagrahic methods to overcome the “treadmill of alienation and 
exploitation” (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 304), dualism relies on transcending the 
bodily pleasures that bind one to such a treadmill, through attaining a higher taste 
experienced by the living entity when he harmonises his activities with the 
desires of the Supreme. Such a method of transcending lesser, sensory pleasures 
is mentioned in the Bhagavad-Gītā and is thus supported by the Vedas: 
 
visayā vinivartante 
nirāhārasya dehinah 
rasa-varjam raso ‘py asya 
param drstvā nivartate 
 
“The embodied soul may be restricted from sense enjoyment, though the taste for 
sense objects remains. But, ceasing such engagements by experiencing a higher 
taste, he is fixed in consciousness” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 2.59). 
Such a transcending of inferior pleasures has been demonstrated as possible by 
Druhl et al. (2001), who advocate employment of the Vedic worldview and 
paradigm given by Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, commonly known as 
Transcendental Meditation, or simply as TM. This has its origins in non-dualist 
Vedic thought, and therefore is not representative of the dualist schools, which 
the Bhagavad-Gītā asserts are more effective at transcending consumerist urges. 
However, the research of Druhl et al. will suffice to partially illustrate the dualist 
concept of a higher taste. They cite empirical benefits of TM practices in 
organisations and citywide settings. In one instance they refer to Rhode Island 
where during 1978 there was a slight increase in the practitioners of Maharishi’s 
yogic tradition, which was significantly and positively associated with increases 
in the Island’s composite quality of life index. The index included eight variables 
including beer and cigarette consumption and levels of air pollution: all showed 
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significant improvement in 1978 compared with the previous four years (Druhl et 
al., 2001). Thus Vedic philosophy, in practice, may effect change where lower 
forms of enjoyment are transcended.  
As Sharma and Talwar (2004) state, Vedic philosophy stresses that 
happiness lies in self-contentment not trying to fulfil material desires. By 
recognising a difference between the wants of the material body and the needs of 
the self, a dualist theory of accountability seeks to provide the means of 
achieving self-contentment. Self-satisfaction, or satisfaction absent the 
dependence on conditions for sensory enjoyment, is also possible in the non-
dualist Vedic paradigm, though Saravanamuthu does not mention this. Other 
commentators though, such as Ghosh (2007) and Gupta (2007), have alluded to 
it. Such self-satisfaction is more difficult to attain via the non-dualist process 
however, as is explained by Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gītā, when His student, 
Arjuna, asks which is the most perfect – dualist or non-dualist methods of self-
realisation. Krishna replies that the dualist method is better because the non-
dualist method is klesah adhika-tarāh – “very troublesome.” The verse reads: 
 
kleśah ‘dhikataras tesām 
avyaktāsakta-cetasām 
avyaktā hi gatir duhka 
dehavadbir avāpyate 
 
“For those whose minds are attached to the unmanifest, impersonal feature of the 
Supreme, advancement is very troublesome. To make progress in that discipline 
is always very difficult for those who are embodied” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 
1989, verse 12.5). The Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1988, verse 
10.2.32) further describes that the non-dualist platform of self-satisfaction is not 
enduring, for it provides no connection to a higher personal reality. In non-dualist 
philosophy, as Saravanamuthu (2006) describes, God is ultimately impersonal. 
However this is not supported in the Bhagavad-Gītā, the essence of Vedic 
philosophy, as Krishna asserts that both He and the living entity eternally 
maintain their personality: 
 
na tv evāham jātu nāsam 
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na tvam name janādhipāh 
na caiva na bhavisyāmah 
sarva vayam atah param 
 
“Never was there a time when I did not exist, nor you, nor all these kings; nor in 
the future shall any of us cease to exist” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 
2.12). If living entities are personal then an impersonal reality will not satisfy 
them – even on a material level, physiologists recognise that people are happier if 
they value good relationships and contribute to the community beyond 
consumerist enjoyment (Kasser, 2002; Layard, 2005). The Vedas assert the same 
for the self on a spiritual platform – personal relationships are more satisfying. 
Therefore dualist accountability can provide a higher platform of sustainability 
than non-dualist schools, even if the latter are orientated towards attaining self-
satisfaction. The great Vaisnava scholar, Prahlāda Mahārāja, illustrates this 
superiority of personalism over impersonalism in his prayers, which also indicate 
what might be possible under a dualist form of accountability: 
 
“My dear Lord of the universe, I am feeling transcendental pleasure in Your 
presence and have become merged in an ocean of transcendental happiness. I 
now consider the happiness of brahmananda [non-dualist liberation] to be no 
more than the water in the impression left by a cow’s hoof in the earth, 
compared to this ocean of bliss” (Hari-bhakti-sudhodaya, quoted in 
Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1970, p. 15). 
 
Dualist Vedic Accountability 
The previous section purported that dualist Vedic accountability is concerned 
with accounting for the self, not as the material body, but as a part of God. One 
of its central features is not attributing any positive value to the production, 
promotion or sale of consumerist goods and services – especially those that only 
stimulate the mind and senses, and are thus unnecessary for healthy maintenance 
of the material body. As the following chapter will detail, one cannot find 
satisfaction through senses of the body, and thus the supply of consumerist goods 
leads only to increasing consumption – an unsustainable situation. Therefore the 
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production and marketing of consumerist goods and services that only gratify the 
physical and mental bodies would have no value in dualist Vedic accountability.  
Dualist Vedic philosophy advances that the highest position of 
sustainability is achieved only when the senses are controlled through enjoyment 
that supersedes material sensory pleasures. Therefore the second feature central 
to dualist Vedic accountability is that the self is recognised as a part of the 
Supreme by attributing value to endeavours intended to bring satisfaction to the 
Supreme. The art, science and culture of pleasing the Supreme are described in 
the Vedic literatures, especially the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, which describes the 
activities of many transcendentalists. However, so the reader may understand 
what type of projects dualist Vedic accountability would attribute value to, an 
explanation is given in the seventh chapter. Essentially, though, dualist Vedic 
accountability would recognise value when other living entities are treated as 
parts of God rather than as their material body, and therefore such accountability 
would identify how other living entities were being benefited by the reporting 
entity by being freed of the bodily conception of life.  
From this outline of dualist Vedic accountability, it is clear that it is 
concerned with accounting to a higher principal – namely Krishna, the Supreme 
Person. Dualist accountability, then, does not follow non-dualists, whose theory 
of sustainability depends upon satyagrahic discourse (Saravanamuthu, 2006). 
Instead dualist accountability is similar to the Islamic model, in that agents are 
held responsible to a higher principal. It is through the satisfaction of Krishna 
that a culture of sustainability is achieved, for by satisfying Krishna, His 
dedicated parts also become satisfied, who then transcend desires for 
unsustainable consumer enjoyment. Dualist accountability is also similar to 
Shearer’s (2002) accountability to the other, for, as described in the seventh 
chapter, accounting for Krishna’s desires includes accounting for the wellbeing 
of other living entities. Indeed, part of the agent’s responsibility to Krishna lies in 
not misleading other living entities to believe that lesser forms of enjoyment will 
satisfy them, and therefore consumerist goods and services would not be 
attributed value under dualist Vedic accountability. As Chapters Six and Seven 
describe, the principle of not recognising goods unbeneficial to material and 
spiritual wellbeing also exists in Islamic accountability.  
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Like Islamic accountability, the dualist model is not limited to the caring 
professions, but extends to the commercial sector. According to the Vedas, the 
real interests of principals and the agents lie in the satisfaction of God, regardless 
of what industry, sector or profession they are in. However, just as Islamic 
accountability assumed that not all agents are equipped with the knowledge and 
aspiration to satisfy their higher principal, dualist Vedic accountability does not 
assume that all principals and agents are free of the conception that they are the 
body and that sensory pleasures are ultimately unsatisfying. Dualist 
accountability is therefore generally contractual, for in many contexts where it 
would be applied there is not high trust and little potential for the conflict of 
values. It follows, then, that the principle cannot specify all the requirements for 
dualist accountability, for that principle may be lacking in the knowledge and 
practice of satisfying the Supreme. As will be described in the seventh chapter, in 
contemporary and traditional Vedic culture, a class of spiritual intellectuals 
would guide society in its accountability to the Supreme Principal.  
Following Roberts (1991), such a dualist system of accountability, being 
more hierarchical and contractual, would produce a more individualised sense of 
self. However, acknowledging a higher principal in dualist Vedic accountability 
does not preclude it from adopting the techniques that Saravanamuthu (2006, 
2007) has suggested for satyagrahic accountability – so long as the self is also 
recognised as a part of the Supreme. Also, there may be circumstances where 
dualist accountability would be better applied communally. Because of its 
attitude towards the sacred and the secular, dualist Vedic accountability may 
embrace any accounting procedure that would better consider the needs of the 
self. Therefore the various accountability tools that Saravanamuthu 
recommended – radar plotting, customised accountability, forward-looking 
accountability, minimisation of the dichotomisation between means and ends, 
and other such techniques – are within the scope of dualist philosophy if they 
improve the care of the environment and society while recognising the spiritual 
identity of the self. 
Roberts (1991) also admits that the individualising of the self is not 
always undesirable. When taken in a context of exploitative disciplinary power, 
an individualised sense of the self has a detrimental effect to wellbeing, as 
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Roberts describes. However, he also concedes the possibility of a beneficial 
sense of self emerging: 
 
“One’s absorption with objective appearance can be purely defensive or can be 
taken on more positively as a series of projects for the enhancement of the self. 
… The individualised self can aspire to an ever more complete autonomy, and 
each level of the hierarchy apparently offers a move towards this; position in the 
hierarchy serving as an objective confirmation of relative value and worth. In 
practice of course one is drawn thereby further and further into conformity with 
the standards of utility upon which “success” depends” (1991, p. 360). 
 
As Roberts explains, “accountability represents the attitudes of others towards us, 
and in this way both addresses and immediately confirms us” (1991, p. 358). 
Under a dualist theory, accountability is intended to confirm the self as a part of 
God whereby success is seen as satisfying the Supreme. Rather than being 
exploitative, such a conception is liberating for, as will be described, it frees one 
from the belief that matter is the summum bonum of everything by giving the 
possibility of genuine spiritual experience, and thus gives much opportunity for 
the development of character. Therefore the sense of self generated through 
dualist Vedic accountability is not undesirable. Roberts (1991) states communal 
accountabilities are limited to contexts without power asymmetries but with 
possible face-to-face interaction. Thus, when the case for individualising forms 
of accountability prevails, it is better that they produce a sense of self that is 
advantageous for the accountee.  
Two significant features of dualist Vedic accountability have been 
identified as not attributing value to consumerist goods and services. To address 
the first research question proposed by this thesis – namely what would be the 
significant features of a theory of accountability informed by dualist Vedic 
philosophy, as represented by Gaudīya-Vaisnavism? – the following two 
chapters elaborate on these two features. In either a traditional or contemporary 
Vedic culture, the serious practitioner would consider himself accountable to 
Krishna as a higher principal, and would mould his life around these two ideals. 
Therefore, such a theory of accountability is relevant on an intrapersonal level. 
However, as the seventh chapter describes, being responsible to Krishna entails 
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that the accountee considers the needs of the other. Therefore dualist Vedic 
philosophy is also interpersonal. This thesis suggests that such accountability 
should be incorporated into social and institutional roles, on the grounds that this 
will cultivate sustainable desires and, hence, sustainable consumption patterns. 
The practicality of this is discussed in the ninth chapter. 
This suggestion of institutionalising Vedic accountability is drawn from 
the explanation of the Vedic social system given by Bhīsmadeva to King 
Yudhisthira, immediately after the battle of Kuruksetra. On his unusual deathbed, 
Bhīsmadeva explained to the King how the arrangement of the Vedic social 
system accounts for the self as different from the material body (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1987, verse 1.9.26). Although the Vedas contend that the self is different 
from the material body, they nonetheless acknowledge that, while inhabiting the 
body, one has to act in the material world – and thus constantly face proposals of 
sensory indulgence. The Vedas describe that, absent a process of refining one’s 
character, one becomes accustomed to thinking that he is the material body, and 
that he, rather than God, is the Supreme Enjoyer. Recognising this, Bhīsmadeva 
explained that the Vedic social system is arranged into several occupational 
divisions so as to develop detachment for lesser, material forms of enjoyment, 
while interacting with the world in such a way that one develops attachment for 
higher pleasures of the self. By utilising his personal talents, qualifications and 
proclivities to interact with the material energy to serve the Supreme rather than 
one’s own senses, one attains a higher taste. Thus Bhīsmadeva explained the 
Vedic principles of counteraction by detachment and interaction by attachment. 
A dualist theory of accountability therefore counteracts material attachment by 
not attributing any positive value to unnecessary, materialistic goods and 
services, and encourages interaction with the material energy by recognising the 
Krishna as the Supreme Enjoyer, so people may attain a higher form of 
enjoyment. These principles are explained in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter Six: Counteraction by Detachment 
The previous chapter established that dualist Vedic philosophy makes a 
distinction between the self and the material body and that one cannot find 
satisfaction through the body via the stimulation of the body’s senses. Instead, 
the Vedas assert that complete satisfaction is only obtained through pure, 
unmotivated service to God, of Whom the living entity is a part of. In a non-
dualist theory of accountability, Saravanamuthu (2006) explained that ahimsic, 
or non-violent outcomes can be achieved by basing systems of accountability on 
the notion of the self as interconnected with the entire ecosystem. This would 
encourage “reflexive responses” to socio-environmental degradation and thus 
individuals would consciously modify their behaviour, expectations and values to 
more sustainable ones (Saravanamuthu, 2006, p. 306). Dualist accountability, on 
the other hand, seeks to transform behaviours, expectations and values by 
addressing the needs of the self, for when the self is satisfied one will no longer 
seek satisfaction through the senses of the body in an unsustainable manner. To 
address the first research question posed at the beginning of this thesis, this 
chapter describes how a dualist Vedic theory of sustainable accountability would 
be constructed to avoid the cultivation of unsustainable patterns of consumption. 
This is achieved by the dualist method of counteraction by detachment. The first 
section of this chapter elaborates on the Vedic assertion that one cannot obtain 
satisfaction through materialistic pursuits. The second explains why such pursuits 
should be considered unsustainable and then details how dualist Vedic 
accountability encourages detachment from them. 
 
The Non-Material Identity of the Self 
The Vedas are not alone in asserting that consumerist behaviour injures 
environmental and societal wellbeing – social and environmental accounting 
research conducted by Islamic and Buddhist commentators has made similar 
claims (Kamla et al., 2006; Khan, 1991; Lewis, 2001; Linyanarachchi, 2007). 
These contentions have also been made from a material standpoint, as Chwastiak 
and Young (2003) argued that mainstream accounting undervalues the 
detrimental repercussions of marketing consumerist goods and services, and the 
negative consequences of promoting and selling them go unmentioned in annual 
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reports because this would conflict with maximum profit realisation – a 
contradiction they attribute to the unequal distribution of wealth and power in 
capitalist society. They claim that when consumption is seen as an ultimate goal, 
it creates emptiness and angst within individuals because the fulfilment of 
consumerist desires is temporary and non-cumulative. The sense of emptiness 
that follows such consumption, however, only stimulates a craving for more, 
“leading to a vicious cycle of desire that can never be satiated” (Chwastiak and 
Young, 2003, p. 542). The current neoclassical regime that mainstream 
accounting is built upon regards such feelings as externalities and, thus, the 
reporting entity is not held accountable for them. Annual reports are therefore 
silent on such matters. 
Chwastiak and Young base their arguments on psychological studies of 
consumerism (Frank, 1999; Huyghe and Ikeda, 1991; O’Sullivan, 1999). In 
recent decades studies of consumerism reporting similar findings have grown, 
though, as Lintott (1998) describes, their implications have largely been 
overlooked in mainstream economics: 
 
 “… the view, common to most schools of economics, [is] that consumption is 
closely related to welfare and should be maximised” (1998, p. 240).  
 
However, beyond the confines of the narrow conventional framework, Lintott 
claims that the effects of excessive consumerism are becoming common 
knowledge: 
 
“The lack of any simple relation between consumption and welfare seems to be 
widely acknowledged among non-economists, whether in folklore (‘can’t buy 
happiness’) or in sociology or psychology, where the motives for consumption 
are investigated more critically than in economics” (1998, p. 242). 
 
Layard (2005), after reviewing psychological research on consumerism, writes 
that for most Western people, levels of happiness have not increased since the 
1950’s – the time period over which consumption has increased the most. In 
America, Britain and Japan, Layard claims people are no happier despite living 
standards having more than doubled with major increases in real income across 
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all incomes. Like other reviewers (Easterbrook, 2003; Frey and Stutzer, 2002; 
Kasser, 2002; Lane, 2000), he found that once basic human necessities of food, 
shelter, clothing and the like are met, subjective wellbeing is only slightly 
affected by income, if at all. Lintott states: 
 
“This literature makes it clear that, once basic material needs are satisfied, 
people seek in ever growing consumption satisfaction of wants … which 
consumption cannot possibly deliver, or only to a tiny minority, and which it 
may even in fact undermine” (1998, p. 245). 
 
Therefore the Vedas describe that once the needs of the body are met, needs of 
the non-material self become the priority, which cannot be met by consuming 
material goods. But lacking knowledge of how to satisfy these needs happiness 
cannot progress beyond a basic level. Myers and Diener support this: 
 
“People have not become happier over time as their cultures have become more 
affluent. Even though Americans earn twice as much as in today’s dollars as 
they did in 1957, the proportion of those telling surveyors from the National 
Opinion Research Centre that they are “very happy” has declined from 35 to 29 
percent. Even very rich people – those surveyed among Forbes magazine’s 100 
wealthiest Americans – are only slightly happier than the average American. 
Those whose income has increased over a 10-year period are not happier than 
those whose income is stagnant. Indeed, in most nations the correlation between 
income and happiness is negligible – only in the poorest countries, such as 
Bangladesh and India, is income a good measure of emotional well-being” 
(1996, pp. 70-71).  
 
Others report similar findings,14 affirming that above an income required for a 
basic standard of living, wealth has little or no effect on subjective wellbeing – 
consistent with the Vedic assertion that satisfaction cannot be attained through 
sensory enjoyment. Some opponents may argue that increased incomes do not 
necessarily represent more consumerist lifestyles, as some households may have 
                                                 
14
 See, for instance, Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz and Diener (1993), Veenhoven (1993) and 
Wilkening and McGranahan (1978). 
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needed to provide for more dependents. However, the percentage of Americans 
who considered themselves happy peaked in 1957 despite consumption per 
person having more than doubled since then (United Nations Development 
Program, 1999).15 Furthermore, research has found that holding highly 
materialistic desires is associated with a lack of wellbeing. Diener and Oishi 
(2000), for instance, found, after collecting value and life satisfaction measures 
from over seven thousand college students in forty-one different nations, that a 
strong value on making money was associated with diminishing life satisfaction. 
Others have reported parallel findings.16 
To account for this phenomenon of decreasing happiness while sensory 
stimulus – or even the desire for it – increases, some psychologists (Kasser, 
2002; Lane, 2000; Maslow, 1954; Ryan and Deci, 2000) postulate that humans 
have psychological needs as well as physical needs, and when lacking the 
former, they try to satisfy themselves through consumption, which leads instead 
to greater dissatisfaction:  
 
“Just as a person who eats junk food will be less healthy than one who eats 
many fruits and vegetables, an individual with relatively central materialistic 
values will have fewer chances to fulfil the needs required for psychological 
growth and happiness” (Kasser, 2002, p. 27). 
 
As Kasser explains, then, it is not simply that people who are already unhappy 
focus more on wealth, image, possessions and sensory enjoyment but rather that 
                                                 
15
 There are also suggestions that happiness does not increase with rising levels of income 
because rising living standards also raises the expectations of happiness. Thus although people 
are happier with more sensory enjoyment, they do not report it. However the same people 
surveyed over their lifetimes have not become happier despite becoming richer (Easterlin, 2001). 
Furthermore, when comparing Western industrial countries, the richer ones are no happier than 
the poorer. In countries that earn more than $20,000 per head, additional income is not associated 
with extra happiness (Layard, 2005). As expectations would not have increased at the same rate 
across all industrial nations, happiness levels cannot have remained stationary due to rising 
expectations. Thus, as Kasser (2002) states, psychological research has established that money 
does not buy happiness.  
 
16
 See, for instance, Ahuvia and Wong (1995), Belk (1984, 1985), Carver and Baird (1998), 
Cohen and Cohen (1995), Dawson (1988), Dawson and Bamossy (1991), Kasser (2002), Kasser 
and Ryan (1993, 1996), Mick (1996), Richins and Dawson (1992) and Sheldon and Kasser (1995, 
1998, 2001). This research has also discovered that those who hold materialistic goals as central 
report significantly higher levels of depression and anxiety (Kasser and Ryan, 1993, 1996; 
Schroeder and Dugal, 1995; Wachtel and Blatt, 1990), more anti-social behaviour (McHoskey, 
1999) and narcissism (Roberts and Robbins, 2000). 
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people lacking satisfaction of their psychological needs take refuge of 
consumerism. The Vedas agree that people have psychological as well as 
physical needs, and they add the needs of the non-material self for consideration. 
When the latter are missing, then seeking satisfaction through materialistic 
pursuits can never satisfy the non-material self. As the Bhagavad-Gītā describes, 
kāma – the desire to enjoy through the mind and the senses – is duspūrena – 
never to be satisfied, and is analena – burns like fire (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 
1989, verse 3.39). The more fuel is applied to a fire, the larger it grows, even 
though it may appear reduced for a short moment after the extra fuel is added. 
Similarly, the Vedas enjoin that the more senses are stimulated, the more the 
desire for sensory enjoyment grows, although it may appear to be satiated 
initially. As Layard describes:  
 
“One reason why happiness has not risen, despite our high standard of living, is 
that we get used to the higher standard of living. At first, extra comfort gives 
extra pleasure. Then we adapt to it and our pleasure returns towards its former 
level” (2005, p. 154). 
 
Similar to Layard, other psychologists refer to kāma as perceptual adaptation, 
whereby responsiveness to sights, sounds, odours and other sensory stimulations 
decrease as people continue to experience them (Schwartz, 2004). As 
experiences become more familiar, people desire more sensory stimuli to remain 
feeling content. Easterlin (1995), for example, when investigating the hedonic 
purchasing power of money, found that with each increment of income people 
created a new standard to measure themselves against. As Richins and Dawson 
state, other researchers have found the same trend when examining psychological 
effects of excessive consumption: 
 
“The lust for goods can be insatiable: the pleasures of a new acquisition are 
quickly forgotten and replaced with the desire for more. This cycle leads 
inevitably to dissatisfaction and discontent … Empirical tests of materialism 
support this hypothesis” (1992, p. 308). 
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Psychological findings therefore confirm the Vedas’ claim for the self having 
needs that cannot be met through sensory stimulus alone. This is consistent with 
Shearer (2002) and others (Hines, 1988, 1989), who contend that values inherent 
in accounting reproduce similar values in society, and promote unsustainable 
consumption patterns. As Ibrahim explains, Western theories of accountability 
hold materialism as an inherent value and belief, asserting the worldview that 
matter, “is the primordial or fundamental constituent of the Universe, which is 
not governed by intelligence, purpose or final causes” (Chapra, 1992, p. 22, 
quoted in Ibrahim, 2000, p. 22). Certain consequences follow from this: 
 
“…material wealth and sensuous pleasures become the greatest values one could 
seek or attain. This in turn becomes the basis for the increasing commercial 
consumer culture in economics and shareholder wealth maximisation concepts 
in accounting” (Ibrahim, 2000, p. 22). 
 
Similarly, Noreen (1988) states that the teaching of agency assumptions in 
conventional accounting socially legitimises values of self-interest, greed and 
opportunism and depicts them as typical human behaviour or as ideals to be 
striven for. 
The Vedas, however, when referring to pleasure and satisfaction, make 
reference to enjoyment that far exceeds that achieved through materialistic 
endeavours. From the Vedic perspective, sensory enjoyment is classified only as 
the temporary cessation of distress. The Vedas regard hankering and lamenting 
for material things as distresses, and sensory enjoyment is simply the negation of 
material hankering. Actual satisfaction, the Vedas describe, begins with the 
freedom from hankering and lamenting for material things (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1989, verse 18.54). As Caitanya Mahaprabhu prays:  
 
na dhanam na janam na sundarīm 
kavitām vā jagad-īśa kāmaye 
mama janmani janmanīśvare 
bhavatād bhaktir ahaituki tvayi 
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“O almighty Lord, I have no desire to accumulate wealth, nor do I desire 
beautiful women, nor do I want any number of followers. I only want Your 
causeless devotional service, birth after birth” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1996, 
Antya-līlā, verse 20.29). Because of His completely selfless service rendered to 
God in bhakti-yoga, Caitanya Mahaprabhu relished such pleasure that He 
considered all material forms of happiness to be insignificant. Vedic philosophy 
agrees that humans have physical and psychological needs but asserts that they 
have spiritual needs as well. Without the knowledge that they are not the material 
body, and thus without knowledge of their spiritual needs, living entities seek 
fulfilment through materialism, and thus fall short of Vedic standards of 
happiness and wellbeing. Therefore, while Chwastiak and Young (2003) reveal 
that annual reporting is silent on the consequences of marketing consumer goods, 
from the viewpoint of dualist Vedic philosophy, the silence is louder than 
Western commentators realise. 
 
Accounting for the Non-Material Identity of the Self 
The previous section established that by indulging the material senses of the 
body one cannot achieve the satisfaction of the self. However, lacking 
knowledge of what is actually fulfilling to the self, one has no option but to 
revert to the gratification of the six senses, which, from the Vedic outlook, 
include the mind. Since the mind is included as a sense organ, from the Vedic 
point of view there are both gross and subtle aspects to materialism. In its subtle 
forms, the desire for sensual enjoyment is manifest as philosophical speculation, 
and in its more gross forms, material desires often take the form of what is 
commonly called consumerism. Because material forms of enjoyment are 
intended to satisfy the self separately from the Supreme, they are ultimately 
unfulfilling. Chwastiak and Young (2003) state, consumerism leads to a cycle of 
desires that can never be satiated. Similarly, the Bhagavad-Gītā describes that 
the desire to enjoy through the senses is duspūrenanalena ca – never satisfied 
and burns like fire (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 3.39). Ecologists have 
therefore stated that excessive consumption is a major threat to the sustainability 
to the world’s environmental and social systems (Commoner, 1990; Daly, 1992; 
Durning, 1992; Goodland, 1992). Thus many thinkers advocate reducing the 
desire for gross forms of materialism. 
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The Vedas are also concerned with reducing material desires, and their 
method is to provide the opportunity to experience enjoyment far superior to 
material sensory pleasure. The Vedas readily acknowledge that more sustainable 
consumption patterns than those currently present in Western culture can be 
achieved by accounting, for instance, with Saravanamuthu’s (2006) methods for 
reducing time and space fragmentations. However, without considering the self 
as different from the material body there is no chance of satisfying the self. 
Dualist accountability therefore addresses the desire issue, not by attempting to 
quell desire altogether, but by encouraging desires to be redirected at a satisfying, 
and thus sustainable ends. Thus dualist Vedic accountability is concerned with 
accounting to Śrī Krishna as a higher principal and part of one’s responsibility to 
Krishna lies in not misleading other living entities to pursue lesser, exploitative 
forms of enjoyment. This also helps to achieve sustainable patterns of 
consumption, for, as it is seen, one cannot extinguish a fire by adding more fuel, 
but only by ceasing to add fuel. 
 As this section will explain, dualist accountability does not recognise 
value for activities that cultivate material desires. In the Vedas this is called 
vairāgya – detachment. In either contemporary or traditional Vedic culture, 
detachment from material desire and rāga – attachment to higher forms of 
enjoyment – are encouraged. Following Lintott, then, before any theory of 
accountability can be regarded as sustainable, it must first address detachment 
from material desire: 
 
“Reducing the scale of rich economies requires not only an increase in the 
efficiency with which resources are used, but also identifying those goods and 
services which don’t need to be produced at all. Such an endeavour is central to 
an economics of sustainability” (1998, p. 246). 
 
Dualist Vedic accountability does not recognise value for the production, 
promotion or sale of consumerist goods and services that only stimulate the mind 
and senses. Thus intangible assets, such as goodwill and brand names would not 
be recognised when established for increasing consumerism. Similarly, assets 
would not be acknowledged where they contributed solely to the production of 
consumerist goods. Furthermore, instead of recognising a positive value for the 
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sale of consumer goods, environmental and social costs would be taken into 
account as previous commentators have suggested. Smark (2006), for instance, 
identifies that the indirect costs of schizophrenia outweighed its direct costs by a 
ratio of two-to-one. Because such indirect costs went unmentioned in the 
Australian Public Health Sector’s financial statements, Smark appealed for a 
more social form of accountability to overcome the silencing of such costs. Peace 
likewise appealed for the inclusion of other human welfare considerations: 
 
“The preparation of a monthly electric bill from a fossil fuel burning utility does 
not take into account the non-commodity costs associated with the impact of 
fossil fuel consumption on the environment, human health and other quality of 
life considerations (Rutherford et al., 1998). Accountants could develop 
procedures to calculate cost data on human health and quality of life effects 
from pollution” (2006, p. 793). 
 
Commentators such as Chwastiak and Young (2003) have identified many costs 
that are silenced in mainstream accountability – costs to the environment, the 
costs of treating animals as commodities, the costs of war and the costs of 
consumerism, but the Vedic paradigm identifies additional costs that go unheard 
due to an unawareness of their existence. The karmic consequences to actions are 
an example of an additional cost bought to light by the Vedic literature. 
Saravanamuthu (2006) describes the Vedic Law of Karma as the principle that 
every action has a consequence. Even materially, every action has an equal and 
opposite reaction – this is the assertion of Newton’s Third Law of Motion. As the 
fifth chapter described, though, from the Vedic perspective, the universe is 
comprised of material and conscious forms of energy. According to the Vedas, 
laws of action and reaction govern the conscious form of energy as well as 
material forms as. This is declared by Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gītā, where He 
states: bhūta-bhāvodbhava-karo visarah karma-samjñitah – “Action pertaining 
to the development of the material bodies of the living entities is called karma, or 
fruitive activities” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 8.3).  
An appreciation of the Vedic Law of Karma requires an understanding of 
the dualist perception of the material body. According to dualist philosophy, the 
body is a concentrated receptor of various nerves and senses awarded to the 
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living entity so that he may experience the reactions of his previous life’s 
activities.17 Even a superficial observation of the material body will reveal that it 
is predominantly a digestive system that supports the functioning of six senses 
(smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing and the emotions of the mind) which 
experience various forms of pleasure and distress. As Devamrita Svami explains: 
 
“The Vedic science of transmigration tells us that in the present human body we 
are undergoing the reactions from deeds of our past life. From that perspective, 
“body” means the embodiment of reactions to past karmic activity. Meanwhile, 
we are busy acting again – business as usual. That means, while we undergo our 
past karma, we simultaneously pile up new karma, which will greet us in our 
next birth. When the soul moves from the dead body to the new one, it is 
actually moving from a withered field of spent karmic reactions to a fresh field 
of ripe ones” (2002, p. 223).  
 
The Vedas enjoin that past karmic reactions that are experienced as enjoyment or 
suffering cannot be fundamentally altered through material means such as social, 
political, or economic measures. Therefore, from the dualist perspective, there is 
little worth in striving for material enjoyment that is already predestined, or in 
trying to repel suffering that is also sure to come – hence another reason why 
dualist accountability does not recognise value for activities ultimately intended 
for sensory enjoyment and overly-comfortable living. Instead, value is attributed 
to activities that are not material and are thus non-karmic – those intended for the 
satisfaction of the Supreme. As the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam states: 
 
tasyaiva hetoh prayateta kovido 
na labhyate yad bhramatām upary adhah 
tal labhyate duhkhavad anyatah sukham 
kālena sarvatra gabhīra-ramhasā 
 
“Persons who are actually intelligent and philosophically inclined should 
endeavor only for that purposeful end which is not obtainable even by wandering 
                                                 
17
 A review of the reincarnation literature is not within the scope of this thesis, but interested 
readers may consult the works of Stevenson (1974, 1987, 1997).  
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from the topmost planet [Brahmaloka] down to the lowest planet [Pātāla]. As far 
as happiness derived from sense enjoyment is concerned, it can be obtained 
automatically in course of time, just as in course of time we obtain miseries even 
though we do not desire them” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, verse 1.5.18). In 
addition to recognising the social and environmental consequences of producing 
and selling consumerist goods, then, dualist Vedic philosophy also identifies the 
costs for marketing goods that accrue further karmic reactions. As the seventh 
chapter will describe, value is instead placed on activities intended for the 
satisfaction of the Supreme, which are called akarma, that do not produce karmic 
reactions (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 4.18). 
Other religious contributors to the social and environmental accounting 
literature have expressed opinions on consumerism that run parallel to the dualist 
Vedic perspective. Anjum (1996), Khan (1991) and Lewis (2001) agree that 
Islamic scriptures prescribe a low-cost lifestyle based on simple living and a 
balanced pattern of consumption. They claim that spending patterns in Islamic 
culture do not follow the excessive consumerism typical of Western societies. 
Harahap, also commenting from an Islamic viewpoint, explains that the 
sustainability of human wellbeing as the focus of socio-economic development 
“requires economic organisation of life and thought, an ethical accounting of the 
flows of income and cost in the light of ethical considerations of production, 
consumption and use” (2006, p. 40). As Kamla et al. state: 
 
“The Islamic perspective on the business organisation is suggestive of 
accountings … covering the legitimacy of business trade (a kind of monitoring 
of the ethics of business activity, akin to ethical investment processes: harmful 
trade, when understood as such, being forbidden, Abdel Haleem, 1998, p. 8), 
whether the business is fulfilling its obligations to help the needy (it is an 
Islamic principal that wealth be shared in this context) and the negative impacts 
of the organisation upon the environment as well as the positive” (2006, p. 259). 
 
Similar to its Vedic counterpart, then, Islamic systems of accountability value 
goods and services according to their worth as prescribed by the Islamic 
scriptures, namely the Quran and the Sharia (Chowdhury, 1999; Lewis, 2001; 
Pomeranz, 1997). Such value is attributed via relevance principles, such as 
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materiality and decision usefulness. Lewis (2001), for instance, states that 
accounting information in an Islamic framework is considered relevant if it is 
related to Sharia requirements, and Pomeranz (1997) explains that decision 
usefulness from the Islamic point of view requires enrichment through the 
addition of Islamic ethical imperatives. Lewis claims that Islamic accountability 
impresses this principle across all accounting concepts: 
 
“Under Islam, the elements of financial position would include all items which 
are subject to financial evaluation, assets, liabilities and the residual benefits, 
based on the Holy Qur’an” (2001, p. 33). 
 
Thus it can be seen that the concept of including social, environmental and 
spiritual costs to encourage detachment from detrimental activities is not limited 
to a dualist Vedic theory of accountability, but has been suggested by other 
commentators. The primary Vedic method of promoting detachment from 
material enjoyment, though, is through providing the facility for rāga – 
attachment to higher spiritual taste, as is explained in the following chapter.  
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Chapter Seven: Interaction by Attachment 
Despite an expanding literature demonstrating that happiness does not increase 
with the consumption of material goods above a certain threshold, relatively little 
research has focused on how to motivate people to alter their lifestyles so they 
consume few resources (Brown and Cameron, 2000). Some have suggested that 
this will require a fundamental shift from self-interested, consumer-oriented 
values to a pro-social value orientation that motivates and fosters development 
and acceptance of economic and social policies aimed at curbing consumption 
levels in the interest of environmental sustainability. However, there has also 
been little systematic research on how to instil such values in society. In the 
sustainable consumption literature, though, Brown and Cameron (2000) have 
drawn on the work of Stern, Dietz and Guagnano (1995), to propose a 
behavioural model delineating the role of social values in guiding belief systems, 
attitudes, intentions, and behaviour. Brown and Cameron suggest that could 
provide a theoretical and empirical foundation to organise and evaluate 
economic, social, and psychological factors that determine consumption patterns. 
A modified version is reproduced below (Figure 1). 
As Brown and Cameron (2000) recount, social institutions (such as 
national laws, systems of accountability, market and incentive structures, 
educational systems, community structures, and social networks) foster specific 
social values that help construct general belief systems or worldviews regarding 
specific life domains, such as political belief systems or views about the 
environment. Such worldviews provide a picture of reality that filters new 
information, and channels and constrains the development of attitudes and beliefs 
about specific issues that in turn determine intentions and decisions to engage in 
certain behaviors. Brown and Cameron explain that behavioral commitments and 
intentions also are influenced by prevailing social norms and by the development 
of specific plans or strategies for engaging in behavior. Behaviors can often 
significantly alter the structure of social institutions, and thus these effects filter 
through the system (Brown and Cameron, 2000). 
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Figure 1. The Roles of Institutional Structure, Social Values, Worldviews, Attitudes, and 
Intentions in Determining Consumption Behaviour18  
 
According to this model, higher-level structures are more stable, less susceptible 
to transient influences, and more resistant to change relative to lower-level 
structures (Stern, et al., 1995). Worldviews, for example, are more stable over 
time and less susceptible to change as a result of moods, propaganda messages or 
social influences. Moreover, higher-level structures have a greater influence on 
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 Adapted from Stern et al. (1995). 
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lower-level structures than lower-level structures have on them (thus the bold 
downward-pointing arrows). For instance, a shift in a worldview (towards a pro-
environmental worldview, for example) will have a greater impact on specific 
attitudes (positive attitudes toward paper made out of recycled material, for 
example) than an attitude shift will have on worldviews (Brown and Cameron, 
2000). Within this framework, then, consumerist values are seen as a product of 
the structure and constraints of the prevailing socio-economic and accounting 
system, including the incentive structure advanced by the market and 
promotional messages. This consumerist value orientation, can serve as the 
organising principle for a general worldview or system of beliefs regarding 
ecology and the environment. 
When considering the prevalent consumerist orientation within the 
context of this behavioural model, it becomes apparent why individuals often do 
not support consumption reduction policies. Efforts to reduce consumption levels 
through penalties, taxation, boycotts and voluntary conservation of resources, 
have usually met only limited success (Aronson, 1990; Sagoff, 1988). Brown and 
Cameron argue that such programs generally attempt to motivate the public to 
engage in efforts to reduce consumption by changing attitudes about issues, such 
as choosing products made from recycled materials. Although consumers 
recognise and understand the information about the environmental benefits, these 
perceptions generally have only a small impact on decision-making. Instead, 
their environmental decisions appear to be determined primarily by perceptions 
of personal and monetary costs (DeYoung, 1989; Cameron, Brown and 
Chapman, 1998), a pattern consistent with a consumerist value orientation. As 
Stern et al. (1995) note, these programs will have little long-term impact because 
they focus on changing specific attitudes and beliefs about individual issues 
while ignoring the general worldviews, values, and institutional structures that 
provide the context for these attitudes. Attempts to induce change at either the 
level of specific attitudes and beliefs or commitments and intentions will fail if 
such changes are inconsistent with more stable worldviews and general cultural 
values. This theoretical model therefore suggests that interventions aimed at 
reducing consumption will be most effective if they can bring about higher-level 
changes in the socio-economic-cognitive system – by changing cultural values 
and worldviews.  
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To bring about a change in cultural values and worldviews, Brown and 
Cameron (2000) state that two essential conditions are necessary – challenging 
the consumerist value orientation and promoting an alternative value 
orientation. This thesis argues that a dualist Vedic system of accountability 
meets both of these conditions because it aims to provide individuals with a 
genuine spiritual experience instead of material luxuries. Such spiritual 
experiences are provided because the system recognises the performance of 
bhakti-yoga. Brown and Cameron state that any viable, alternate value 
orientation to consumerism must promote a pro-environmental belief system and, 
in turn, a willingness to support and adopt both voluntary and legislative efforts 
to reduce consumption levels. Bhakti-yoga can provide such a value orientation 
because by achieving a higher taste through satisfying the Supreme, the 
enthusiasm for unsustainable, materialistic pursuits is transformed into the 
enthusiasm for satisfying the desires of the Supreme. Properly supervised and 
applied, bhakti-yoga is successful at altering social values and worldviews 
because it provides a genuine experience of a spiritual reality which shatters the 
worldview that matter is the summum bonum of the universe, and that sensory 
pleasure is the highest goal one can aspire for.  
Instead of attributing a positive value to items and endeavours intended 
for sensual enjoyment, then, dualist Vedic accountability would recognise value 
in endeavours meant for the satisfaction of the higher principal Krishna. This 
chapter explains how it can attribute value to such activities in the following 
section discussing the concept of a higher taste. The latter sections describe, with 
reference to Vedic literature, what activities constitute as pleasing to God, and 
how they would be recognised as valuable in a system of accountability.  
 
A Higher Taste 
Some spiritual paths, such as Buddhism and Taoism, stress the need to eliminate 
much of the desire for sensory enjoyment to achieve sustainable lifestyles and 
consumption patterns. These religions derive this objective from a conception of 
the self that is null or void:  
 
“Buddha prescribed the eight-fold middle way consisting of right views, resolve, 
speech, conduct, livelihood, efforts, mindfulness and concentration to attain 
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freedom from desires. Ho (1995) points out that at the heart of Buddhism is the 
metaphysical position that denies the ontological reality of the self. This view of 
freedom is also prominent in Taoism. Lao Tzu, the founder of Taoism, wrote 
“Let people hold on to these: Manifest plainness, embrace simplicity, reduce 
selfishness, have few desires” (quoted in Bishop, 1985, p. 450)” (Velayutham 
and Perera, 1996, p. 69). 
 
Even outside of religious paradigms, some commentators suggest that, in the 
interests of stemming consumer culture, economics should adjust its conception 
of welfare so that only material needs are valued instead of endless wants 
(Kronenberg, 2007; Lintott, 1996, 1998). Dualist Vedic philosophy, however, 
does not maintain that the elimination of the desire for pleasure altogether is 
possible, especially in Western countries, where the conception of one’s 
freedom, as described by Velayutham and Perera, is liberation from external 
constraint, “so that he or she can make a choice and proceed to satisfy his or her 
own desires” (1996, p. 69). As Krishna explains in the Bhagavad-Gītā: na hi 
kaścit ksanam api jātu tistaty akarma-krt – “… no one can refrain from doing 
something, not even for a moment” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 3.5). 
Bhaktivedanta Svami therefore writes that to restrict one from sensory enjoyment 
is akin to restricting a diseased person from certain eatables: “The patient, 
however, neither likes such restrictions nor loses his taste for eatables” (1989, p. 
148). Buddhist commentators concede this, even though they advocate the eight-
fold middle way to attain freedom from desires: 
 
“However it is stated that human nature is such that people choose happiness 
over pain. Accordingly, people tend “to seek pleasure or happiness and recoil 
from pain or a source of unhappiness” (Majjhima Nikaya, cited from Jayatilleke, 
2000, p. 55). Thus contrary to some misconceptions that Buddhism is gloomy 
and renounces all pleasures, seeking happiness is not condemned (Jaytilleke, 
2000). What is encouraged is a change of focus so the seeking of happiness is 
not harmful to one’s moral and intellectual development nor, more importantly, 
does it preclude others’ search for happiness. The difficulty of pursuing such 
action is obvious” (Liyanarachchi, 2007, p. 24 [Emphasis added]). 
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Therefore, as Brown and Cameron (2000) state, researchers and environmental 
experts tend to reach an impasse here when theorising about how to reduce 
overconsumption. Rather than eliminating desires altogether, though, dualism 
advances that desire should be transferred from sensory enjoyment to the desire 
to satisfy the Supreme.  
Druhl et al. (2001) demonstrate that Vedic philosophy has a powerful 
effect on its practitioners and their surrounding environment, especially in its 
ability to withdraw the living entity from unsustainable desires. As previously 
described, the TM paradigm that Druhl et al. analyse is located in non-dualist 
Vedic philosophy, and hence does not accurately represent the dualist 
philosophy. Dualism asserts that its practitioners experience a higher taste 
because their spiritual reality is personal rather than impersonal. Thus enjoyment 
in dualist philosophy is significantly greater than that which non-dualist schools 
refer to.19 Therefore the examples that Druhl et al. provide will only partially 
illustrate the dualist conception of a higher taste.  
In any case, they recount that the founder of the non-dualist Maharishi 
Vedic Science predicted that in cities where approximately one percent of the 
population practiced Transcendental Meditation techniques, the quality of life as 
measured by crime and accident rates, amongst others, would improve 
significantly. Follow-up studies have tested these claims, comparing the changes 
in the FBI Uniform Crime Report Index for twenty cities where one percent of 
the population practiced TM techniques with a control group of twenty cities 
without the one percent level of practitioners. The former showed an average 
decrease in crime of twenty-two percent in 1973, compared with an increase in 
the latter cities (Dillbeck, Landrith and Orme-Johnson, 1981). A larger scale 
analysis of the relation between TM practice and crime reduction was undertaken 
in 160 USA cities from 1972 to 1978. It compared crime trends to those 
projected from a linear regression from 1964 to 1971, finding that the increased 
percentage of TM practitioners was a leading indicator for decreases in the crime 
trend – accounting for a reduction of about eighteen percent (Druhl et al., 2001). 
                                                 
19
 Śukadeva Gosvami testifies to this in the Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, stating: madhudvit-
sevānurakta-manasām abhavo ‘pi phalguh – “Krishna is so attractive that one can give up all 
desirable things for His sake. Indeed, even [non-dualist] liberation is considered insignificant for 
those whose minds are attracted to the loving service of the Lord” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1987, 
verse 5.14.44). 
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Druhl et al. have also claimed that such practices would positively effect the 
physical environment and have identified TM as a solution to the pressing 
environmental problems currently facing the world. Thus, even through non-
dualist Vedic meditative techniques, a comparatively small group of practitioners 
can significantly influence an area as large as a city. 
  The concept of a higher taste is not unique to the Vedic paradigm, but has 
been advanced by commentators from the Islamic paradigm as well. As will be 
described later in this chapter, Islamic accountability requires the Muslim to 
make certain sacrifices for societal-wellbeing to please God. As Anjum explains, 
such sacrifices also have a positive effect for the contributor themselves, and thus 
are recognised as a unique type of welfare by Islamic economics: 
 
“… a Muslim consumer experiences an increase in his own utility whether he 
consumes goods himself or offers goods he likes for himself to the other human 
beings for consumption. The marginal utility of a person … goes on diminishing 
if he consumes more and more … because the law of diminishing marginal 
utility applies when anybody consumes additional material goods for himself. 
However, the marginal utility of a Muslim … goes on increasing if he offers 
more and more of goods to other in the way of Allah because the law of 
increasing marginal utility applies due to ever-increasing spiritual satisfaction 
and reward from Allah associated with offering more and more material goods 
in the way of Allah” (1996, p. 68). 
 
Thus the concept of a higher taste is also acknowledged in Islamic economics. 
Dualist Vedic philosophy describes the means of attaining a higher taste by being 
held accountable to Krishna as a higher principal, whereby the consumerist 
propensity is subdued. The highest platform of sustainability, then, is the desire 
to satisfy Krishna – not an artificial attempt to abolish or lessen desires, for such 
efforts are neither satisfying nor sustainable. What constitutes God’s pleasure 
and how to incorporate this into systems of accountability is described below.  
 
Real Wealth 
Kasser (2002) suggested that people follow unsatisfying consumerist lifestyles 
because their psychological needs have gone unfulfilled. The Vedic position 
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concurs, and further asserts that people have spiritual as well as psychological 
needs that must be met for them to be completely satisfied. Due, however, to a 
lack of knowledge of his spiritual needs, man resorts to materialism. This thesis 
has presented that one can attain full spiritual satisfaction through the execution 
of the bhakti-yoga, but this is not something that can be done whimsically. As 
Devamrita Svami explains: 
 
“It’s not that anything you construe as wholesome and good is transcendental 
service to Krishna. Genuine love means that you inquire from the beloved what 
is most pleasing. That is true in the temporary, shadowy romances of the relative 
plane as well as in the eternal, lawless devotional love of the spiritual plane. 
Any ordinary, tiny living entity feels quite competent to explain what 
supposedly gives him or her satisfaction. Certainly Infinite Complete – Krishna, 
the source of all living entities – can perfectly do so. … Through the most 
comprehensive spiritual texts, Bhagavad-Gītā and Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, and 
through a chain of spiritual teachers who exemplify these texts, Krishna 
instructs us how to give genuine pleasure to Him, the source of everything” 
(1996, p. 41).  
 
In the Bhagavad-Gītā, Krishna states that He is pita – the father – of sarva-
yonisu – all species of life (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 14.4). Naturally a 
father is concerned for the welfare of his children, yet without knowledge of his 
spiritual needs, one cannot experience a level welfare higher than the 
maintenance of his temporary body and mind. Krishna therefore states in the 
Bhagavad-Gītā that anyone who tries to teach others of their spiritual needs is 
acting in the way that is most pleasing to Him (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 
18.69). Thus the Vedas describe that God is a person Who becomes inclined to 
those who inform other living entities of their spiritual nature and spiritual needs, 
and thus the dualist Vedic paradigm is deeply concerned with responsibility for 
the other. Attempts to spread the philosophy and practice of bhakti-yoga are 
therefore activities that are considered real wealth in a dualist system of 
accountability. As Brown and Cameron state, this principle of informing others 
of the particulars of sustainable living is consistent with the behavioural model of 
Stern, et al. (1995) for determining consumption patterns: 
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“Individuals need specific plans and strategies for reducing resource 
consumption. As research in other social domains reveals, simple dissemination 
of information may be sufficient to change attitudes, but it is not sufficient to 
induce behavioral change (Hines et al., 1987; Leventhal and Cameron, 1994). 
Individuals also need specific guides and strategies for reducing consumption of 
resources and for attaining a lifestyle of ‘voluntary simplicity.’ Ideally, these 
guides will not only provide realistic and specific suggestions, but they will also 
use role models to provide salient demonstrations that these techniques are 
effective and that this alternative lifestyle is, in fact, a satisfying and rewarding 
one” (2000, p. 37).  
 
Because bhakti-yoga stresses the teaching of sustainable lifestyles to others, it 
also fulfils Brown and Cameron’s criteria for a viable alternative to a 
consumerist value orientation. Furthermore, if the living entity differs from the 
body it is consistent that he should learn of the needs of the self. As 
Bhaktivedanta Svami states, much emphasis is placed on education pertaining to 
the body and the mind and how to maintain them but none on understanding the 
self as a part of God:  
 
“Generally, people are not educated in this confidential knowledge; they are 
educated in external knowledge. As far as ordinary education is concerned, 
people are involved with so many departments: politics, sociology, physics, 
chemistry, mathematics, astronomy, engineering, etc. There are so many 
departments of knowledge all over the world and many huge universities, but 
there is, unfortunately, no university or educational institution where the science 
of the spirit soul is instructed. Yet the soul is the most important part of the 
body; without the presence of the soul, the body has no value. Still people are 
placing great stress on the bodily necessities of life, not caring for the vital soul” 
(1989, p. 450).  
 
As Bhaktivedanta Svami (1989) further describes, to inform others of their 
spiritual needs is the greatest philanthropic activity. Many religious and non-
religious commentators advocate forms of economics and accountability that 
incorporate concerns for the material wellbeing of the other. As explained above, 
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the Vedas encourage bodily and mental health, but they also assert that concerns 
for spiritual health must be present because the real identity of the self is 
spiritual. To have compassion only for the dress of a drowning man is never 
considered adequate from the material standpoint. Similarly, responsibility only 
for the body, the dress of the self, is inadequate according to dualist Vedic 
thought. To be accountable to the other, one must recognise that both he and 
others are parts of God, and will be fully satisfied only when engaged in the 
service of the God. Hence dualist Vedic accountability recognises the value of 
efforts to spread the philosophy and practical application of bhakti-yoga. 
In either traditional or contemporary Vedic society, the communication of 
Vedic moral principles is a fundamental part of the social structure – as 
Kanagasabapathi describes, in ancient India, “ethical principles and higher values 
were taught and basic norms were advocated in society” (2007, p. 579). Moral 
principals were taught by a class of intellectuals called brāhmanas, who were 
thoroughly conversant with the Vedas, and whose full-time duty it was to guide 
the rest of society in their dharma (moral and religious principles) (Iyer, 1999). 
Since it was the full-time duty of the brāhmanas to know and teach religious 
principles, the rest of the social classes would support them with charitable 
donations – as Iyer describes, “Ancient India was notable in the practice of dana-
dharma (or the law of gifts) that stipulated giving ceremonial and ritual gifts to 
Brahmins and temples” (1999, p. 107). As Gupta (2007) further explains, before 
the third decade of the nineteenth century, merchant charity in India was largely 
given to religious organisations. However, since one qualification of a real 
brāhmanas is damah – self-control (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 18.42) – 
whatever charity the brāhmanas did not need above the minimal requirements of 
the body, they would give to the materially impoverished.20 Real brāhmanas 
never accept a salary – and in this way their teachings are not materially 
motivated or subject to bias. Thus both ancient and contemporary Vedic societies 
support a class of people who teach Vedic principles and guide the rest of the 
                                                 
20
 As Saravanamuthu (2006) describes, Svami Vivekananda argues that religious knowledge 
should be the subjected to the same methods of investigation as secular knowledge, because in 
the past the Vedas have been associated with religious rituals that have been used by the priestly 
(brāhminical) class to exploit the masses in India. Therefore this thesis makes reference to 
qualified brāhmanas – those who genuinely possess the qualities of self-control and 
religiousness.  
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population in the needs of the self. By giving charity and support to the 
intellectual brāhmana class, other social classes recognised God as the Supreme 
Enjoyer, rather than themselves. Thus they acted in their constitutional position 
as servants of God. 
Chanakya Pundit, a Brahmin intellectual who wrote the Arthaśāstra – an 
economic scripture – approximately two thousand three hundred years ago in 
India, described the role of brāhmanas in the ancient Vedic society. Chanakya 
Pundit himself exemplified many characteristics of a brāhmana as described in 
the Vedas – although he was the advisor to the King, for instance, he did not 
accept a salary and lived in very humble conditions. His economic scripture, 
‘Arthaśāstra’ can be translated as meaning The Science of Material Gain.21 It is 
one of the world’s oldest treatises on the economic administration of a state and 
is, supposedly, the first to describe aspects of accounting (Matessich, 1998). 
Extremely comprehensive, it provides guidelines for efficiently managing an 
aristocratic economy, discusses the ethics of economics, and explains the duties 
and obligations of a king. As wealth was vital to the state, the Arthaśāstra 
contains numerous accounting principles and concepts, which some 
commentators have likened to their modern day equivalents (Mattessich, 1998; 
Sihag, 2004; Bhattacharyya, 1988). The author, Chanakya Pundit, was not a 
Vaisnava however, and therefore, whilst his Arthaśāstra is a useful reference 
point, it cannot provide an exact working model. Nonetheless, Chanakya Pundit 
indicated that the societal growth in knowledge of moral principles – dharma – 
depended upon “knowledge-creating workers” (brāhmanas), income, and 
existing knowledge (Sihag, 2007, p. 21). Sihag drew the following equations 
from Chanakya’s descriptions: 
 
H0 = ∆H/∆t = LH + H + Y 
 
In Chanakya’s formula above, H0 is the growth in all disciplines of knowledge, 
LH are the knowledge creating workers (brāhmanas), H is existing knowledge 
                                                 
21
 ‘Artha’ translates to wealth and ‘śāstra’ means scripture, or science. However, as Kautilya 
(Chanakya Pundit) uses it in this context, artha has much broader significance than merely 
wealth. The material wellbeing of individuals is a better description (Rangarajan, 1992). Hence, 
The Science of Economics or The Science of Material Gain is a more accurate translation.  
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and Y is income.22 Sihag claims that Chanakya Pundit thought a determinant of 
Y, income, was HE, “the knowledge of economic principles and accounting 
methods” (2007, p. 21). The formula he gives for income, then, is: 
 
Y = A(GG, HE, M)*F(K L) 
 
Here GG is Good Governance. HE, as mentioned, is the knowledge of economic 
principles and accounting methods. M is ethical conduct – adherence to dharma 
– and F(K L) is the production factor.23 Since economic principles and 
accounting methods helped create income that was a factor of society’s 
knowledge of their dharma, it can be asserted that Chanakya Pundit did hold a 
place for accounting in Vedic civilisation and the promotion of dharma. He did 
not specifically identify income as a relevant factor to the creation of knowledge 
but the existence of the intellectual class depended on support from Y, income 
per capita: 
 
“With the coming of an agricultural economy, there came also the promise of 
economic surplus – the production of goods and services in excess of what was 
needed for survival. This is the condition of civilisation: the possibility of 
supporting a culture-creating class of professionals” (Drekmeier, 1962, p. 105, 
quoted in Sihag, 2007, p. 21). 
 
Thus it can be seen that brāhmanas, or spiritual intellectuals, are the keystones to 
Vedic accountability and sustainability, for they can give others access to a 
higher taste. 
 
Accounting for the Pleasure of the Supreme 
It is evident from the previous section that, by recognising Krishna as a higher 
principal, dualist Vedic accountability makes specific recognition of two items – 
the donation of charity to brāhmanas engaged in teaching Gaudīya-Vaisnava 
philosophy, and the endeavour to spread the philosophy and practice of bhakti-
                                                 
22
 Adapted from Sihag (2007, p. 21). 
 
23
 Adapted from Sihag (2007, p. 21). It should also be noted that Sihag himself neglects to define 
what the A stands for in the above formula. 
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yoga under the guidance of qualified brāhmanas. Such activities, according to 
Brown and Cameron, are required to install a culture of sustainability: 
 
“It is also essential to foster appropriate worldviews about environmental 
conservation [in order to promote pro-social and pro-environmental value 
orientations]. To do so, it is important to disseminate information regarding 
environmental principles and values in schools, the media, popular books, and 
the community at large” (2000, p. 36). 
 
It has been described that when accounting to a higher principal, dualist 
accountability would generally be contractual – though contractual accountability 
is not always necessary. As seen in Laughlin’s (1996) analysis of the Church of 
England, accountability was communal because there was a high degree of trust 
between principals and agents. In a contemporary Vedic society, then, it might be 
seen that amongst brahminically inclined persons with some practical realisation 
of their non-material identity, accountability would be structured in a more 
communal way. Accountability of a contractual nature, however, would usually 
be required where principals and agents have no realisation of their identity as 
separate from the material body, and are therefore unaware of their common 
interests, or how to fulfil them. Furthermore, for those with little jñāna and 
vijñāna – knowledge and realisation – of the Vedic paradigm, decisions must be 
made upon information attained via sense perception. However, the third chapter 
has already pointed out the fallibility of knowledge obtained thus. Therefore, 
without a solid understating of the Vedas, there is the need for contractual forms 
of accountability because of the potential for conflicting values between 
principals, agents and the higher principal. Similar thoughts exist in Islamic 
accountability: 
 
… man's knowledge about himself as well as about the universe is so limited 
and imperfect, due to his inherently limited observational and intellectual 
faculties, that his eyes can not see beyond a certain limit even in front of him. … 
In this situation man cannot be a rational person if he relies only on his personal 
limited knowledge. Rationality logically demands that man should behave on 
the basis of flawless sets of full information and instructions … This axiom is 
received through the institution of Risalah from Allah Who is the Only One 
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possessing perfect information. On the basis of limited wisdom, man cannot 
judge with certainty whether a particular thing is good or bad for him. … 
Fortunately, the institution of Risalah by informing mankind about Halal 
(permissible) and Haram (prohibited) goods, services and activities, provides to 
mankind in general and to Muslims in particular, a perspective of certainty about 
the consequent usefulness or harmfulness of an issue or activity or a commodity 
on the basis of principle of dominance of a good's utility over disutility” 
(Anjum, 1996, pp. 70-71).  
 
Because it draws upon scripture for these reasons, it is seen that Islamic 
accountability, similar to its Vedic counterpart, values particulars according to 
Islamic injunctions: 
 
“The concept of goods is also different in Islam. In Islam goods are bounties 
bestowed by God upon mankind. According to the Holy Qur’an, the 
consumable goods are those which attribute moral and ideological values to 
them (mankind). … According to Islam, consumer goods are useful, beneficial 
consumable materials whose utilisation brings about the material, moral and 
spiritual betterment of the consumer. Things which are not useful and prohibited 
in Islam are not goods in the Islamic sense. In capitalism goods are those which 
are exchangeable. But in Islam goods are those which are exchangeable and 
morally useful” (Chowdhury, 1999, p. 44). 
 
Because of the fallibility of sense perception, dualist Vedic accountability 
requires that a reporting entity describe how it is contributing to a culture of 
sustainability by making endeavours for the teaching of bhakti-yoga. In this way, 
dualist Vedic accountability allows people to utilise their natural tendencies and 
proclivities to advance a pro-social and pro-environmental value orientation.  
By the direct teaching of bhakti-yoga, one simultaneously attains a higher 
taste and the experience of a higher transcendental reality, even having done 
nothing to gratify his senses. Thus, under dualist accountability there is the 
incentive for the inferior, material energy to be used for a spiritual purpose – 
consistent with the philosophy of acintya-bhedābheda-tattva. As described, this 
use of the material energy is called interaction by attachment. Bhaktivedanta 
Svami states: 
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“Every endeavor requires land, capital, organization and labor. Just as in 
business one requires a place to stay, some capital to use, some labor and some 
organization to expand, so the same is required in the service of Krishna. The 
only difference is that in materialism one works for sense gratification. The 
same work, however, can be performed for the satisfaction of Krishna, and that 
is spiritual activity. If one has sufficient money, he can help in building an office 
or temple for propagating Krishna consciousness. Or he can help with 
publications. There are various fields of activity, and one should be interested in 
such activities. If one cannot sacrifice the results of his activities, the same 
person can still sacrifice some percentage to propagate Krishna consciousness. 
This voluntary service to the cause of Krishna consciousness will help one to 
rise to a higher state of love for God, whereupon one becomes perfect” (1989, p. 
642). 
 
As described above, such service must be conducted under the supervision of 
qualified brāhmanas – for even in a material sense, specialised work must be 
conducted under the direction of an expert to yield the desired result. As 
Bhaktivedanta Svami alludes in the above, if one cannot directly teach the 
philosophy and practice of bhakti-yoga, then they can provide some indirect 
support or donation. This would also be recognised by dualist Vedic 
accountability. Indeed, a similar form of charity is already acknowledged under 
Islamic accountability. Like the Vedic position, the Islamic conception of wealth 
is that God entrusts any assets acquired by man upon him, and man has no 
absolute ownership of them (Lewis, 2001; Loqman, 1999). Therefore the Muslim 
is required under Islam to give a type of charity called zakat, which in essence 
means almsgiving (Khan, 1991). Zakat is an obligatory financial levy on all 
surplus wealth and agricultural income of Muslims, and is the most important 
instrument in Islamic societies for redistributing wealth. As Lewis recounts, 
zakat forms an integral part of Islamic accountability, and its main purpose is to 
give financial aid to the needy: 
 
“This religious levy is applied to the initial capital of the bank, on the reserves, 
and on the profits while a major social purpose is to moderate social variances in 
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Islamic society, and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material 
life in dignity and contentment” (2001, p. 116).  
 
Zakat, as with the charity given to brāhmanas, is not simply a material practice, 
but is designed to advance one in spiritual realisation. As Lewis describes: 
 
“The significance of zakat in Islam is different from a welfare programme, and 
zakat is different from a tax as it is understood today. A tax in a modern society 
is an obligation of individuals and other entities toward the state, whereas zakat 
is an obligation of a Muslim not only to society and the state, but also to Allah. 
In other words zakat is not merely a ‘contribution’, but also a ‘due’ or a ‘claim’. 
A person paying zakat is not primarily doing a favour to the recipient or 
beneficiary of zakat, but is rather meeting a claim on himself by purifying 
wealth. Of course, the same is true of a Muslim who eschews interest. Neither 
obligation can be judged in earthly terms alone” (2001, pp. 116-117).  
 
As the purpose of charity in Vedic culture is to support the promotion of bhakti-
yoga, like the Islamic zakat, it is described as advancing one spiritually as well, 
for it is given with the intention of satisfying the higher principal, Krishna.  
The unique feature of dualist Vedic accountability is that the higher 
principal Who is recognised is the summum bonum of existence. Thus, being 
parts of Krishna themselves, it is in the common interests of the mundane 
principal and agent to be concerned with the interests of the Supreme. Where this 
is not firmly realised or properly understood there is potential for conflict of 
interests, and thus dualist accountability would be contractual. Furthermore, 
because the higher principal is the summum bonum of existence, dualist Vedic 
accountability satisfies Shearer’s concern for broadening accountability to the 
other. By taking responsibility for the spiritual wellbeing of the other and 
informing them of their spiritual needs, one experiences and disseminates a 
higher taste that fulfils Brown and Cameron’s (2000) requirements for reducing 
overconsumption. Such a higher taste simultaneously challenges present 
consumerist value orientations and promotes a viable alternative orientation that 
is pro-social and pro-environmental. This experience of a higher taste is a unique 
contribution that dualist Vedic philosophy brings to the sustainability literature. 
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While other commentators from the Islamic and non-dualist Vedic paradigms 
have mentioned similar concepts of a higher taste, few have advanced them as a 
method for changing worldviews and social values. The dualist Vedic philosophy 
and its theory of accountability has the potential, if combined with enough 
empirical demonstration, to dig the foundations for an entirely new paradigm of 
thought.  
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Chapter Eight: Dualist and Non-Dualist Accountability 
At the outset of this thesis it was declared dualist and non-dualist theories of 
sustainable accountability would be compared: how does a dualist theory of 
accountability, represented by the Gaudīya-Vaisnava school of Vedic philosophy, 
differ to the non-dualist theory of the Ghandi-Vedic paradigm, as presented by 
Saravanamuthu (2006)? A summary of these two philosophies and their theories 
of sustainable accountability is presented in Table 1 at the end of this section. 
The second section then compares both theories of accountability with respect to 
Saravanamuthu’s (2007) case study of the Riverlands citrus industry.  
As described in Chapter Four, Saravanamuthu’s (2006) Gandhi-Vedic 
method of accountability seeks reflexive responses through increased 
transparency. Gandhi-Vedic accountability was likened to Roberts’ socialising 
forms of accountability, as both through mutual understanding, reach a point of 
common interest (Roberts, 1991). Saravanamuthu (2007) has likened this 
satyagrahic accountability to the sustainability efforts of the MESH blockies in 
the Riverlands citrus community in South Australia. The blockies formulated a 
vision of communicative action based on techniques such as the collection of the 
most sustainable horticultural practices, the compilation of a manual of best 
practices and reviews by internal and external auditors. All these techniques, 
Saravanamuthu (2007) explains, increase the chance of a rational discourse 
between the citrus producers and their customers. Thus the blockies envisioned 
that their customers would view citrus produce as a product rather than a 
commodity, for a product has a story (of sustainable growing) behind it. 
Saravanamuthu (2007) suggested that presenting environmental measures in the 
form of radar plots could supplement such communicative action, for radar 
plotting can minimise fragmentations of time and space (Saravanamuthu, 2006). 
These features, especially rational discourse, also characterise Roberts’ (1991) 
socialising forms of accountability. However, satyagrahic accountability is 
designed to find common interests in situations where one party maintains a 
stronger position – as Saravanamuthu states, “satyagrahic communicative action 
refers to the process of argument, reflection and legitimation of claims despite 
the unequal distribution of power” (2007, p. 7). Therefore, because of low trust 
relationships with the potential for conflicts of interests, such accountability has 
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contractual elements as well: rather than being left to their devices, under 
Gandhi-Vedic accountability agents would be required to fulfil additional 
reporting obligations to achieve ahimsic outcomes. 
From the dualist Vedic perspective, both satyagrahic accountability and 
MESH’s vision of communicative action illustrate the non-dualist conception of 
the self – fully competent to reach a conclusion and satisfy oneself through 
rational discourse. While such accountability significantly extends accountability 
to the other through increased reflexivity (or spiritual interconnectedness), it does 
not recognise a higher principal that the mundane principals and agents are 
responsible to. From the standpoint of dualist Vedic philosophy, the satisfaction 
of common interests and attainment of ahimsic outcomes require an 
understanding that the self is not the material body but part of a higher principal 
– Krishna. Without knowledge of these two factors, actions cannot be classified 
as in the interests of both (or either) parties, and neither can such actions be 
regarded as non-violent or responsible for the other, for ultimately one will take 
common interests to be the gratification of the mind and senses. Thus by 
accepting Krishna as a higher principal, dualist Vedic accountability has a 
different understanding of non-violence. As Bhaktivedanta Svami states: 
 
“Ahimsā, nonviolence, means that one should not do anything which will put 
others into misery or confusion. Material activities that are promised by so many 
politicians, sociologists, philanthropists etc., do not produce very good results 
because the politicians and philanthropists have no transcendental vision; they 
do not know what is actually beneficial for human society. Ahimsā means that 
people should be trained in such a way that the full utilization of the human 
body can be achieved. The human body is meant for spiritual realisation, so any 
movement or any commissions which do not further that end commit violence 
on the human body. That which furthers the future spiritual happiness of the 
people in general is called nonviolence” (1989, p. 511). 
 
It is this acknowledgement of a higher principal that is the central difference 
between the two theories of Vedic accountability, and from this difference 
several other distinctions arise. Alongside a different understanding of non-
violence, dualist Vedic accountability has a different view of how to generate the 
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most sustainable behaviours and patterns of consumption. By acknowledging 
Krishna as the higher principal, dualist accountability provides the opportunity to 
experience a higher taste, by which one simultaneously becomes detached from 
lower forms of pleasure and enjoys a completely different worldview and set of 
values. By not recognising any responsibility to a higher principal, Gandhi-Vedic 
accountability attempts to reach sustainable outcomes through rational discourse. 
However, without recognising Krishna as the higher principal, the highest 
pleasure that Gandhi-Vedic accountability can appeal to is sensory enjoyment. 
Therefore non-dualist Vedic accountability is not as effective as the dualist at 
changing social values and worldviews.  
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Table 1. Comparison between Dualist and Non-dualist Philosophy and Theories of 
Sustainable Accountability 
  
 
Faction of Vedic Philosophy Point for 
Comparison Non-Dualist Dualist 
Conception of the 
Self One with God. Part of God. 
Conception of 
God 
Brahman: the impersonal 
sum of all material energy. 
Krishna: the summum 
bonum, or the personal 
source of all energies. 
Ultimate 
Philosophical 
Goal 
Realisation of the non-
difference of the self with 
brahman. 
Unmotivated service to 
Krishna (love of God). 
Conception of 
Sustainability 
Achievement of common 
interests and ahimsic (non-
violent) outcomes. 
Detachment from material 
enjoyment and attachment 
to the satisfaction of 
Krishna. 
Method for 
Achieving 
Sustainable 
Outcomes 
Satyagraha – the socio-
political discourse whereby 
common interests are 
reached through rational 
dialogue. 
A higher taste for Krishna’s 
pleasure attained via bhakti-
yoga. 
Higher Principal None recognised. Krishna, the summum bonum of all energies. 
Techniques for 
Sustainable 
Accountability 
Techniques that establish a 
rational dialogue between 
parties. Examples are 
customised accountability, 
the minimised 
dichotomisation between 
means and ends, increased 
reflexivity, forward-looking 
accountability and radar 
plotting. 
Recognition of value for the 
direct teaching and practice 
of bhakti-yoga, or the 
indirect teaching through 
the support of qualified 
brāhmanas. 
Nature of 
Accountability 
Contractual, but with some 
similarity between the 
characteristics and goals of 
social forms of 
accountability. 
Mostly contractual, though 
possibly communal for 
those conversant and 
experienced in dualist Vedic 
philosophy and culture. 
Method for 
Achieving 
Greater 
Accountability to 
the Other 
Increased reflexivity, or the 
conception of spiritual 
interconnectedness. 
Responsibility for the 
other’s spiritual welfare is 
required in order to satisfy 
Krishna. 
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The Riverlands Citrus Industry 
With its theory of social change dependent upon communicative action, 
Saravanamuthu (2007) states that satyagrahic accountability is better illustrated 
from an analysis of the agricultural industry, rather than the manufacturing – thus 
her case study of the Riverlands citrus industry. She states: 
 
“The agricultural sector has been deliberately chosen to formulate a vehicle of 
accountability (through the reiterative process of theory shaping practice, and 
vice versa) for the following reasons: firstly there is a more direct relationship 
between the farmer’s action/inaction and the socio-environmental consequences 
than in a manufacturing business. Secondly, agriculture is often sequestering 
carbon dioxide through the cultivation of crops, or the reduction in land 
clearing” (Saravanamuthu, 2007, p. 10).  
 
However, because of its focus on cultivating sustainable desires, a dualist theory 
of sustainable accountability can be equally demonstrated from an analysis of the 
manufacturing industry. Depending upon the specifics of what a manufacturing 
business produces, it will facilitate the cultivation of either sustainable or 
consumerist desires within society, and therefore there is a strong relationship 
between action/inaction and the socio-environmental consequences of such an 
industry – contrary to what Saravanamuthu (2007) suggests. At the 
manufacturing level of a citrus industry, for example, produce may not always be 
regarded as an economic good by dualist Vedic accountability if it is meant only 
to cultivate consumerist desires, without regard for the health of the body or the 
non-material identity of the self. Many soft drink manufacturers, for instance, 
add large quantities of refined sugar to reconstituted citrus juices to give them 
more appealing taste, yet this is widely understood by nutritionists to be 
detrimental to the health of the physical and mental bodies of customers. 
Retailers nonetheless advertise that such products will endow one with pleasure 
and satisfaction – or social repute – and such manufacturers and retailers are not 
required to account for the detrimental consequences of consuming such goods, 
just as Smark (2006) noted that indirect costs of schizophrenia go unaccounted. 
Holford states: 
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“Refining foods makes them last, which makes them more profitable but at the 
same time deficient in essential nutrients. The food industry has gradually 
conditioned us to eat sweet foods. Sugar sells, and the more of it we eat the less 
room there is for less sweet carbohydrates. As our lives speed up we spend less 
time preparing fresh food and become ever more reliant on ready-meals from 
companies more concerned with their profit than our health” (1997, p. 27). 
 
Dualism readily acknowledges that the consumption of such beverages is 
detrimental to the health of the material body, and it encourages businesses being 
held accountable for such costs. However, more serious than the cost to the 
material body is that the marketing of such goods socially conditions people to 
believe that simply by entertaining the senses of the body, they will be satisfied. 
As the Coke-a-Cola Company states in its annual review, for instance: 
 
“Fanta’s vivid advertising reminds consumers to live life in full color. These ads 
and graphics reinforce Fanta’s bubbly, fruity and bold taste experience. By 
“amazing our senses,” we also enliven our desire for play and exuberance” (The 
Coke-a-Cola Company, 2008). 
 
Therefore, from the dualist perspective, one’s accountability needs to be 
extended to the higher principal Krishna, for unless this is done, the higher levels 
of wellbeing available through Vedic philosophy are forgone. Instead of 
recognising a positive value for the manufacture and retail of such goods, a 
dualist system of accountability would ascribe such actions with a negative value 
to account for their spiritual and environment costs.  
While a manufacturing industry provides an example where goods may 
not be considered valuable according to a dualist accountability framework, the 
agricultural industry affords the opportunity to promote Vedic philosophy and 
culture. Traditionally, Vedic culture was largely rural and agrarian, and 
contemporary Vedic societies follow suit. The Eco-valley in Hungary is an 
example (Eco-valley, 2008). It is founded upon the principals of dualist Vedic 
accountability presented in this thesis, and thus it is managed according to the 
advice of qualified brāhmanas and directly teaches the philosophy and practical 
application of bhakti-yoga. Given a goal of the Eco-valley is complete self-
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sufficiency, it has several organic fruit orchards, vegetable gardens and grain 
fields, and practices the ancient Vedic tradition of cow protection. Other features 
include independent waste water systems, ox-powered farm equipment and 
electricity, where required, is generated from solar panels and small windmills. 
Being accountable to Krishna as a higher principal, the Eco-valley shares its 
philosophy and experiences with a diverse range of audiences. For this purpose, 
in 2007 the community established a foundation called the Applied Ecological 
Sustainability Research Institute (formerly the Sustainability Sciences Research 
Institute). Through the Eco-Valley Programme (EVP) – the main programme of 
the foundation – the community collaborates with research institutes, 
universities, colleges, intellectual workshops, government organisations and 
leading scientists. The EVP includes scientific conferences, a network of 
educational centres, educational paths, courses, and versatile communication 
systems, so that other communities can start developing self-sufficient farms. An 
ecological and life-style training centre situated in the Eco-valley itself attracts 
up to fifty thousand visitors annually. Because of their focus on teaching Vedic 
sustainability practices, there is little doubt in the minds of visitors, consumers or 
regulators that the Valley’s produce is grown in a sustainable, organic way – thus 
the goal of MESH is achieved by dualist Vedic accountability.  
While the Riverlands community is likely to be highly context-specific as 
to whether it could adopt similar features of dualist accountability, the Hungarian 
Eco-Valley serves as an example of dualist Vedic accountability in an 
agricultural environment. Alternatively, instead of directly promoting 
sustainability through the teaching of Vedic culture, the industry’s participants 
could promote it indirectly, by supporting those who are directly teaching bhakti-
yoga. The Coke-a-Cola Company, for instance, present their endeavours to 
promote sustainable development in their annual review, stating that in 2006 and 
2007 they invested nearly one hundred million dollars in community programs 
such as environmental stewardship, HIV/AIDS prevention and awareness, 
disaster relief, the promotion of physical activity and education (The Coke-a-
Cola Company, 2008). If it is possible to report donations and endeavours made 
for material wellbeing, then it is also possible to report contributions that 
companies give to spreading the philosophy and practice of bhakti-yoga. In these 
ways, the Riverlands citrus industry could adopt dualist Vedic accountability and 
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promote a culture of sustainability by making the higher taste of satisfying the 
Supreme available to others.  
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Chapter Nine: Operational Feasibility and Research Implications 
The Vedic literature recognises that to become self-satisfied via the non-dualist 
method is klesah adhika-tarāh – “very troublesome” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 
1989, verse 12.5). This is because it is difficult to maintain attachment and 
concentration upon something impersonal. As such, Saravanamuthu (2006) has 
not recommended the process of self-satisfaction via the non-dualist method but 
instead put forward Gandhi’s advaitic method of satyagraha. As Bhaktivedanta 
Svami (1989) describes, though, the personal method for attaining a higher taste 
is not difficult, for it is natural for the living entity. Furthermore, as Krishna 
explains in the Bhagavad-Gītā, one does not require any material qualification to 
achieve His satisfaction – even if an offering is not materially impressive, as long 
as it is made with bhakti, devotion, it is pleasing to Him: 
 
patram puspam phalam toyam 
yo me bhaktyā prayacchati 
tad aham bhkty-upahrtam 
aśnāmi prayatātmanah 
 
“If one offers Me with love and devotion a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water, I will 
accept it” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1989, verse 9.26). Specifically stating that He 
will accept insignificant and easily available (vegetarian) items, Krishna declares 
that His satisfaction does not depend upon material extravagance, although this 
does not exclude one from making Krishna offerings of utmost extravagance. 
Not being dependent upon material qualifications, bhakti-yoga forms a 
sustainable foundation for a theory of accountability, for if Krishna can be 
satisfied with insignificant resources, so too can His parts that make the offering. 
While the application of dualist accountability might be relatively simple 
at the personal level, its practical application at the organisational or institutional 
level would first require societal appreciation of the benefits of Vedic culture, 
and an understanding of how it is non-sectarian – how regardless of one’s beliefs, 
its correct application will yield the promised result. This thesis has been written 
to stimulate interest in the Vedic paradigm but it acknowledges that, for the 
majority of the world, to implement such a system of accountability at an 
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institutional level, many more real life examples of the benefits and practicality 
of Vedic culture are required. Therefore this thesis suggests that where Vedic 
philosophy makes claims its potential for sustainability, these should be subject 
to further research. As discussed earlier, there is already work documenting the 
benefits of non-dualist Vedic and Buddhist philosophy (Druhl et al., 2001; 
Inayatullah, 2005). Similar studies are warranted to investigate the tangible 
benefits of the dualist philosophy, especially where dualist Vedic accountability 
has been successfully implemented. This is an initiative shared by economists 
who support sustainable consumption: 
 
 “Economists also can collaborate in research exploring the consumption 
patterns of communities that already practice or encourage simplified living. 
Although there are religious and communal groups that strive to practice 
environmentally responsible lifestyles, their efforts rarely make their way into 
economic discussions of resource consumption. Studies of such groups would 
provide important insights into their economic behaviors, social dynamics and 
quality of life and how they differ from those of a traditional consumer society. 
As such, these studies may lead to insights regarding potential institutional 
mechanisms for promoting resource sustainability” (Brown and Cameron, 2000, 
p. 39).  
 
Given current social and environmental problems and the solutions offered in the 
Vedas, a dualist theory of Vedic accountability presents many research 
possibilities of critical importance. There are beginnings of such research, with 
Wolf (1999) suggesting that the tri-guna model presented by Krishna in the 
fourteenth chapter of the Bhagavad-Gītā represents a valid framework for 
understanding human psychology.  
It may be suggested, though, that while some parts of dualist Vedic 
accountability are far from being institutionalised, other aspects are extremely 
practical. The selective valuation of consumerist goods and services described in 
the sixth chapter, for example, has been recommended for years by 
environmental economists, based on the strength of psychological findings. As 
Lintott states: 
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“It may also be argued that, even if desirable, reducing consumption is 
infeasible or utopian. However this appears so largely because of the assumed 
relation between consumption and welfare, an assumption that has been strained 
by two decades in which growth has been accompanied by high unemployment 
and increasing poverty… However that may be, it is ‘sustainable growth’ which 
is unrealistic, along with the idea that it is the most efficient way to promote 
welfare. The possibilities for reducing consumption while maintaining welfare, 
and not illusions about saving the environment while increasing consumption, 
should be the focus of ecological economics” (1998, p. 247). 
 
Following Brown and Cameron, a greater awareness of what does not cause 
happiness can be one of the first steps toward a higher level of accountability:  
 
“Developing acceptable methods for resource allocation will require extensive 
work by environmental scientists, economists, and other social scientists. 
Although it is likely such methods will be developed, they may not be available 
for many years. Until then, society needs to develop consumption strategies that 
are likely to promote environmental sustainability in the absence of definitive 
solutions to these problems. Strategies such as adopting simplified lifestyles that 
involve general reductions in resource use may prove to be the most viable and 
effective strategies for the near future” (2000, p. 30). 
 
Furthermore, while a nationwide adoption of dualist Vedic accountability may 
yet be far off, social studies infer that some organisations, already having an 
environmentally friendly orientation, would be willing to adopt a dualist Vedic 
framework. Research on social values and cultural ethics (Inglehart, 1990; 
Schwartz, 1992; Stern et al., 1995) indicate that a consumerist value orientation 
is not the only ethic held by members of Western societies. These studies have 
indicated that a growing trend toward post-materialist, altruistic, and ecological 
values in Western countries may reflect an alternative value system that 
promotes simplified lifestyles and lower consumption. Social scientists have 
observed two distinctive classes of values systems amongst members of Western 
societies. The first class has been branded as materialistic (Inglehart, 1990), self-
enhancing (Schwartz, 1992) or egocentric (Stern et al., 1995) as it places 
importance on wealth, social power, authority, and control – values which 
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closely correspond with a consumerist orientation. The second class of values, 
have been labelled post-materialistic (Inglehart, 1990), self-transcending 
(Schwartz, 1992), social-altruistic, or biospheric (Stern et al., 1995). This value 
system is instead orientated towards nonmaterial goals such as social justice, 
preservation of the environment, a world of beauty, self-esteem, cooperation and 
altruism (Brown and Cameron, 2000). It is suggested here that organisations 
adhering to the second class of values may be more inclined – if correctly 
informed – to adopt certain principals of dualist Vedic accountability. For those 
organisations, the Vedic worldview and ethical values are not so far distant from 
their own, and therefore such organisations may be inclined to experiment with 
the dualist theory of accountability. 
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Chapter Ten: Concluding Comments 
This thesis has described significant features of a dualist Vedic theory of 
sustainable accountability and compared them with a non-dualist theory. 
However, the term sustainable does not adequately describe a fully-fledged 
system of dualist accountability. The expression sustainability implies that 
humans can adjust their patterns of production and consumption, so that natural 
resources can be replaced at least at the rate they are being used, rather than 
being continuously diminished (Costanza, Daly and Bartholomew, 1991). This 
concept, though, fails to capture the potential for environmental conservation 
offered by a dualist system of accountability. The phrase accountability of 
abundance, or its like, would more adequately describe the dualist theory for, 
instead of simply replacing natural resources, under a well implemented system 
of dualist accountability, the entire ecological system thrives. This is related on 
several different occasions in the Vedic texts, and one such instance is 
reproduced in this final chapter.  
Rather than ascribing to the linear Judeo-Christian notion of time, the 
Vedas give a cyclic explanation of time. Indeed, the Judeo-Christian model of 
time embraced by most of the developed world also measures time in many 
cyclic ways – seconds, minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and seasons all pass 
through repetitive cycles. Rather than departing from the cyclic conception of 
time in periods of years, the Vedas describe a cycle of four reoccurring 
millenniums, which are comparable to the four seasons. The linear conception of 
time held by modern science runs parallel to the notion of human progress – that 
over time, humans advance their technology, standard of living, and 
understanding of the universe. Conventional Western doctrine asserts that 
modern humans evolved from other humanoid species approximately two 
hundred thousand years ago, and, since then anatomically modern humans have 
advanced many fields to reach the current standard of civilisation. The Vedas, 
however, instead of suggesting the evolution of the human race, present its 
devolution (Cremo, 2003). The Vedas describe that, millenniums ago, human 
beings were highly advanced in spiritual understanding and culture, and 
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consequently they were very satisfied and extremely powerful.24 As time passed, 
though, their finer qualities began to decline. When considering the current social 
and environmental degradation in the world, the Vedic suggestion of human 
devolution is a more compatible explanation of human history than notions of 
human progress.  
The Vedas divide time according to descending periods of human quality. 
Four broad categories called yugas, or ages divide these periods. These may be 
compared to the four seasons but they are more commonly compared to different 
metals, just as modern historians allocate different populaces to different ages, 
such as the Bronze Age and the Iron Age. According to the Vedas, the ‘spring’ 
age is called Satya-yuga, or the Golden Age. In Satya-yuga, which was many 
millennia ago, people were for the most part, self-satisfied, peaceful and tolerant. 
The following ‘summer’ age was called Tretā-yuga, the Silver Age, and in this 
yuga, most of the populace were brāhmanas – spiritual intellectuals. Although 
most people were religious, occasionally their performance was marred by 
ulterior motives, especially the desire for prestige. Nonetheless, people were free 
from excesses of lust and anger. In the next ‘autumn’ age, Dvāpara-yuga (the 
Bronze Age), people would commonly pursue glory and nobility. The population 
consisted of large numbers of the Vedic martial and administrative class. People 
would devote themselves to Vedic study as well as to accumulating extraordinary 
wealth, fame and power. Qualities like greed, self-interest and dissatisfaction 
were gradually becoming more prevalent. Finally, the present age known as Kali-
yuga – the Iron Age or the ‘winter’ age – is characterised by a human population 
that is generally self-interested in behaviour, materialistic, and dissatisfied. Five 
thousand years ago it was foretold that the qualities of the people in Kali-yuga 
would be influenced by the values of the capitalist social structure:  
 
vittam eva kalau nrnām 
janmācāra-gunadayah 
                                                 
24
 Consequently, the Vedas do not ascribe to Darwin’s theory of evolution, but hold that 
intelligent humans have existed on Earth for millions of years. This is not contrary to 
archaeological findings, for, outside of mainstream research, there are many documented cases 
where the remains anatomically modern humans have been found deeply embedded in layers of 
rock dated to be many millions of years old (Cremo and Thompson, 1998). A review of this 
literature is not within the scope of this thesis, though interested readers may refer to Cremo and 
Thompson (1994, 1998). 
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dharma-nyāya-vyavasthāyām 
kāranam balam eva hi 
 
“In Kali-yuga, wealth alone will be considered the sign of a man’s good birth, 
proper behavior and fine qualities. Law and justice will be applied on the basis of 
one’s power” (Disciples of Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1988, verse 12.2.2). Given the 
self-interested nature of the human populace in Kali-yuga, it is of little surprise 
that the world faces dire environmental and social problems. The Vedas, 
however, do not support the theory that since Kali-yuga is in effect, 
revolutionaries are powerless to effect change. Instead the Vedas encourage 
decisive action. The Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam, for instance, describes that through 
accountability to God, it is possible to attain a situation equivalent to that in the 
Golden Age, Staya-yuga. This was so during the reign of Lord Rāmacandra (an 
incarnation of Krishna), during the period of Tretā-Yuga:  
 
tretāyām vartamānāyām 
kālah krta-samo ‘bhavat 
rāme rājani dharma-jñe 
sarva-bhūta-sukhāvahe 
 
“Lord Rāmacandra became King during Tretā-yuga, but because of His good 
government, the age was like Satya-yuga. Everyone acted according to Vedic 
injunction and was completely happy” (Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1988, verse 
9.10.51). During the reign of Lord Rāmacandra, the populace was expertly held 
accountable via principles similar to those mentioned in this thesis. Because 
everyone was held accountable to God, everyone achieved a higher taste, and, 
consequently, a situation was created just like the Golden Age, where people 
were not interested in lesser, materialistic pleasures. And as the Bhāgavatam 
states, this was more than a sustainable situation: 
 
vanāni nadyo girayo 
varsāni dvīpa-sindhavah 
sarve kāma-dughā āsan 
prajānām bharatarsabha 
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nādhi-vyādhi-jarā-glāni- 
duhkha-śoka-bhaya-klamāh 
mrtyuś cānicchatām nāsīd 
rāme rājany adhoksaje 
 
“O Mahārāja Parīksit, best of the Bharata dynasty, during the reign of Lord 
Rāmacandra the forests, the rivers, the hills and mountains, the states, the seven 
islands and the seven seas were all favorable in supplying the necessities of life 
for all living beings. When Lord Rāmacandra, the Supreme Personality of 
Godhead, was the King of this world, all bodily and mental suffering, disease, 
old age, bereavement, lamentation, distress, fear and fatigue were completely 
absent. There was even no death for those who did not want it” (Bhaktivedanta 
Svami, 1988, verses 9.10.52-53). Therefore the theory of accountability 
presented in this thesis is not simply a theory for sustainability, but is a theory for 
plenty. As Bhaktivedanta Svami states, “A similar situation [to the reign of Lord 
Rāmacandra] could be introduced immediately, even in this age called Kali, the 
worst of all ages” (1988, Ninth Canto, p. 361). 
While the Vedic theory of sustainability might seem incredible, this thesis 
has argued that the Vedas should be accepted in academic discourse, not on 
grounds of religious belief, but on the strength of spiritual experience. One can, 
for instance, adopt the principles of Vedic accountability and experience a 
situation similar to Satya-yuga, the Golden Age, and in such an experimental 
way, study the Vedas. Archer et al. (2004) have similarly argued that the 
question of God’s existence should be allowed entrance into the academic arena 
on the grounds of spiritual experience, for all debates, they contend, arise from 
differing standpoints of experience. In order for spiritual experiences to be 
accepted as evidence of a transcendental reality, though, Archer et al. explain 
that a model must exist in academia that accepts that man can be influenced by 
the direct experience of reality. To this end, the critical realist model was 
suggested as making such an acknowledgement.  
The Vedas assert that there is a process that one may follow to obtain the 
experience of a transcendental reality, and this thesis began to describe it in 
stating that if one satisfies Krishna, they too will become completely satisfied – 
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even if having done nothing to satisfy their own mind and senses. To deny the 
Vedas entrance to the academic arena when there is a means of verifying what 
they describe imposes a standard upon spiritual topics not applied to their 
material counterparts – similar to when Aristotelian metaphysicists refused to 
look through Galileo’s telescope because they did not want to see their paradigm 
completely refuted in a glance. It is the aspiration, then, of the dualist Vedic 
philosopher, to see that what is currently viewed as a religion will come to be 
known as a science.  
Because of the contribution it can make to ecological economics and 
accounting, this thesis has asserted that a Vaisnava theory of accountability and 
sustainability should be heard in academia, in addition to non-dualist theories. 
Thousands of years ago, it was predicted that the Vedas would be “contaminated 
by the speculative interpretations of atheists” (vedāh pāsanda-dūsitāh) (Disciples 
of Bhaktivedanta Svami, 1988, verse 12.3.32). Now, considering the non-dualist 
theories that propose that man is God, it is possible to see the fruition of this 
prediction: 
 
“The universal religion that Vivekananda taught was a modernized form of 
Vedanta and Hinduism with its broad approach to Truth. According to “Practical 
Vedanta” none of us are limited or weak. None of us are fallen and in need of 
redemption. We are not sick, or in need of comfort or healing. We are not a little 
body or limited mind. We are not even souls or children of God; we are God. 
No, we are greater than God. We are, each one of us, the self of all beings. This 
entire universe of matter and mind is no more than our shadow. It is beneath our 
dignity as the master of the universe to be dominated by anger, fear or desire, to 
want anything or to be the slaves of anyone’s opinion” (Gupta, 2007, p. 644). 
 
However, it may be argued that if the living entity is “greater than God” (Gupta, 
2007, p. 644), then he should not be struggling for existence in the material 
world, trying for enjoyment in a body doomed to fail. The non-dualist will reply 
that the living entity is only temporarily covered by illusion, and that through 
yoga, meditation and service to man he can come to the enlightened 
understanding that he is God (Gupta, 2007). However, the dualist may then 
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respond with the statement that if God can be covered by illusion, then it is 
illusion, rather than the living entity, that is greater than God.  
While the Vedas should be accepted in academic circles, it should be 
understood that to give an authentic representation of the Vedas, one must 
possess certain qualifications. This same principle also applies in material life – 
to be recognised as an authority in any field, one must have an accredited 
qualification. Krishna declared to Arjuna that he would understand the 
Bhagavad-Gītā without misinterpretation because he was bhakto ‘si me sakhā – 
Krishna’s friend and devotee. Therefore, Krishna is explaining that He reserves 
the right not to reveal Himself in person to the challenging living entity who 
thinks that God should appear on his demand, and who lacks the qualification of 
bhaki, devotion to God. Even in the material sense one does not reveal personal 
aspects of himself to a stranger, but to a trusted friend, a sakhā. Therefore, to 
lack these qualifications and yet claim that God is impersonal, that God does not 
exist, or that man is God (or greater than God), is to impose on spiritual topics a 
double standard, a standard that one would not tolerate imposed upon themselves 
in a material context. This requirement for understanding the Vedas is often 
overlooked, yet it is the first and one of the most important principles in 
understanding the Vedas and in understanding God. Because this thesis is written 
from the Gaudīya-Vaisnava perspective, it offers an authentic presentation of 
Vedic accountability.  
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